Sierra Leone's post-conflict reconstruction: a study of the challenges for building long term peace

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ABSTRACT

The main purpose of this research was to understand the civil war in Sierra Leone and its antecedents, and to analyse the package of reconstruction reforms which came along in the post-war era and their relevance for and impact on the local challenges for longer term peace. Continued corruption among the political class, the persistent disenfranchisement of important social groups, and emerging tensions along political party lines suggested that, ten years on from the Lomé Peace Accord, there may have been a malaise in the peacebuilding plan.

To investigate the complex issues, and to support the hypothesis that the model for reconstruction was not best suited to local conditions and local priorities, the work first made a deep interrogation of the historic political, cultural and economic factors which led to the violent conflict. This scrutiny of the local experience allowed the conceptualisation of a germane 'framework for peace' which represented the most pressing priorities of the local community and the central challenges for peace. The framework reflected the main concerns of the local populace and was used as an analytical tool to better understand the relevance of the model for reconstruction vis-à-vis the local context. Through a critical analysis of the post-war reforms and their impact on the social dimensions of recovery, in particular macro-economic reforms and the promotion of democracy, conclusions were drawn about the appropriateness and efficacy of the model of reconstruction experienced in Sierra Leone and how it supported local priorities for peace.

The enquiry found that, in general, the model for reconstruction was not best suited to the local context because of its inflexibility to support the local peacebuilding and its many challenges. In some ways the model for reconstruction heightened residual tensions from the conflict because it failed to address key issues for reform such as governance and social justice.

Key words: peacebuilding, post-conflict reconstruction, democratisation, liberal peace, structural reform, Sierra Leone

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To the memory of my father, Jack

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACC	Anti-Corruption Commission
ACP	Africa, Caribbean and Pacific
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
APC	All Peoples' Congress
AU	African Union
CCP	Commission for the Consolidation of Peace
CDC	Chiefdom Development Committee
CDF	Civil Defence Force
CGG	Campaign for Good Governance
CMRRD	Commission for Strategic Mineral Resources, National Reconstruction and Development
CPI	Corruption Perceptions Index
CSAP	Civil Society Alternative Process
CSM	Civil Society Movement
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CWIQ	Core Welfare Indicator Questionnaire
DACDF	Diamond Area Community Development Fund
DACO	Development Assistance Coordination Office
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DfID	Department for International Development
DMO	District Medical Officer
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
EMB	Electoral Management Body
ENCISS	Enhancing the Interaction and Interface between Civil Society and the State
EOC	Election Offences Court
ESAF	Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
EU	European Union
GDO	Gold and Diamond Office
GovSL	Government of Sierra Leone
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
HIPCI	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative

HR	Human Rights
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDPs	Internally Displaced People
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Assistance
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IGAP	Improved Governance and Accountability Pact
IMATT	International Military Assistance Training Scheme
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-governmental Organisation
iPRSP	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
IRCBP	Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project
JSDP	Justice Sector Development Programme
KPCS	Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MOP	Movement for Progress Party
NACSA	National Commission for Social Action
NEC	National Electoral Commission
NEPAD	The New Partnership for Africa's Development
NEW	National Elections Watch
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NMJD	Network Movement for Justice and Development
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPRC	National Provisional Ruling Council
NRA	National Revenue Authority
NRS	National Recovery Strategy
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PC	Performance Criteria
PDA	Peace Diamond Alliance
PETS	Public Expenditure Tracking Studies
PFM	Public Financial Management
PIU	Project Independent Unit
PMDC	Peoples' Movement for Democratic Change

PMU	Primary Medical Unit
PPRC	Political Parties Registration Commission
PRGF	Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
PRSPs	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
RRI	Rapid Results Initiative
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
RUFP	Revolutionary United Front Party
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Policies
SC	Special Court
SLAF	Sierra Leone Armed Forces
SLMWA	Sierra Leone Market Women's Association
SLPP	Sierra Leone Peoples' Party
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
TRC-R	Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHDR	United Nations Human Development Report
UNPC	United Nations Peacebuilding Commission
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WFD	Westminster Foundation for Democracy
WGI	Worldwide Governance Indicators
YES	Youth Employment Scheme
YPP	Young Peoples' Party

INTRODUCTION

0.1 - RATIONAL FOR THE STUDY: PROBLEMATISING THE PEACEBUILDING

This research addresses the question: to what extent were local priorities for long term peace and stability addressed in Sierra Leone's model for post-conflict reconstruction? The purpose of the research is to discover what the local priorities were through a deep investigation of the conflict and its antecedents, and to provide a rigorous analysis of the efficacy and appropriateness of broad based international support for recovery and reconstruction in the context of the war history and priorities for building peace among locals. More specifically, the research presents an analysis of the interventions which influenced political and economic reforms to determine their impact on the social dimensions of recovery and their ability to address the challenges for sustainable peace. The focus on external interventions rather than local peacebuilding initiatives, NGO support for reconstruction, or other areas of reform, is because Sierra Leone was so dependent on multilateral and bilateral institutions and arrangements for the reconstruction of its state apparatus. The conditionalities attached to post-conflict support with regard to economic development and political reform are therefore key to understanding the shape of the new nation as it emerged after war and the choices made by political elites to progress the peacebuilding plan.

The aims of the research are important and relevant because, over a decade from the negotiated peace settlement, the promised dividends from economic restructuring and political reform have generally not been realised; unemployment levels are unacceptably high, basic service delivery remains poor and most rural areas are still badly neglected; basic commodity prices are persistently unstable and foreign investment has failed to flow. There remain high levels of mistrust of

governing elites among citizens and rising tensions among the populace suggest that peace remains in a state of deep fragility. The objective of this research is to better understand why this is so.

The politics of peace in Sierra Leone were determined by the norms and practices of contemporary international peacebuilding missions. Liberalising reforms, democratisation and civil society support were some of the central components of the statebuilding project but were not necessarily connected to the realities of post-conflict Sierra Leone - its complex political history, troubled national economy, deeply fractured society, and ruined environment. This work therefore investigates the progress of the reforms to determine what was achieved and what was not achieved, and the extent to which the model for reconstruction supported the longer term peacebuilding plan or influenced the disappointing outcomes outlined above.

The issues are complex and interesting and there are several possible variables which emerge to explain the problematic nature of the Sierra Leone recovery. For example, was the longer term peacebuilding plan too ambitious? The multiplicity of activities and broad reach of reforms commonly associated with contemporary 'transformations' may have put huge pressure on both external resources and local capacity. Were the resources for recovery sufficient; were the promises for support honoured; and was there enough local capacity to absorb the aid effectively? Did the activities, choices and decisions of peacebuilding actors, both local and global, hinder the progress of peace, or was the sequencing of reforms inappropriate? Was the programming problematic, particularly as it was devised with a Western state-centric approach and paradigm for peace? Did the three key projects of the post-war era – peacebuilding, statebuilding and nation building – add to the burdens of sustainable peace by blurring the objectives of the post-war mission and

missing the point of peace? The aim of this research is to provide a better understanding of the role of all these factors in securing longer term peace in Sierra Leone.

This work therefore presents a critical analysis of the role of international and domestic actors, and the influence of global and local structures, on attempts to build a peaceful nation. It is predicated on the supposition that the local society presents exceptional and nuanced vulnerabilities for the imposition of the current global model of peacebuilding and reconstruction, and that effective peacebuilding requires a sound understanding of the social history of war.

0.2 - OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH

The central argument is based upon the hypothesis that the most pressing concerns of the local populace in post-war Sierra Leone were not best served by the model for reconstruction. That the model was not well thought through in terms of local priorities for long term peace, and that the structures put in place may have inadvertently exacerbated some of the problems. It might be the case that solutions for peacebuilding in complex war torn states cannot be successfully constructed from outside because they fail in some way to address the challenges for peace.

The research is guided by five secondary questions:

1. What contributing factors led to the civil war?
2. What were the challenges and local priorities for longer term peace?
3. How did the peace process help to address the challenges?
4. What programmes of reform were implemented for the post-conflict reconstruction?
5. What impact did the reforms have on local priorities for peace?

The research is presented within six chapters and starts with a comprehensive investigation into the political history of Sierra Leone and the nation building project of the independence years to determine the complex contributing factors which led to the outbreak of war and the eventual collapse of the state. This investigation provides for a better understanding of the issues, their nuance and complexity, and exposes the particular vulnerabilities of Sierra Leone after war. It explains what the priorities for post-conflict reconstruction were, the many challenges involved, and the need to get the issue of governance right in the reconstruction to give long term peace the best chance of success.

In chapter two a close interrogation is made of the peace documents - the Lomé Peace Accord and supporting Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report (TRC-R) – to make a comparison between the findings made in chapter one and the package for reconstruction promised in the settlement, and to establish any synergy. Two further documents are examined – the National Recovery Strategy (NRS) and the UN's Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) – which are conceptualised as the 'blue prints' for peace. The analyses of these documents will reveal the proposals and frameworks for the reconstruction project, and their relevance for the local challenges.

Chapter three builds upon this theme by conceptualising the peacebuilding plan within a framework of statebuilding for security and development. This is because peacebuilding missions generally focus on the project of statebuilding. The chapter investigates whether the local priorities for peace could be accommodated in the larger statebuilding project and whether there was synergy between the promises made by government to externals and the promises it made to locals. This re-conceptualisation of peace involves the analysis of several documents: the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), the Government of Sierra Leone's (GovSL)

Letters of Intent, and the documents of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPCI). The analysis helps to identify any points of departure between local and global ambitions in the reconstruction project. This chapter also helps to understand the conditionalities which came along with post-conflict support and the structural framework for the operationalisation of reforms, to see how they relate to the peacebuilding challenges.

Chapters four, five and six represent the substantive body of evidence to support the central arguments. They present empirical data which reveals the outcome of key post-conflict reforms. Chapter four investigates claims for improved management of the economy brought about by broad based macro-economic reform to see how previous tensions around the share of resources were addressed. It engages with the government's pledge to give ownership of public goods to the people of Sierra Leone; in particular its pledges to redirect resources to impoverished and marginalised communities in diamondiferous areas, and to bring accountability and 'good governance' into the economic sector. The analysis helps to understand the role of economic liberalisation in the challenge of resource distribution and high unemployment.

Chapter five focuses on the post-conflict political process to determine the extent to which democratisation addressed old political fractures, provided for an inclusive society, and secured representative and accountable government for the populace. The central arguments are progressed in this chapter through a critical analysis of the efficacy of three key mechanisms of accountability - elections, the rule of law and civil society. An analysis is made of the role of both local and global actors in the process.

Chapter six reconceptualises the peacebuilding project by investigating the social dimensions of recovery - the nature of the new state and its relationship with

citizens. An examination is made of the impact of reforms on former marginalised and vulnerable groups to identify the character of the social contract which emerged after war and how it was distinguishable from the old. The character of the new state is compared to that of the state as it emerged after independence to determine how post-conflict reform re-modelled the levers of power to enhance the capacity of government to respond to its citizenry. The chapter concludes with an exploration of possible alternative structures for governance.

The concluding chapter explains the contrast between the needs of the local populace from their reconstruction project and what was delivered to them in the outcome. It summarises the findings against the theoretical framework and central hypothesis of the research, and explains its contribution to the body of knowledge on reconstruction in Sierra Leone. It moves the debate forward by taking a pragmatic approach to the issues which the research has raised, by suggesting areas for further research.

0.3 - METHODOLOGY AND ITS CHALLENGES

For reasons outlined above, this research is an inductive study which draws from the analysis of empirical data to form conclusions and enhance understandings about relevant theory in the area of peacebuilding. This is because the deductive approach to solving the problem of long term peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, - the application of pre-defined templates for recovery after war - is hypothesised here as being part of the problem (see Medawar, 1984:33). The study aims to contribute to the debate by deepening understandings of the complexity and diversity of the Sierra Leone conflict and the dynamic conditions of the post-war environment. The research is therefore a critical instance case study because of its depth of analysis and longitudinal focus, and because it investigates a universally understood assertion

(that of liberal peacebuilding) vis-à-vis its relevance for Sierra Leone. As a single case study, the conclusions are unique and any observations will be exclusive to it, but deductions may be drawn which challenge assumptions about the efficacy of the liberal model in the context of the collapsed state and post-war environs in other instances. The methodology for analysis of the peacebuilding environment may also be relevant elsewhere.

The theoretical component of the work is based on the review and analysis of primary data sources including the peace documents mentioned earlier and official documentation between the Independent Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the GovSL including the PRSPs, statements and resolutions from the UN, DfID and other official sources, and legislation. These are rich sources for data on the country's peace process and reconstruction project. Secondary data for the theoretical analysis is also of a qualitative nature and is drawn from official and unofficial documentation and sources including academic books and articles, surveys and reports, working papers, forecasts, local literature and news commentary. This broad base of evidence produces good sources of information on war history, political history and challenges in the post-conflict environment. Evidence is also drawn from quantitative secondary data, such as economic performance statistics, and from qualitative primary data collected from field interviews and observation.

In terms of the empirical analysis, the substantial amounts of material noted above are complemented by a qualitative approach to primary data collection which the flexible design of this study allows. This approach is important because the post-war period provides such a dynamic environment for epistemology, and the qualitative approach to primary data collection enables more nuanced understandings of the impact of peacebuilding on the various actors involved and also assists triangulation (Harvey, 1990, Kvale, 1996). The primary evidence is collected from forty semi-

structured and unstructured elite interviews with civil society organisations (CSOs), government ministers and members of the opposition (including the current president of Sierra Leone), and other members of the community. All but two interviews were tape recorded. They were coded and transcribed in full. The analysis did not involve any particular coding mechanisms but more a general summary of the issues raised which were of concern to the central tasks of the research. The outputs were stored electronically and in hard copy with the coding list stored separately, although most respondents were happy to have their names associated with their contributions. Empirical evidence is also drawn from observations during two official and two unofficial visits to the country (November 2006 and March 2007, June 2004 and May 2009 respectively). References to each source are indicated in the text. A list of interviewees and guiding questions can be found in Appendices 1 and 2.

Reflections on the methodology and methods

To achieve the aims of the study it was necessary to develop a deep understanding of the country's atrophy to war and state collapse involving a thorough examination of its political history, the socio-economic, cultural and regional dynamics of the war, and the role of the various actors involved. It required a sound understanding of what went wrong in the nation building project and what needed to be corrected in the peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. This was essential to understand the local challenges for peace. The selection of documents for this purpose was therefore crucial to the outcome of the research findings. The central quest was to locate the most legitimate local account of the war and the implications of that account for the reconstruction project.

The report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was identified as being the central source for this legitimacy because of the limitations and omissions of the

Lomé Accord, and the mandate in the Accord for the TRC to compensate for its shortcomings (GovSL, 1999: Article IV, 2(ix)). There were, however, strong criticisms of the Commission including its delayed launch and chronic lack of funding, its uncomfortable relationship with the Special Court and the selection of its key officials who were appointed by the president (ICG, 2002, May, 2006). Triangulation with other sources, however, substantiated the TRC-R as a rich source of data to support the arguments and theoretical and empirical underpinnings of this work, and which gives voice to the local priorities for peace.

There is an abundance of official documentation describing the conventions and conditionalities imposed on the GovSL for support in reconstructing the country, the impacts of those conditionalities in terms of local experiences and the implications for future peacebuilding policy. The focus of this research was generally on the documents which chronicled the conditionalities attached to financial and technical assistance (macro-economic reform) as well as documents which related to other external pressures around democratisation and its promotion. Positive assumptions were made about the veracity of the official documentation - the Letters of Intent for example - as it was impossible to unequivocally claim they were genuine representations of actual realities but only that they were the best sources available to work from.

The body of literature in terms of official reports, statistics, surveys etc. produced a wealth of empirical data to support the investigation on structural reform and its outcomes. The challenge, however, was to determine what was realistic to expect in terms of peacebuilding gains in such a relatively short time frame. After all, peacebuilding is a long term project. It is at this point that the primary data, collected from local citizens, is invaluable in supporting the evidence that suggested the new nation state was constructed on weak foundations and that external priorities were

somewhat contrary to local needs. This primary data greatly enhanced the exposure of actual realities at the local/global interface.

The sampling of respondents was not representative in any way but supported the exploratory nature of the study; sampling methods included snowballing, purposive and, in some cases, convenience approaches. A larger sample and more structured sampling would have improved the data base and more could have been achieved by taking this methodology into the provinces to determine the similarities and differences between Freetown and rural experiences. This would have extended the scope of the work to unmanageable proportions, however. The author has no knowledge of the many local languages in Sierra Leone and this also constrained the choice of local respondent. The political situation in the country, especially during the second field trip which was conducted at the time of voter registration, meant that certain respondents were very keen to take part in the research: opposition politicians, for example, welcomed the opportunity to vent their frustrations at the incumbent party's 'corrupt' or 'inept' systems of governance, and other respondents thought the opportunity to talk to a British researcher might have a positive impact on the redistribution of donor aid. A more critical analysis of these responses was therefore required.

Reflections on the field work

The approach to field work was exploratory in nature, the aim being to provide a better understanding of some of the issues affecting democratisation in the country and the nature of the relationships between external and local actors. Respondents were chosen because of their relevance in this regard. Civil society organisations were chosen because they were generally easy to access and because their responses would help to explain how civil society was being

supported vis-à-vis its role as a mechanism for holding government to account. The idea was to explore the extent to which local priorities for peacebuilding synergised with those of the international community. Parliamentarians and other political elites were chosen to enable a better understanding of how the system was working with regard to representation and the parliamentary process.

With regard to civil society, the first points of reference were the key CSOs which featured strongly in the peacebuilding literature on Sierra Leone: Campaign for Good Governance (CGG), the Civil Society Movement (CSM) and 50/50 Group, for example. Snowballing followed from these respondents. Access to parliamentarians was gained through contacts in the political studies department of the University of Sierra Leone (Fourah Bay College) who had good working relationships with colleagues in Peace Studies at Bradford. One or two initial contacts allowed further snowballing. A total of nine parliamentarians were interviewed including two ministers from the ruling party, six members of the APC and the leader of the newly formed PMDC political party. Not surprisingly, the most forthcoming were opposition MPs who had a lot to say about the practices of the incumbents but who also had very interesting comments to make about the parliamentary process.

Making contact with all participants was problematic. Due to the lack of a well functioning national telephone network, cell phones were relied upon heavily. It was common for locals to have at least two if not three or four cell phone numbers which allowed them to take advantage of the different charging structures of individual mobile operators, but this made contacting respondents and setting up interviews arduous and time consuming.

Field work was further challenged due to the difficulties getting around the capital. Taxi travel was the most convenient but severe congestion in most parts of the city meant a lot of wasted time stuck in traffic jams. Safe and reliable taxi vehicles were also at a premium and all drivers were regularly stopped by the police for bribes. Respondents themselves had transport issues getting from one location to another and, with heavy workloads, could sometimes only allow time for short interviews. In several cases (MPs), respondents had rooms full of local people waiting for an appointment. On one occasion, after several hours, the author had to leave for another appointment before the respondent became available for interview. Most interviews were conducted in extremely hot and uncomfortable surroundings; those offices with generator driven air conditioning drowned out some of the conversations and, in any event, street traffic made recording some interviews very difficult. Most were taped, however, and were transcribed using high quality audio equipment at the end of each day. This was quite an onerous task as some participants spoke English with very heavy colloquial accents and, coupled with the background noise of the city and generators, accurate transcription was a lengthy process. Waiting around offered other opportunities to talk to locals, however, and the author was well received by most people. At the time the UN still had a large presence in the country and many aid agencies were working in the area. Locals thought the author was part of the aid community and this may have explained the general attitude towards her.

Women were generally more forthcoming with information than men and appeared to be quite comfortable talking to the author. In particular, conversations about marriage and children (the author is a mother of three)

broke the ice on a number of occasions and helped to build some degree of trust with women participants. Younger male participants were more suspicious but the older generation were very relaxed and happy to talk about 'old colonial times' with the author. From broader discussions and observations, Sierra Leoneans seemed to fall within two general camps – those who thought the British should come back and rule once more, and those who thought the British had caused all their problems. More mature participants had fond memories of the British era and were most welcoming to the author as a British national, especially as she had some personal history with the country.

The urban bias of the field work was mainly due to time constraints and some safety issues; due to personal circumstances, the author was unable to spend lengthy periods in the field. At the time of field work, it was safe to travel throughout the country in terms of security but the road infrastructure was such that any journeys up country involved many hours travelling on dangerous roads and several overnight stays to avoid journeying after dark; Sierra Leone has no road lighting, road markings, traffic signs or signals, and unenforced legislation on vehicle standards makes serious accidents commonplace.

Despite the difficulties, good primary data was gathered in the field. This made a very useful empirical contribution to the work and helped to support the central argument.

Reflections on the scope

The potential scope of the enquiry is immense and justification for focussing on political and economic reforms has already been stated. It must be emphasised at this point, however, that there are other areas of enquiry which cannot be covered in this work but which have significant implications for the prospects of durable peace in

Sierra Leone. These include the reform of the armed forces whose problematic relationship with the state and history of coup d'état warrant further research to understand the impact of security sector reform on the local political process; a gender study of the role of women and men in peacebuilding and their relationship with each other post-war; grassroots attempts at peacebuilding, in particular methods of traditional justice and reconciliation; civil society as defined by the 'broader citizenry needs to be explored, and the role of religion in the peacebuilding project are just a few areas which require deeper investigation.

0.4 - CONTRIBUTION OF THE RESEARCH

There is a substantial body of literature in this area of research and the questions raised earlier, about the efficacy of liberal models for peacebuilding, are not exclusive to this work. Scholars and policy makers have engaged with the issues and produced various analyses on the subject (Newman et al., 2009). There is a lively debate around optimum sequencing of post-conflict reform, for example, the most notable being Paris' 'institutions before liberalisation' thesis (Paris, 2004), see also (Fukuyama et al., 2007, Mansfield, 2005, Krasner, 2005); or the importance of the role of local stakeholders in the peacebuilding process (Chopra and Hohe, 2004, Pugh et al., 2008b, Lederach, 1997); or the dangers (in terms of renewed conflict) of importing neo-liberal Western models of state formation into fragile, complex and war-torn states and societies (Paris, 1997, Kumar, 1997, Mansfield, 1995). Certainly, the ideological underpinnings of contemporary peacebuilding have been highly contested because they reflect a new form of Western interventionism compounded by the requirements for global stabilisation after the events of 9/11 (Bellamy, 2004). What results is argued to be a 'virtual peace' devoid of any real meaning to people living locally, which robs local societies of the capacity to self-govern (Chandler,

2006, Richmond, 2004). It is argued that this exercise in westernisation can exploit the weakness of war torn states attempting to recover in very challenging conditions (Jackson, 1990, Krasner, 2005, Keohane, 2003).

The discourse claims that peacebuilding is, in fact, statebuilding involving all the accoutrements of restructuring sovereign entities which can 'fit in' to the international system and enhance global security (Franks, 2009, Newman, 2009:29). In the case of Sierra Leone, there is evidence that peace may have been built upon such a narcissistic approach involving the reconstruction of the state by western actors to produce institutions of 'good governance' which mirror established industrialised democracies and which overlook the more complex needs of the local populace for living peacefully together.[1] Richmond describes these efforts as *peace as governance* because of the preoccupation of external interventions with governing structures rather than peacebuilding per se (Richmond, 2005).

The issue of complexity in the multi-dimensional, multi-sector, multi-level and multi-staged dynamics of peacebuilding missions has provoked further commentary (Lund, 2003). Critics claim that the whole process of liberal peacebuilding is ambitious and ambiguous with a plethora of different ideologies and mandates among the various implementing bodies which engage in peacebuilding missions – an area which has evolved into a professional field of practice (Chetail, 2009b, Barnett et al., 2007). These organisations range from world bodies such as the UN and the World Bank (WB), to regional organisations such as the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU), to multinationals such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and to bilateral government arrangements between individual states such as Britain's Department for

[1] For a discussion on western hubris in peacebuilding see Duffield (2007), Chandler (2006), Turner and Pugh (2006) and also the United Nations *A more secure world: our shared responsibility* (2004) available from http://www.un.org/secureworld/, accessed on 21/01/10

International Development (DfID) and the government of Sierra Leone (GovSL). The ambiguity of peacebuilding missions has been manifest in the different terminology used by the various implementing bodies; terminology determined by the way 'peace' is conceptualised and operationalised by the differing mandates of the diverse range of actors. These different conceptualisations have impacted on the coordination of peacebuilding programming but, more seriously, concerns have emerged as to whether there is actually a connection between external mandates for 'peace' and those of local peacebuilders (Barnett et al., 2007, Smith, 2004). For example, 'deeply rooted organisational mandates' tend to define the strategies for peacebuilding rather than the adoption of best practice which is born of empirical realities (Barnett, ibid: 53). Something of a crisis of identity for international peacebuilding missions has emerged out of this confusion (Chetail, 2009a, Cooper, 2007).

What these arguments reveal is the need for a clearer definition of the aims and objectives of peacebuilding missions; a definition which can address the contextually specific dimensions of peace because the central challenge is to correctly identify 'peace' in any given context (Mac Ginty, 2006). The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) conceptualised peacebuilding as follows:

> *Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritised, sequenced and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.* (UNPC, 2007: 2)

The contestations are many and this brief overview presents only a part of the wealth of scholarly material engaged with the vibrant and dynamic discourse on liberal peacebuilding.

There is, however, a dearth of scholarly material on single in depth empirical studies which can provide clearer definitions of what peace might mean in local contexts and how a more durable and positive peace might be secured. In the case of Sierra Leone, analysis has been mainly thematic. For example, Albrecht and Jackson have produced a lengthy evaluation of programming on Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) (Albrecht and Jackson, 2009, Ginifer, 2004); further themes include the role of the Special Court and traditional justice (Kelsall, 2009, Kerr and Lincoln, 2008, Boersch-Supan, 2009, Dale, 2007); the youth issue (Peters, 2006, Christensen and Utas, 2008) or the reintegration of child combatants (Denov, 2005).

It is at this point that this research makes a distinctive contribution to the debate because of the depth of its analysis of peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, in particular the role of liberal structural reform. It provides a unique addition to the body of literature in the peacebuilding domain. Scholarly analysis around international policy in peacebuilding, especially for individual case studies such as Sierra Leone, is uncommon. This is because the focus has been more on the mechanics of statebuilding than the local politics of peace (Zaum, 2007, Chandler, 2006, Pouligny, 2006). The research therefore provides an empirical study against an established and dominant theory (albeit confused and complex) of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction, and presents a sound analysis of the specific needs of Sierra Leone.

Effective conflict transformation requires analyses which emphasises the structural causes of conflict and which also dig deep to extract ‘context specific

knowledge' which can inform peacebuilding strategies (Goetschel, 2009: 101, Galtung, 1996, Curle, 1971). This is the sort of analysis in peacebuilding research which has been recognised by scholars as imperative to understanding the complexity and diversity of contemporary violent conflicts, and to improving understandings of the dynamics of conflict and peace at the micro-level (Goodhand and Hulme, 1999: 23, Luckham, 2004, Richmond, 2008). Richmond and Franks have tried to correct this dearth of context relevant research and literature by interrogating the outcomes of 'liberal peacebuilding' in five different environments – but none on the African continent (Richmond and Franks, 2009). Their volume is a step in the right direction but single chapters on complex case histories can only reveal so much.

This research therefore makes a useful contribution to the critical analysis of liberal peacebuilding and contestations already in the literature; it also complements the emerging debate around 'post-liberal' peacebuilding (Richmond, 2009b), and the possibilities for 'local-liberal hybrids' to compensate for what Richmond has described as 'backsliding' (Richmond, 2009a).

0.5 - CENTRAL ARGUMENT AND ANALYTICAL FOCUS

The central argument running through this research proposes that what Sierra Leone needed for building long term peace was not what it got when the state was reconstructed and that peacebuilding solutions are not successfully created from outside.

This argument complements the school of thought which claims that peacebuilding initiatives must have their political roots in local societies; that policy makers must engage in 'unscripted conversations' rather than assume peace is a normative concept by constructing solutions from outside (Pugh et al., 2008a, Duffield, 2007: 234). It develops the critique made by Chandler, and others, that

contemporary interventions after conflict present a serious disconnect between the demands of global actors and the needs of local people; that negotiation and policy making takes place between national and global elites, rather than local people and their government (Chandler, 2006, Richmond, 2008, Ignatieff, 2003). This is significant for this study because international peacebuilding endeavours claim that models for reconstruction are inclusive and that ownership of the process is located with the masses (Easterly, 2006, GovSL and IMF, 2008, UN, 2007, Stiglitz, 1998).

The research develops conclusions by Pugh (et al) that a 'paradigmatic shift' is required in the 'negotiation of the political economies of peace', and that a new and contextualised definition of peace is needed to challenge the Western normative doctrine – sometimes known as the 'liberal peace' - by introducing a range of discourses which might produce a more emancipatory peace (Pugh et al., 2008b, Jabri, 1996). It is therefore appropriate that the 'liberal peace' thesis is central to the analysis in this research because it assumes the infallibility of a certain set of ideas which are non-negotiable and because of its power to influence the prospects for peace in Sierra Leone. The 'liberal peace' involves the 'scientific perfecting' of known strategies to form a readymade template for the deployment of 'peace' in post-conflict zones (Richmond, 2008:106), and represents a western normative view of peace rather than nuanced interpretations born of local experiences and local knowledge (Mac Ginty, 2006). It holds that third party interventions which redefine the 'discourses, practices and structures of the conflict environment' and replace them with the 'liberal architecture of the modern state' are necessary for the business of peacebuilding (Richmond, 2008:106). The theoretical underpinnings of this research present an opportunity to take a critical approach which complements previous contestations of the 'liberal peace' in terms of its component parts, the methods used to build it, and the legitimacy of its universal claims for the peace and

stability of the developing world (Richmond, 2008: 7, Duffield, 2001, Call and Cook, 2003, Paris, 2004).

There are several analytical foci for the research. The first critiques the 'liberal peace' as a relevant, efficacious or plausible model for peace by analysing the local political culture, social, economic and physical environments and determining what programming was operationalised; what worked and what did not work, what was prioritised and what was sidelined, and for what purpose. The originality of this analysis is in the search for empirical evidence of the extent to which a 'liberal peace' exists in Sierra Leone. By getting to grips with empirical realities some suggestions can be made as to optimum models to address the local challenges.

A second focus for analysis centres on the theoretical and philosophical premise of ownership in the liberal peacebuilding project; that the model for reconstruction is 'inclusive' and locally owned because the process involves widespread consultations with local stakeholders for 'emancipatory' peacebuilding (Richmond and Franks, 2009:12). The aim is to establish whether external interventions on predetermined templates for predetermined purposes related to local people and the local context, and their impact on local accountability mechanisms. The academic analysis focuses on the conflation of democracy, a central component of peacebuilding missions, with the politics of intervention to determine whether or not the two are mutually exclusive.

A third focus empathises with the contestation that statebuilding is central to the liberal peacebuilding project and has replaced peacebuilding concerns with those of development (Duffield, 2001, Herbst and Mills, 2003, Carmody, 2005, Goodhand, 2006). The analysis centres on the institutional apparatus constructed with development aims in mind and its capacity or ability to deliver on the peace so as to

determine any areas of synergy between development goals and peacebuilding priorities. This work argues that development is not the same as peace.

0.6 - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: PROBLEMATISING THE 'LIBERAL PEACE'

The theoretical underpinnings for the arguments in this research are drawn from the large body of literature on peacebuilding and the so called 'liberal peace'.

The search for empirical evidence of the 'liberal peace' at work in Sierra Leone is relevant because, although identified as in a state of crisis, its rhetoric does have primacy in the area of conflict resolution and societal reconstruction and peacebuilding experiences in the country were framed by the neo-liberalising agenda. It is therefore important to understand the genesis, premise and central components of the 'chief organising idea' behind building the peace to analyse the nature, success or failures of the peacebuilding mission there (Mac Ginty, 2006).

The starting point for the 'liberal peace' consensus was the end of the Cold War when communism had been defeated and any opposing model for post-conflict support was eliminated (Fukuyama, 1989, Fukuyama, 2004, Diamond et al., 1990). This consensus meant that a specific form of governance was required to secure durable peace in states affected by conflict and that a formulaic approach to peacebuilding and reconstruction, imposed from outside, was required for successful state 'transformation' (Richmond, 2005, Duffield, 2001). This 'urge to engineer' troubled societies through interventions revealed the hubris of external actors convinced they knew what local peace might look like (Pugh, 2005). The 'liberal peace' involved the use of certain mechanisms and tools for 'building peace' which were deployed by an epistemic community within the troubled locale where the peace was 'done' through a predefined process. This involved the pursuit of constitutional democracy, the promotion of human rights, liberal development of the

economy, civil peacebuilding and the promotion of the rule of law; an echo of the characteristics of like-minded liberal states and a complex and 'eclectic' approach to peace (Goodhand and Hulme, 1999). Despite its critics, the doctrine has support from analysts who judge positively its credentials for returning conflict torn states to stability (Fortna, 2004, Doyle and Sambanis, 2006). Certainly this paradigm appeared to be reflected in efforts to reconstruct Sierra Leone.

The 'liberal peace' reflects a Western subjectivity of what peace should be, based loosely on Kant's expression of the *democratic peace* (Kant, 1796, Barash, 2000, Jabri, 2007: 127). Kant's thesis argued that shared international norms and practices could solidify democratic consciousness and that nation states could be unified through economic interdependency and shared security interests. It was influential in building the global consensus around liberal reconstruction of collapsed or fragile states so that 'rogue', failing or failed sovereign entities could be brought into the global system to fulfil their international obligations, and also their local obligations. States like Sierra Leone.

Conditional relationships were central to the process of the 'liberal peace'. Notions of sovereignty and respect for nation states meant that interventionist politics had to be balanced by consent and through coercion (Ceadel, 1987, Clark, 2001) - although it was the case that collapsed states such as Sierra Leone had virtually no leverage or room for manoeuvre on negotiations. The main players in this global enterprise were states, donors, international and regional organisations. They formed multi-level and non-territorial decision making networks which embodied a complex system of authority and power brokering zones (Duffield, 2001, Richmond, 2006, Held et al., 1999). Consequently, the 'liberal peace' involved both an explicit and implicit consensus amongst a myriad of international actors that liberalism was the key to peace and stability. This enquiry investigates whether this consensus was

operationalised in the policy programming of donors and the conditionalities of lenders in the reconstruction of Sierra Leone and challenges the notion that the concept is any more than rhetorical. The enquiry does not take as given that what was created in Sierra Leone in the peacebuilding enterprise was anything akin to a genuine liberal polity.

With regard to practical implementation, what was to be 'done' in Sierra Leone for peace, Richmond's conceptualisation of the 'third generation' approach to peace – the 'liberal peace' – explains the consensus between the UN, the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The 'blue print' for peace first emerged in the historic document *Agenda for Peace* where peacebuilding was described as 'action to identify and support structures which… [would] tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict' (Ghali, 1992: II); a statement which was further credited by the subsequent recommendation that interventions should involve a stronger emphasis on building state institutions and state capacity, based on the rule of law (UN, 2004). Integrated operations such as these, whose goal is to transform societies, adopt a 'multidimensional' approach to peace which claims to address the causes of war as well as stop the fighting (Pouligny, 2006).

Richmond identified four components parts of the 'third generation' approach to peacebuilding (Richmond, 2008:7), and there is evidence of these components parts being operationalised in Sierra Leone. First, the 'victor's peace', which necessarily involves some form of militarisation and securitisation. In Sierra Leone this came in the form of the UNAMSIL (although initially unsuccessful in securing the country), and also military interventions by the Nigerian led ECOMOG and the British Armed Forces, along with attempts by various mercenary groups such as Executive Outcomes to defeat the rebels. Security sector reform (SSR) was

successful and involved a major undertaking to retrain and re-equip the Sierra Leone Armed Forces (SLAF) by the British Ministry of Defence in collaboration with IMATT (Ginifer, 2004). The second component, the 'institutional peace', involves international governance and conditions on lending and guarantees etc. Embedding Sierra Leone into the international system of global governance included commitments by the government of Sierra Leone (GovSL) to uphold and respect international law, for example, and to this end the government made guarantees to respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights by passing relevant laws such as The Child Rights Act (2007) (GovSL, 1999: Article xxiv). The third component of the 'liberal peace' is the 'constitutional peace' witnessed by the democratisation and trade liberalisation which took place in the country. Finally, the 'civil peace' - this promotes and guarantees individual freedoms and rights. The 'civil peace' is central to the peacebuilding project because the paradigm claimed that there could be no 'liberal peace' unless there was a strong civil society which participated in the process (Lederach, 1996, Lederach, 1997, Richmond, 2008: 105). Support to civil society and its inclusion in 'consensus' building was an important part of the post-conflict endeavour in Sierra Leone (GovSL, 1999, GovSL, 2001, IMF/IDA, 2006).

The above sketch is evidence that the peacebuilding plan in Sierra Leone included all four components of the 'third generation' approach yet conceptualisation of the 'liberal peace' carries several basic assumptions; that peace, democracy and free markets are a viable combination, and that this combination is unproblematic and acceptable to those working and living in post-conflict Sierra Leone, citizens who lived through the war and understood its antecedents (see Richmond, 2006, Mandelbaum, 2002, Duffield, 2001, Cox, 1981); that the characteristics of 'like-minded' liberal states and norms of the international community can be mirrored and

absorbed by fragile states just emerging from war, or merged with political cultures born of specific local traditions and their history. The epistemic community appears to be empowered by the belief that it knows the precise processes and goals of peace which are relevant in the locale (Mac Ginty, 2008:34, Richmond, 2008:108).

0.7 - CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS

The *international community* is conceptualised as a 'body of actors with sufficient consensus and will to be able to bring about peace'; the interaction and interdependence of a multitude of organisations' activities, and their shared norms and values (Zaum, 2007:9, Richmond, 2005:14). The concept has its critics, however, who argue it is imaginary or even fictitious (Ignatieff, 2003:2, Pouligny, 2006:155-156, 161). In this work, the conceptualisation of the term is drawn from Ismail's idea of a 'post-war reconstruction complex' (Ismail, 2008) and is defined as the body of external actors, with shared norms and values, who have influenced the liberalising trajectory of post-conflict Sierra Leone'; diplomats, policy makers, governments, academics, practitioners, negotiators, NGOs, INGOs and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). This work therefore supports the view that an international community does exist, conceptualised by the interconnected presence of like-minded and influential internationals (Richmond, 2005:115).

Interventionist politics are defined in this work as the *conditionalities* imposed or promoted by external actors for assisting post-conflict recovery and the politics involved in brokering peace. The term is helpful because it identifies external policy making as opposed to local policy making which is relevant here because such actions have the potential to constrain national government's responses to local citizenry and 'crowd out' the popular voice (Richmond, 2005, Duffield, 2001, Chandler, 2006, Pugh et al., 2008b). The concept is most useful for developing the

argument about democratisation and the constraints of interventions which essentially present an exercise in contradiction (Ignatieff, 2003:113, Chandler, 2006:69), and it also aids analysis of the political economy of peacebuilding.

Peacebuilding - as distinct from peacemaking and peacekeeping - is about long term security and development. The analysis in this work draws from definitions by Galtung and Lederach which emphasise the need to address the root causes of war such as cultural or structural violence (Galtung, 1975, Lederach, 1997). Peacebuilding is therefore conceptualised here as the activities involved in securing a positive peace, including efforts to build durable peaceful relationships among communities in troubled societies (UN, 2000, Annan, 2000). As noted earlier, the concept of peacebuilding is deeply problematic and contested (Chetail, 2009); in this work it is not to be confused with local efforts of reconciliation and trust building an investigation of which is beyond the scope of this enquiry.

Statebuilding – these are the technical activities involved in reconstruction after war with the purpose of rebuilding or reforming institutions of governance to maintain physical and economic security, and legitimise the global system of states (Chandler, 2006:1). The concept is relevant because state-centric reform can be in tension with the provision of security for citizens, such as welfare provision, which has implications for peace (Schwarz, 2005: 22, Fukuyama, 2004).

Nation building is defined here as the continuous process necessary to prevent the re-emergence of old political tensions which could threaten the unity of the state and lead to renewed conflict; it is 'the product of social, cultural, historical and political factors which coalesce around local identities' (Newman, 2009:30), and the concept is utilised to describe *community building* in this work (Etzioni, 2004). This is because, in Sierra Leone, it is important for peacebuilding to assimilate and mobilise previously marginalised groups into the political process, to find a way for

previously hostile groups to get along and to create solidarity. The concept of nation building is central to peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, but the notion that this can be achieved by external actors is highly contested (Newman: ibid).

CHAPTER ONE

HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT

In order to put the peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction into context and to compare the characteristics of the modern state in Sierra Leone with those of the pre-war state, a detailed account is given here of the political history of the country; the ethno-regional dynamics; the nature of colonial rule and its influence on the nation building project; the independence era and the 'hijacking' of the nation; the gradual atrophy of the state and decent into war.

1.1 - COLONIAL ERA: MEDIATED HEGEMONY

> *The Commission finds that the seeds of discontent of the late 1980s and early 1990s can be traced to the colonial strategies of divide and rule and the subversion of traditional systems by the colonial power and successive governments.* (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 2, Primary Findings, 19)

Sierra Leone was made up of 17 ethnic groups but the Temne in the north and Mende from the south and east were the most dominant groups. They made up around 60% of the population and exercised some influence over smaller ethnic groups, yet the minority northern Limba, around 8% of the population, were influential among the governing elite. Three of the four presidents of Sierra Leone were ethnic Limba: Siakka Stevens (1971-1985), Joseph Momoh (1985-1992) and the current president Ernest Bai Koroma elected in 2007. During the colonial period, however, the minority Creole of Freetown were the most dominant among all ethnic groups (Kandeh, 1992a, Alie, 2006). Although the ethnic mix was complex, there were no serious issues among them during the early years.

Figure 1 – Ethnic map of Sierra Leone c.1969



Image sourced from NationMaster.com

In 1787 the British established the capital, Freetown, as a settlement for freed slaves who became known as the Creoles, but it wasn't until a century later, in 1896, that the wider hinterland became a British protectorate (Fig.1) (Porter, 1963). Subsequent tensions emerged between the Creoles of the colony, who were British subjects, and the indigenes of the protectorate whose boundaries enclosed a number of different ethnic groups and tribal affiliations, including the large majority in *Mendeland* (Kup, 1975). *Mendeland*, in the south and east, provided lucrative mineral and agricultural resources for British colonists, including high grade cocoa, coffee, and diamonds,

and this region was therefore prioritised for development (Lewis, 1954: 207). The Mende people enjoyed strong influence in the rest of the protectorate. This was evidenced by the common use of their language throughout the country and across the border into Liberia to the south east. Their religion was mainly traditional and expressed through animalist or pagan practices. The Islamisation of the north during the eighteenth century therefore gave the Temne people a distinct identity of their own (Fyfe, 1964). The Temne were known for their warrior histories and their centuries old trade connections via routes across their northern provinces to Timbuktu in Mali. Of all the peoples which populated the area which came to be known as Sierra Leone, the Temne were the most resistant to colonial rule (Kup, 1975: 41, Little, 1967: 27). Generally, the Temne and Mende peoples lived peacefully together and benefitted mutually from trading activities between their populations. It wasn't until the transition to independence that tensions emerged between these two dominant protectorate groups.

Creole was a constructed identity made up of a fusion of new 'settlers' and 'liberated Africans' who were generally confined geographically to the Freetown peninsular. The first settlers, in 1787, were made up of a small group of white male colonists, a group of unmarried white women commonly understood to be prostitutes, and a larger group of black Africans who had previously worked as slaves in America and elsewhere, and who were living in London. Added to this first group of settlers were the blacks who had been formerly rehabilitated to Nova Scotia, loyal to Britain in the American war of independence and around 1000 in number, who arrived in Freetown in 1792. A third group, the Maroons, were ex slaves from Jamaica, arriving in 1800. Together these three groups made up the settler community. 'Liberated Africans' arrived in Freetown after the abolition of slavery (1807) and were 'rescued' from the middle passage of the Atlantic Slave Trade

during the first half of the 19th century (Falconbridge, 1794, Porter, 1963: 35). Indigenes also occupied this space, as did 'tribal immigrants' from the interior, but they were mostly ignored and excluded by the settler community and lived in separate settlements where assimilation was not encouraged (Kandeh, 1992). This segregation and identification of 'tribal' groups during urbanisation over time became a stimulus for the future ethno-politicisation of Sierra Leone society when different interests became more apparent as people lived in close proximity. For example, in 1891 Creoles made up 58% of the Freetown population but by 1947 that proportion had reduced to 27% (Jusu-Sheriff, 2000).

In nineteenth century Freetown the Creoles represented an elite, educated group who were appointed to high ranking positions in the colonial administration and who developed their own language known as Krio. Their Western education, knowledge of the English language and allegiance to Christianity were significant factors for colonial favours but the Creoles also became independently powerful in their own right through a variety of successful trading activities and substantial landholdings (Porter, 1963). Any ambitions of Creole self-rule were thwarted during the twentieth century, however, when immigrant competitors – Europeans and Syrians – took over their trade and ruined them economically (Fyfe, 1964:295).

In the colonial era tensions mainly centred on the colony/protectorate fault line, between the Creole of Freetown and the combined indigenous African elite whose interests were served through a separate administration system in the hinterland. Creoles were subject to direct rule and the 'non-native' British based judicial system, whereas the 'natives' of the protectorate were ruled by indirect 'mediated hegemony' and subject to traditional judicial practices (Kandeh, 1992, Kup, 1975). (Mediated hegemony involved the cooption of protectorate elite, through bribes and other favours, in exchange for control of their populations.) These two

separate legal systems were to persist into the post-conflict era making reform of the judicial sector rather problematic (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 1:11).

The declaration of the Sierra Leone protectorate in 1896 aimed to unite the country politically, but cultural and ethnic divisions remained strong (Porter, 1963:61). There were two issues; the continued practice of allocating prestigious administrative positions to Creoles in the protectorate and a parallel system of administration where chiefs and headmen were used by the British to control their populations through a system of indirect rule, but with no protectorate representation at the centre. As Porter noted, 'Creoles were in… demand as clerks and as artisans and generally in a variety of positions of minor responsibility for which uneducated 'natives' were unsuitable' and by the 1920s considerable polarities were evident between the Freetown Creoles and the tribal Africans of the interior whose social value was judged to be inferior (Porter, 1963:14, 52). This was politicisation of ethnicity by the British but, at the same time, traditional leaders from all ethnic and regional backgrounds were also privileged. This introduced a class dimension to the ethno-political dynamic (Kandeh, 1992b). By 1924 protectorate elite – three paramount chiefs - were appointed to central colonial institutions in Freetown giving the peoples of the protectorate central representation for the first time, but Creole domination remained strong. The privileged status of the Creoles as an ethnic group was only seriously challenged by indigenes after 1945 when industry brought increased development to the hinterland and a greater sense of entitlement to the locals. British education in the protectorate also had a growing impact on the 'social value' of the tribal population who emerged to challenge the superiority of the Creoles at the same time their (Creole) trading endeavours were beginning to diminish, and the Constitution of 1951 gave protectorate elites new opportunities to challenge the power structures of the past (Porter, 1963:64).

After independence the fault line between protectorate and colony altered dramatically as indigene elites jostled among themselves for political power and its associated privileges, and the Temne/Mende rivalry emerged as the most salient ethnic dynamic (Kandeh, 1992a:81). This was because the British colonial administration had played a major role in the ethnicisation of politics in Sierra Leone first through their polarised administration structure, pitting Creole against indigenes, and then through their uneven development of the country, provoking tensions between north and south.[2] A strong sense of ethnic consciousness was produced by the colonists but this focus on 'tribalism' was a reconstruction of the social reality which crystallised more around class formation than tribal affinity (see Mafeje, 1971: 253-261). The use of local elites meant that ethno-politics provided a platform for class formation, which was hitherto unknown, and which emerged at the top levels of elite professionals and bypassed the masses (Kandeh, 1992b, Saul, 1979). To serve their hegemonic ambitions, the British strengthened what they believed to be 'tribal' patriotism through their education policies which claimed to promote the preservation of local customs, language and cultures (Keen, 2005: 15, Kandeh, 1992a, Fyfe, 1964: 304). Indeed, so well did the British protect indigenous tribes' cultural and traditional norms with their 'no interference policy', that it wasn't until 1927 that traditional slave practices in the protectorate were outlawed (Banton, 1957: cited by Kandeh, 1992a: 85). The provision of education, however, was not even, and this was to be influential in the emergence of the Mende as the more prestigious class at independence. Due to strong opposition to colonial rule in the north and the presence of Islam, Christian missionary schools were concentrated mostly in the south; by 1938, 80% of all schools in the protectorate were in Mendeland (Kilson,

[2] See Young (1994:232, 236) for an account of the colonial state's 'compulsion to classify'- not necessarily the same classifications as the indigenes themselves who acquired an 'array of ethnic fault lines far more pronounced that those in the pre-colonial world' sometimes subsequently restructuring established ethnic groupings for their own purposes.

1966: cited by Kandeh, 1992a: 86). Although the intention of the British was to educate future chiefs for the protectorate, not to build a homogenous group of educated elite or make a new society of Creoles, Creoles themselves found the emerging educated elite indigene a new threat that challenged their comparative advantage - 'cultural capital' (Fyfe, 1964:304). Within the education system itself, where Temne and Mende pupils attended the same school, children were segregated and taught by Temne and Mende teachers, and sporting events were divided along ethnic lines. This had the effect of creating enmity and friction and the consolidation of ethnic identity among different groups of young people (Kandeh, 1992a: 86).

> *Special care will be taken to strengthen the tribal patriotism natural to the pupils. Mendi pupils will be taught in such a manner as to make them prefer Mendi land to any other country, so with the Temne and all the various other tribes represented in the school.*[3]

Although ethnicity played an unsubstantial role in the war insofar as rebel demographics were concerned, tensions among the three main regional groups were to influence the nation building project after independence and the multi-party systems which emerged after war.

The economic development of Sierra Leone was based on the extraction of unprocessed raw materials - such as diamonds and iron ore - which were channelled for export through trade and administration areas in the larger towns and the capital. Consequently, rural economies in the protectorate were neglected and this created a skewed topography of development which was biased towards the urban centres, particularly Freetown. Because of the concentration of natural resources in the south, road and rail infrastructure serviced Mendeland and, again, northern areas were neglected (Keen, 2005, Kandeh, 1992a, Richards, 1996, Cartwright, 1978, Lewis,

[3] Extract from Bo School Prospectus (para.8), C.O.271/11 *Sierra Leone Royal Gazette*, 29th September 1905 (drawn up by James Proudfoot) and reproduced in Fyfe (1964:306)

1954). The railway, built by the British in the 1890s but problematic because of its narrow gauge design, linked Freetown to main towns in the country's areas of cash crop production: Moyamba, Bo, Kenema and Pendembu with only a small spur to the town of Makeni in the north (Kup, 1975: 188, Gberie, 2005: 33). This uneven development increased the sense of relative deprivation among northerners and was to encourage the politicisation of ethnicity around access to services. This dramatic urban/rural divide and sense of marginalisation deepened throughout the independence period and, in the post-conflict settlement, the issue of rural development was prioritised to address not only historic deprivation in the countryside but the intensified atrophy of the countryside due to the destructive nature of the war.

The colonial relationship with traditional chiefs was to have a major impact on the nature of 'democracy' as it emerged after independence. As noted, mediated hegemony involved co-option of the protectorate elite by the British to control the potentially unruly hinterland population (Kandeh, 1992a, Fyfe, 1964). The British system of indirect rule through their 'intermediaries of hegemony' meant that chieftaincy became a direct route to acquisition for rural elites, a practice which was to persist into the post-war era causing serious concerns around decentralisation of state power (Lewis, 1954: 68, Bangura, 1997, Chazan, 1999: 87, Fanthorpe, 2005, Jackson, 2005). The Native Administration System (1937) allowed for generous salaries to be paid to Paramount Chiefs (Keen, 2005:10); they were also entitled to take a percentage of taxes or fines collected from their communities and were given licence to solve local disputes. Such wealth, an addition to the traditional advantages of chieftaincy such as status, power and influence, provided new opportunities to develop patronage systems among elites and their subordinates. Development programmes, such as they were, provided additional sources of patronage and chiefs

captured these initiatives to fend off any potential challenges to their authority (ibid). This abuse of chieftaincy power bred resentment and discontent among community members, especially the youth, a structural dynamic which was to influence the successful recruitment of rebels during the war (Fanthorpe, 2001, Abdullah, 1998). Not all chiefs were co-opted in this way. Tamba Mbriwa, a progressive chief and the founder of the rebellious Kono Progressive Movement (KPM) in the 1950s which demanded fair benefits for the community from diamond mining in the region, succinctly explained the relationship between paramount chiefs and the British:

> *It was a happy lot for Paramount Chiefs. Everyone obeyed. A man couldn't say things or reason. The chief had the full backing of the government. This was colonist tactics. People couldn't report Paramount Chiefs. They had all these powers.*[4]

Social mobility became dominated by access to the state and state resources, and exploitation and corruption became not only the norm, but a moral obligation for many elites who were locked into the system of lineage kinship. This practice persisted throughout the war years and into the post-war era. For example, in the 1996 elections, the incumbent Sierra Leone Peoples' Party (SLPP) depended on traditional leaders to secure their victory at the polls (Zack-Williams, 1999: 151, Jackson, 2007, ICG, 2007). As well as manipulating the chieftaincy system as a tool for control, the British also exercised their power through the security services, practices which were to be reinforced during the independence era and which prompted a concerted effort post-conflict for widespread and penetrating reform of the armed forces (Gberie, 2005: 41, Sesay, 1993: cited by Keen, 2005: 9, Ibrahim, 2003).

[4] Chief Tamba Mbriwa quoted by Fred Hayward in his article on the formation of the KPM in Lewis (1954)

1.2 - INDEPENDENCE – BUILDING A NATION

At independence new fractures emerged between the former protectorate elites when northern Temnes became concerned over their lack of representation within the main political party, the SLPP, led by Dr Milton Margai. The SLPP was founded in 1951 by the ethnically diverse, educated protectorate to thwart attempts by Creoles to exclude them from the political process, and it was successful in forcing the colonial authorities to grant the protectorate majority rule under the 1951 Constitution (Gberie, 2005, Sesay and Hughes, 2005). This gave unprecedented opportunities for indigenes to bid for power in the newly forming state against the previously favoured and more powerful Creoles of Freetown who had upset the British with ideas about federal rule and strong criticisms as to the democratic credentials of protectorate representation through self-appointed paramount chiefs on the legislative council (Lewis, 1954:229, Alie, 2006, Fyfe, 1964:328). Creoles were fearful of majority rule by the protectorate and were outraged that, with 96% illiteracy, indigenes were to have more representatives at the centre than the colony (Fyfe, 1964:328). The Freetown based Creole party was known as the National Council of Sierra Leone (NCSL) and the following extract from its petition reflects the views of Creoles at the time:

> *The right of a Protectorate Chief or persons to become members of the Legislative council of British subjects in Sierra Leone has always been questioned and repudiated by the [National] Council on the following grounds:*
>
> *(a) that the Protectorate of Sierra Leone is a foreign country outside the territorial dominions of the Crown ...*

(b) that a Protectorate Chief or person is an entire foreigner ... [5]

The National Council did not succeed in its protestations, however, and Creoles were absorbed into other political parties after independence. The distinction between the educated Creoles of Freetown and the rest of the populace diminished somewhat after independence but it remained an important dynamic when it came to a sense of 'shared nationhood' (Keen, 2005:14).

Nature of post-independence politics

In the absence of any serious threat from the Creoles, Siaka Stevens' APC emerged at independence to challenge Mende dominance in the SLPP (Kup, 1975:209). The APC claimed to represent the interests of the marginalised Temne northerners, as well as being the party of the 'common man' against traditional chiefs, and all those disaffected by the elite SLPP including some Creoles (ibid:211). The hierarchy of the APC consisted mainly of the smaller but very influential northern group, the Limba. Events on Independence Day (27th April 1961) were indicative of the intense struggle for political power which was starting to emerge between the two main parties. Protesting against the birth of the new nation before democratic elections could take place and with the SLPP at the helm, the APC launched a 'campaign of sabotage' by organising a general strike. The party went on to present a strong challenge to SLPP dominance at the first post-independence elections, in 1962, and the era of 'multiparty politics' was born. At the time party politics was narrow; it was regionally based and 'with little or no national agenda' (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 1:11).[6]

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[5] Extract from the National Council Petition to King George VI, September 1950, Colonial Office Library and reproduced from Fyfe (1964:327/8)

[6] See also archive BBC reportage, 27th April 1961, '*Sierra Leone wins independence*', sourced at BBC Online 'On this day' http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/27/newsid_2502000/2502411.stm, accessed on 27/05/09

There was some justification for APC concerns. The victorious SLPP, claiming to represent all Sierra Leoneans – whose motto was 'one country, one people' - downgraded Temne appointments in favour of Creoles and as the political fracture widened, old allies were soon designated as new adversaries (Kandeh, 1992:90, Fyfe, 1964:329). Temnes were purged from all but three ministerial posts, and the armed forces became ethnically *Mendesized*.[7] Table 1 (below) shows how entho-politics worked in Sierra Leone in the post-independence era. In the 1960s under the SLPP government, Mende ministers had the majority of posts. In the 1970s and 1980s, not only did the APC appoint a much larger majority of Temnes to ministerial positions but the size of the cabinet was doubled to accommodate them. Notably, Limba ministers featured in the APC regime but not that of the SLPP. This ethnicisation of the political sphere also extended to the broader bureaucracy and the security services (Kandeh, 1992).

Table 1 – Ethnic composition of Sierra Leone cabinets

Ethnic composition of Sierra Leone cabinets

Ethnic group	1962	1964	1973	1988
Mende	7	6	3	5
Temne	4	2	10	12
Limba	0	0	2	4
Creole	5	4	5	3
Others	2	2	4	3
Total	18	14	24	27

Reproduced from Kandeh (1992:93)

> *It is precisely the constant reordering of state-society relations along ethno-clientelist lines ... that has been the bane of Sierra Leone politics since independence* (Kandeh, 1992a:93)

After a marginal victory in 1967, the APC eventually took control of the country but it was to take two military coups to extract Albert Margai from state house (Sesay and Hughes, 2005). The roots of the emerging patrimonial state were secured through existing structures of indirect rule left over from the colonial administration (Richards, 1996). Over the next twenty five years the APC had an unbroken era of government which evolved a de facto single party system through co-option of many of the opposition (Forna, 2002). In the House of Representatives, the practice of 'crossing' (moving allegiance from APC to SLPP, and vice-versa in the Stevens era) enabled certain members to advance to status of Paramount Chief – this would have been very unlikely for members opposed to the government of the day (Kup, 1975:214). Multi-party politics therefore became more aligned to class politics; the political elite forming a united front at the centre to personalise the benefits of the state to the detriment of the rest of the population.

In the countryside, traditional rule continued because no other form of local government had been successfully established. Extending APC rule through grass roots organisations into the rural areas was stymied by lack of infrastructure and communications systems which rendered most villages fully dependent upon local traditional politics. Paramount chieftaincy elections were held on a spasmodic basis when vacancies became available through the death or removal from office of the incumbent chiefs, but the franchise was narrow and limited to mostly male members of recognised ruling houses (Kup, 1975:221). This marginalisation meant greater opportunities for chiefs, loyal to patrimonial networks, to manipulate their subjects (Bangura, 2000). Thus, it was essential for the APC to co-opt chiefs as part of their

political apparatus in the same way the British exercised control (Kup, ibid). This was somewhat ironic considering the historic resistance of northerners to colonial rule and to the chieftaincy system itself which had been so strongly represented through the opposition SLPP, but it illustrates well the fluidity of politics in the post-independence era.

There was no clear picture of the role of ethnicity in the Sierra Leone conflict, but evidence suggests that it was minimal. The rebel forces, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), aimed to overthrow the APC government but the party affiliation of RUF combatants included both APC and SLPP with more support from APC affiliates. Foday Sankoh, leader of the fight against the APC government, was a northern Temne. Further, the war continued despite a change of government and despite the overall ethnic make-up of the RUF being 50-60% southern Mende. There was noticeably hardly any representation of the Creole within the warring factions (Alie, 2006).

An important point about ethno-politics at state formation was that it served as a vehicle for the consolidation of upper strata class formation within Sierra Leone society (Kandeh, 1992b). Although there was no real sense of class consciousness in Sierra Leone, the British had created structures where modern and traditional elites (Creoles and protectorate chiefs) occupied 'upper strata' positions and the rest of society unconsciously occupied the lower stratus (see for example Young, 1994: 229, Kandeh, 1992b, Sklar, 1979, Saul, 1979). The frustration of the relatively impoverished northern elite compared to the educated and professional southerners who dominated the SLPP and had become so influential, led to the emergence of the APC at independence. The bourgeois elements in the north of the country used the newly formed APC as an instrument to transform themselves into distinct elite - determined not to be sidelined in the transition to statehood – and determined to

benefit from the privileges state power could provide. At the same time, the APC claimed to represent the 'masses as opposed to the privileged few' and campaigned on a populist ticket to challenge the conservatism of the SLPP (Saul, 1979:405, cited by Kandeh, 1992a: 82).[8] This claim was to prove as shallow as the SLPP's 'one country, one party' because cultural politics was only successful in shaping and mobilising ethnicity to serve elite interests, not those of the masses (Saul, 1979, Sklar, 1979, Kandeh, 1992a:83, Alie, 2006:19, 20).

Herein lay the roots of the problems which were to characterise multiparty politics in Sierra Leone. Politicians mobilised the public by manipulating their ethnic consciousness, not class consciousness; but the reality was to create a strong sense of class consciousness solely at the upper strata, where elites jostled to compete for the dividends of state control.

Multiparty politics became a distorted interpretation of the unified state. In the outcome, multi-partysm in Sierra Leone represented neither class nor ethnic politics. Ethnicity was relevant but not particularly divisive; the most serious fracture would emerge between the politicians and their electorate. This was not the only cleavage. Tensions also emerged between unpaid professional people up country and their government, a rural/urban divide where the state itself had little relevance to the majority of the population living outside the main metropolis. People living in Kailahun near the border with Liberia, for example, lived 'beyond the state' and associated themselves more with Monrovia than Freetown because of the difficult bush track journey to their own capital and the easier taxi ride into Monrovia (Alie, 2006:20, Gberie, 2005:34, Richards, 1996:43). In short, the nation building project produced a multiplicity of discontent with serious potential to challenge the state.

[8] Quote taken from Ibrahim Tagi writing in *We Yone* (1966) and reproduced by Kandeh (1992)

Nature of the state

Richards described the character of the 'emerging democracy' in Sierra Leone as *façade politics* – a polity which showed good credentials at independence but which deteriorated rapidly (Richards, 1996). The nation building project seemed to have disappeared, crushed by the predatory tactics of a small, dominant, self-interested elite who subjected all the institutions of the state to strict party control (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 1:11). The centralised APC government, first under Stevens and then under Momoh, 'sustained itself through corruption, nepotism and the plundering of state assets' to the exclusion of the majority of its citizens and the leadership of the APC was condemned by the TRC for the country's decent into war (TRC, 2004: Executive Summary, para 14). The Stevens' administration marked the beginning of continuous systematic political violence which accelerated the downward trend of electoral quality but secured his position as national patriarch (Keen, 2005:16, Zack-Williams, 1999:144). The 'staggeringly corrupt patrimonial system' was exclusive of anyone outside Steven's personal network including the workerist associations his APC party had claimed to represent (Adebajo, 2002, Keen, 2005: 16, Richards, 1996: 40). Strong resistance to Stevens' regime from opposition parties, the press or civic groups resulted in their intimidation or co-option. Unions, agricultural cooperatives, businesses, professional organisations, and the judiciary were all brought into the patrimonial system, and the subsequent foreign migration of many radicals eased the pressure on government and paved the way for the dearth of human capacity after the war (Adebajo, 2002, Bangura, 2004). This politicisation of the bureaucracy was to be a challenge for peacebuilding. In 2007, there was still evidence that the politicisation of workers unions was being practiced and a report on the flagship Anti-Corruption Commission concluded that the judiciary was still serving the interests of the governing elite (DfID, 2007).

1.3 - ATROPHY OF THE STATE

Although the TRC-R condemned the APC leadership for the atrophy of the state and the war which eventually led to state collapse, the role of external forces and actors was also acknowledged (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 1, Executive Summary: 7). Global conditions were also a factor as price fluctuations on the international markets meant a steep decline for the mineral economy in the late 1970s when mining activities were halted and overseas investors withdrew. For example, Marampa iron ore mines in 1975 and Yengema diamond mines in 1982 (Richards, 1996). This was disastrous because the extractive industries were the engine of the formal economy; in particular, mineral resources dominated trade and were the main source of foreign exchange. Concentration on mineral extraction was at the cost of a properly developed agricultural sector or light industries, and the country's dependency on primary commodity exports made it very vulnerable to external shocks or fluctuations on the market. This dependency may have made the country more vulnerable to an increased risk of conflict (Collier, 2007: 21). Falling prices of other exports such as iron ore, coffee and cocoa and the oil crisis of 1973 meant a serious emergency for the patrimonial state in respect of revenue generation, and this provoked the discounted sale of some of the country's highly prized foreign assets so that loyal supporters could continue to be rewarded through the usual patronage systems (Bangura, 2004).[9] The main source of wealth generation became the illicit mining of alluvial diamonds which involved pre-industrial methods of mining by hand, informal licensing arrangements and clandestine deals which prioritised foreign traders over locals. This meant the privatisation of the Sierra Leone state as

[9] See report from the African Development Bank Group *'Combating Corruption in Africa'* January 2003 from www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/queries/queryattach/q44Addisreport.pdf, accessed on 06/03/08

national revenues were absorbed into informal networks which enhanced personal enrichment (Reno, 1998). As the mining industry was criminalised, locals were actively discriminated against on the issue of mining licences in favour of Lebanese traders. This meant that opportunities to sustain already meagre livelihoods for locals diminished considerably (ibid). The APC management of the national economy was to be a travesty for the security of the country and its citizens.

Economy

What became known as the *shadow state economy* was indeed the consequence of a broader global economic malaise and poor practice on the domestic front, but the rapaciousness of the political class and its (mostly) Lebanese clientele in the systematic pillage of the country's diamond wealth was to bring catastrophic consequences for the national economy (Adebajo, 2002: 81). The shadow economy was facilitated through a network of transactions outside the country's formal legal frameworks which processed the looting of the country's natural resources by powerful politicians and business elite. Those networks were still in place and operational well into the post-war era.

Figure 2 (below) shows how official exports of diamonds dropped dramatically during the mid 1970s and remained low for a decade. The peak around 1985/86 was due to attempts by the new President Joseph Momoh to get state resources under state control in response to pressure from the IFIs and local residents.

Figure 2 - Sierra Leone diamond exports 1975-1987



Data sourced from the Sierra Leone Ministry of Mineral Resources http://www.mmr-sl.org/

Because political leaders had an interest in the clandestine diamond trade they expropriated civil servants to their shadow networks through systems of bribes and rewards (Keen, 2005:21). Membership in patron networks had a serious impact on the legitimate functioning of the state, the health of the national treasury, and the capacity and will of the government to deliver public goods, and public services diminished considerably during this period. Alliances with politicians meant that multinational corporations with an interest in mining activities, for example Sierra Rutile and SIEROMCO, avoided taxes by massaging the figures on the quantity and quality of exports (Keen: ibid). The APC government, complicit in these arrangements, thus denied the local populace its legitimate right to profit from the extraction of national resources and the Lomé Accord committed future governments to rectify this malaise.

By the mid 1980s, around the time Stevens appointed his successor Joseph Momoh (1985-1992), domestic revenue collection had plunged to 18% of the levels in 1977/78 (Reno, 1995: 131, cited in Keen, 2005: 23), and the national economy had

reached crisis point. This was the era of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) which increased the pressure on an already weak state to reform and expose its fragile economy and diminished markets. With the onset of harsher economic conditions, most jobs were to be found in the informal sector or the bureaucracy – both areas targeted by SAPs - and many jobs disappeared, swelling the numbers of unemployed and disenfranchising a large section of the community. For example, the World Bank insisted on the privatisation of customs and fisheries to improve royalty collections; instead of reform of the bureaucracy, 'trimming' was recommended. Further, to attract foreign investors and please the IFIs, President Momoh attempted to formalise the economy through initiatives such as 'Operation Clean Sweep' in the mining sector which put 25,000 unskilled workers out of work (Hayward, 1972). The arrival of SAPs brought opportunities for wide ranging economic reform; conditionalities from the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) meant the reduction of state activity and the privatisation of state-run trading operations but these initiatives, which had potential for increased revenue collection, were 'hijacked' by Lebanese businessmen and political elites who were keen to replenish their meagre stockpiles. Many parastatals were sold off to 'undesirable' entrepreneurs (Reno, 1995). Despite pressure for economic reform from the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), President Momoh's predicament was that he did not have control of government institutions in order to reform them (Richards, 1996: 41). As the chosen successor of Stevens, his mandate was to cooperate with the outgoing administration in order to avoid any coups, and so the proceeds of the country's mineral wealth continued to be personally delivered by Stevens to his allies long after succession by Momoh to the detriment of the country's development and the development of its people (Reno, 1998). The situation went from bad to worse; between 1980 and 1987 state spending on health and education declined by

60% with large disparities between the rural areas compared to those in the Freetown peninsula. People in the Mende south were especially neglected because of their problems with the Temne leadership (Reno, 1998: cited in Adebajo, 2002:81). Instability and insecurity in rural areas had a major impact on the economy when large amounts of FDI were withdrawn. In 1994, for example, Sierra Rutile and Sieromco withdrew their operations from the country taking with them 15% of GNP (Reno, 1998:126).

People

What this account illustrates is the nature of bad leadership in Sierra Leone, cited by so many observers as a key factor in the eventual outbreak of war because of its consequences for local people, local conditions, national security, and building a common sense of national consciousness and belonging (TRC, 2004). The APC government continued the trend established by the SLPP, hijacking the nation building project in the quest to capture the state and its lucrative resources for themselves. The practice of ethno-politics, however, would still necessitate tangible benefits penetrating to grass roots constituents as well as across the broad spectrum of elites yet the post-independence political economy created 'pronounced and obscene elite-peasant disparities' as the masses sunk deeper into poverty, suffering terribly from the economic decline whilst their elite plundered the country's wealth (Riddell, 2005, Gberie, 2005: 32). The urban bias for development reflected the politicians' concerns that the close proximity of the population in Freetown could present a physical challenge to their authority, and they ignored the threat from the countryside (Riddell, 2005, Herbst, 1996:130). The phasing out of the strategic railway link across the southern and eastern regions in the early 1970s was to have a marked effect on the economic and social activities of many rural communities there

(Riddell, 2005, Zack-Williams, 1999, Gberie, 2005:34). A National Health Survey published in 1978 showed that infant mortality in Freetown was 20% compared to 33.3% for the rest of the country and the proportion of chronically undernourished children in Freetown was 10.3% compared to 26.6% of children elsewhere. The proportion of children who were 'significantly underweight' in Freetown was estimated at 18.3%, compared to 32.4% across the rest of the country and the incidence of malarial parasites in the blood was vastly skewed towards the rural areas – 36.3% compared to 4% in Freetown.[10] Figure 3 (below) indicates that the Freetown/province divide was still acute in the post-conflict era despite promises in the peace settlement for the redirection of resources to neglected rural areas (GovSL, 1999: Article VII: 6).

Figure 3 – Freetown/ province poverty disparity (2005)



Source Africa Development Bank, Country Strategy Paper, Sierra Leone 2005-2009, http://www.afdb.org

[10] All data from the Government of Sierra Leone and United States Agency for International Development, *Sierra Leone: National Nutrition Survey*, 1978, University of California quoted in Gberie (2005:33)

This account shows the incompetence of government in the independence era and the nature of the state as it emerged under the APC. When it came to unifying the nation to cohere a sense of national consciousness, how could the populations of the disenfranchised areas offer a sense of loyalty to the state when the state had neglected them so badly? The reality was the state had little meaning to people living on the edges of survival in remote rural communities.

The military

As noted previously, a characteristic of government which transferred from the colonial era and which became a significant contributing factor for state atrophy was the politicisation of the security forces. The political history of the country was littered with coups, counter coups and attempted coups, and the armed forces were to play a major role in the trajectory and longevity of the war.

Table 2 – Chronology of post-independence politics in Sierra Leone

1961-1967	Democracy
1967-1968	**Military Regime**
1968-1971	Emerging Democracy
1971-1978	Restricted Democratic Practice
1978-1991	One Party State – All Peoples' Congress
1991-1992	Multiparty Transition
1992-1996	**Military Regime**
1996-1997	Emerging Democracy
1997-1998	**Military Regime**
1998-2002	Emerging Democracy
2002 -	Democracy

Sourced from African Elections at http://africanelections.tripod.com/sl.html - accessed on 03/03/08

Table 2 chronicles the role of the military in Sierra Leonean politics since independence. There were three successful coup d'états - 1967, 1992 and 1997; a

counter-coup in 1968, and an attempted coup in 1971.[11] The coup culture was not limited to assaults on civilian regimes as it continued during the reign of the National Provincial Ruling Council (NPRC) when there were several attempts and one success in 1996.[12]

Stevens privatised the armed forces to defend the interests of the APC and not those of the state or its civilians; this entailed de-Mendecizing the troops and selecting senior officers from the ranks of northern loyalists (Keen, 2005:15). This tradition resembled the army's 'historic role as an instrument of colonial repression' (Ibrahim, 2003, Gberie, 2005:41). The military exercised extraordinary brutality against citizens; for example 18 unarmed protestors were killed and 121 wounded when the army used automatic weapons to control protesting civilians during riots which broke out in February 1955 (Gberi, 2005:41). In addition to the regular army, Steven's 'Special Security Division' operated as a private security force whose mandate was to intimidate the opposition. By the late 1980s, the privatisation of parts of the army weakened the formal troops and command structure so that, when the conflict started, the state security apparatus had no capacity, skills or resources to cope. What followed was a mass recruitment drive by President Momoh, and later President Strasser, which attracted thousands of 'hooligans, drug addicts and thieves' from the streets in Freetown. Their indiscipline, unprofessionalism and general lack of purpose, left them indistinguishable from the rebels they were sent to defeat

[11] It was during this failed coup of 23rd March that Foday Sankoh (leader of the RUF) was arrested and charged with failing to report a coup plot. This resulted in his imprisonment for seven years at the harsh Pademba Road gaol, an internment which would lead to the hardening of Sanko and his resolve for revolution (Gberie, 2005:42).

[12] The National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) took over government in 1992, after war had broken out, and a palace coup led by Julius Maada Bio, eventually overthrew the military president Valentine Strasser. A counter coup in 1997 against Major Johnny Paul Koroma's APRC was foiled. See New York Times, published 19/11/97, *Sierra Leone Makes 10 Arrests In a Reported Coup Attempt*, accessed on 04/03/08 from http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A05E0D71F38F93AA25752C1A961958260

(Koroma, 1996, Gberie, 2005). The dubious demography of the SLAF terrorised local communities rather than reassured them.

Unprotected from the economic downturn, poorly equipped, underpaid and underfed, the lower ranks of the military became bitter at the disrespect shown them by their government (Adebajo, 2002, Gberie, 2005). Little of the monthly government spend of 250 million Leones was getting to the front line because it was being embezzled by senior officers (Koroma, 1996). This was bad news for civilians as the rank and file of the SLAF saw the profitability of looting, being amply demonstrated by their RUF counterparts in the countryside, and informal collaboration with the RUF resulted in aggressive exploitation of the civilian population (Gberie, 2005:64).

In 1992, after suffering heavy casualties, young and rebellious junior officers rallied their troops under the leadership of Strasser and mutinied against their seniors in a successful coup attempt in Freetown (Koroma, 1996). The coup was executed by the ordinary rank and file who had been despatched to deal with the rebels. The coup had strong support from the citizenry because, after thirty years of misrule by the APC, citizens were desperate for change especially as the NPRC promised an end to the war, a reenergised economy and a return to multi-party democracy (Abdullah, 1998). Abdullah described the 1992 coup as a revolution in the city to match the RUF revolution in the countryside – both had the same 'revolutionary script' and were products of a rebellious youth culture which was searching for a radical alternative to decades of corrupt rule (ibid:204). In this 'strangely co-operative conflict' rebels and soldiers had similar goals (Keen, 2005).

The NPRC junta soon squandered the goodwill of the citizenry, however, through random acts of terror and human rights abuses, corruption and plunder, and by subjecting poverty stricken Sierra Leoneans to flamboyant displays of lavish

lifestyles (Gberie, 2005:76, Keen, 2005:100).[13] Some critics argued that the NPRC was even complicit in prolonging the war for its own enrichment (Abdullah and Muana, 1998, Abraham, 2004a) and by 1995 the country had reached a stage of 'anarchy and dissolution' as the junta failed to take control of the rebel areas and lost many recruits to the *sobel* phenomenon – a leaderless army, increasing in size and running amok in the countryside, murdering and looting indiscriminately.[14] In December 1994, for example, government soldiers murdered a prominent lawyer in Kenema who had been appointed as Director of Public Prosecutions by the NPRC. This was possibly in protest at their continued disenfranchisement and the execution of twelve of their soldier colleagues by the NPRC for 'banditry' the previous month. It was around this time that Major Johnny Paul Koroma joined the *sobel* hierarchy, a union which was to lead to the state-breaking coup of 1997 (Gberie, 2005).

The NPRC regime was looked upon favourably, however, by the IFIs due to its cooperation under SAPs:

> *The government of Sierra Leone is carrying out a comprehensive programme of economic growth aimed at achieving sustainable growth and reducing poverty.* World Bank, Judicial and Legal Reform Project, October/November 1993 (cited in Keen, 2005: 166)

This statement was somewhat ironic considering the trajectory of the economy noted in Table 3 (below). Other economic successes during that time were influential; for example inflation fell sharply from 115% in 1991 to 18% in 1993, and military spending was cut back (Keen, 2005:166-167). These small successes were in contrast to the previous Momoh era when in 1988 inflation reached triple figures and the country was unable to pay its debt arrears (Reno, 1998).

[13] For example, Gberie describes the incident when Strasser rounded up the mentally ill from the streets of Freetown and incarcerated them in a remote area of the country under harsh conditions where most died (Gberie, 2005).

[14] *Sobel* - soldiers by day and rebels by night – see Gberie (2005:91)

Whilst the national economy contracted, the war economy flourished. Instability in the region provided ideal conditions for proceeds from the conflict in Sierra Leone to mesh with other criminal agendas such as those of Charles Taylor. An unstable Sierra Leone allowed Taylor to take control of the diamond mines and run a lucrative market of arms for diamonds to fund his own rebel war in Liberia. Although there was no consensus among analysts as to how much influence Taylor had in the vanguard rebellion, there is little doubt that his supply of weapons and other goods prolonged the war for several years (Campbell, 2004, Gberie, 2005).l, 2004). Other regional actors such as those in Burkina Faso, Cote D'Ivoire and Libya also colluded to promote and fund the RUF (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 3, Recommendations: 412).

Table 3 – Sierra Leone exports, 1991 and 1995 (in US$ millions)

	1991	1995
Agricultural	***10.40***	***2.700***
Palm kernels	0.05	0
Cocoa	2.30	0.006
Coffee	2.40	1.300
Minerals	***134.00***	***0.900***
Diamonds	20.60	0.800
Gold	0.50	0.013
Bauxite	26.00	0
Rutile	69.10	0

Reproduced from Reno (1998:127)

By 1995 the Sierra Leone state had no loyal army so private mercenary units including the British-based Ghurkha Security Guards, Nigerian and Guinean forces and eventually Executive Outcomes were procured to secure the state. Although

international and local pressure had combined to influence the return to multi-party democracy, the government of President Kabbah produced no significant change in the political landscape and, in the absence of a national army, a *coup* quickly followed (Kandeh, 2004). Rank and file soldiers arrested their senior officers and freed jailed colleagues from Pademba Road prison, among them Major Johnny Paul Koroma, who was to appoint himself chair of the newly formed AFRC which did a deal with the RUF to form a joint regime. The new junta alleged that the civilian regime was once again undermining the army, this time through its support of the Kamajor militia and Civil Defence Force whose compliance to the ceasefire had not been stipulated in the Abidjan Accord and who were continuing their attacks – as were the RUF. *Operation Pay Yourself*, which followed the coup, involved sustained waves of looting both in the capital and in the countryside, and propelled the country to a state of crisis and the final stage of state collapse (Gberie, 2005:96, Abdullah, 1998). The coup brought about a total collapse of military cohesion and command:

> *What happened on 25 May 1997 was a complete collapse of the command structure of the Armed Forces. The subsequent effort to overthrow the democratic order was only a by-product … soldiers daily humiliated the entire Officer Corps* [15]

> *Thus for the first seven days after the takeover there was widespread anarchy. It was not a case of collapsed state structures that could be revived; the state had become non-existent; the rule of law an abstraction (Abdullah, 1998)*

What this account illustrates is the extent to which the military in Sierra Leone contributed to the political destabilisation of the country, at first acting as an instrument of state aggression, and then the economic downturn and neglect of serving soldiers transforming the military into the de facto opposition. In both

[15] Khobe, Brigadier-General Mitikishe Maxwell (1998) *Anatomy of the Sierra Leone conflict and its resolution by ECOWAS.* Paper presented to the ECOWAS regional forum on conflict management and resolution, Ouagaduogou, Burkina Faso, 7-11 July cited in Keen (2005)

scenarios, the army bred mistrust and fear among citizens. Security sector reform was therefore paramount in the peace-building and reconstruction.

1.4 - THE REVOLUTION FROM THE COUNTRYSIDE

The youth

The youth of Sierra Leone was also a key group which gave the conflict its distinct character and trajectory; a group which was the subject of extensive commentary in the conflict and post-conflict literature because of their importance for the future stability of the country (Richards, 1996, Bangura, 1997, Abdullah, 1998, Fanthorpe, 2001, Adebajo, 2002, Kandeh, 2005). Ten years on from the peace accord, an army of unemployed youth is still evident on the streets of Freetown. This was documented by analysts as a serious threat to sustainable peace and security in a continuing climate of intense socio-economic pressure and high unemployment which was provoking an upsurge in violent protests and criminality (UN, 2005, ICG, 2007, Meyer, 2007, Thomson, 2007, UNSC, 2008). Many of the post-war youth were ex-combatants experiencing no means to support themselves and no prospects for the future (Ginifer, 2003, McIntyre, 2003, Hanlon, 2005, Christensen and Utas, 2008).

It was the systematic marginalisation of this group from the political process and their socio-economic discrimination which impacted on the ideological rhetoric of the elite uprising and the successful recruitment campaigns among the unemployed during the war (King, 2007). This group were made up of the urban and rural poor and disenfranchised and they were to constitute the rank and file of both warring factions in the armed conflict (Abdullah, 1998, Fanthorpe, 2001). The term ‘youth’ in Sierra Leone is loosely linked to the age group 15 and 35 years and considering life expectancy in the country is around 40 years this group represents the majority of the population. A more accurate distinction is to describe those

citizens with no access or entitlement to land or wives; a group which was marginalised and powerless. (Girls and women did not feature strongly in this group.)

Youths in Sierra Leone could not acquire farmland unless they were married, and yet polygamy was widely practised in the country. Marriage is very important for the status of both men and women in the country (Keen, 2005:73), and limited access to women was a cause of deep resentment. Many young men were subjected to demeaning traditional practices within village communities which included reparations for 'woman damage'. Woman damage is a form of tax levied by chiefs on young men who take advantage of their wives or concubines; compensation can be in the form of payments but more often is associated with tied labour (Lewis, 1954, Dale, 2007, Richards et al., 2004). 'Youth' constituted a political label which symbolized both resistance and a distinct social position, yet youths were also to play a significant role as the 'pawns and navigators' in Sierra Leone's political game as agents of the state apparatus (Christensen and Utas, 2008: 516, 517).

During the 1930s a youth rebellion emerged from the difficult sociological conditions in the country at the time, and when the APC came to power in 1968, the leadership promised a revival of the popular Youth League tradition (Spitzer and LaRay, 1973). These promises were quickly forgotten when the government centralised power and patrimonial networks became the *modus operandi* for governing the country (Abdullah, 1998, Richards, 1996). When a culture of thuggery became associated with national politics it presented a rare economic opportunity for some of the country's youth. The infamous red-shirted APC Youth League, whose sole purpose was to violently suppress any opposition to the government, became a common option for the urban and rural poor (Gberie, 2005, Abdullah, 1998, Zack-Williams, 1999, Forna, 2002). The practice of using the youth for political

intimidation re-emerged during the elections of 2007 when political parties recruited unemployed youth, many of them ex-combatants, to coerce support among the populace during election 'campaigning' (Christensen and Utas, 2008: 535).

Throughout independence, the youth of Sierra Leone lost its voice and any form of legitimate vehicle for protest. Although university students played an important role in challenging the APC regime against corruption through a mass protest in 1977, by 1985, student radicals were being ejected from the country (Ibrahim, 2003, Abdullah and Muana, 1998). In the events of January 1977 university students had mobilised to protest against the alleged theft of $40 million by President Stevens from the national treasury. In the following government clampdown, forty students were killed but the protest continued until elections were held in June of the same year (Ibrahim, 2003). The disenfranchisement of urban students resonated with the youth in the countryside who had been excluded from local politics because of historic informal and oppressive power structures within rural chiefdoms. This marginalisation of a large and important group created a 'cauldron of disquiet' up country (Jackson, 2005, Fanthorpe, 2005, Meyer, 2007). Meanwhile, in the city, a homogenous youth constituency was evolving made up of university students and the lumpen, illiterate, urban masses. An important dynamic for this homogenous uprising was access, or lack of it, to education (Wright, 1997: cited in Keen, 2005: 72). The neglect of the education sector and its deterioration through the independence years meant a growing number of young people outside the school system had few opportunities to find work or leave home (Banya, 1993, Skelt, 1997 cited in Keen, 2005: 72, Richards, 1996: 174). Over 30% of RUF and CDF combatants had never attended school (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2004: 19), and low education levels were still preventing employment opportunities for much of the youth in post-war era (ENCISS, 2007).

This mass disillusionment and its subsequent protests influenced both the RUF revolution from the countryside and the NPRC revolution from the city (Richards, 1996, Abdullah, 1998). It seemed that the youth had become maladjusted to peace and better adjusted to war (King, 2007: 30). As Bright argued, the war was a 'family war' borne out of common backgrounds of social and economic deprivation; the RUF, Kamajor and AFRC all displayed similar tactics and unified ambitions - such as access to diamonds, previously the domain of the privileged elite. Despite being at war with each other, rebel factions mined diamonds peacefully together (Bright, 2001). For many of the rural and urban poor, the war economy was a welcome opportunity to amass wealth and transform their status, and the inability of the governing class to secure compliance from these subordinate groups (and subsequently the armed forces) was a major contributing factor for the war (Zack-Williams, 1999, TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 2, Findings: 455).

Character and genesis of the war

Clearly Sierra Leoneans were let down by the national project and the authoritarian politics of the independence era, but their interests were equally thwarted by the 'revolution' which rose up against their government. From the birth of the nation to the outbreak of war, the neglect, intimidation and violence of the state was to be nothing compared to the brutality and terror inflicted upon the civilian population by the revolutionary warriors. The undisciplined, disorganised and deadly combination of both RUF rebels and the government troops sent to defeat them was to inflict untold fear and misery on millions, and to reduce the country to a state of anarchy and eventual collapse. Over the course of eleven years, amidst coups, failed peace accords, intermittent ceasefires and democratic elections, there were around 50,000 fatalities, mass amputations and mutilations, displacement of the majority of the

population and incalculable numbers of physically and psychologically damaged citizens and combatants (Reno, 2004). The toll was particularly heavy for women and children (TRC, 2004).

The conflict lasted from April 1991 to January 2002 and became famous for its blood diamonds and child soldiers phenomena, where drug crazed gangs of Rambo type revolutionaries - including young children – murdered, raped, tortured, and looted their way across the country in a 'senseless' frenzy of violence pursuant of a handful of diamonds (Abdullah, 1998, Gberie, 2005). The conflict was more complex than that, however.

There were several armed factions involved in the fighting:

- The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) which represented the vanguard of the 'revolution'. Made up of combatants of diverse ethnicities and nationalities, and influenced by external actors, the RUF was led by Corporal Foday Sankoh, a northern Temne;
- The Kamajor militia, the indigenous army of local warriors, also known as the 'Mende Militia' who were aligned to the SLPP after elections in 1996 and who were considered an instrument of ethnic aggression, feared by many in the north. They provided support for UN and British troops during the latter stages of the war (Keen, 2005:206);
- The Civil Defence Force (CDF), a paramilitary organisation which supported the civilian government elected in 1996 and which was also Mende dominated. Favoured by the governing SLPP over the northern dominated SLAF (although the majority of CDF combatants had no political affiliation), the CDF fought in close collaboration with the Kamajor and other smaller civilian militia. The force was led by Chief Hinga Norman (Alie, 2006, Gberie, 2005:100, 107);

- The Sierra Leone Armed Forces (SLAF) were government troops, many of whom joined the rebels to fight as *sobels* especially after the military coup of 1992 (Abdullah and Muana, 1998:182, 183);[16]
- The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) represented a union of RUF, remnants of the NPRC military junta and disgruntled factions of the SLAF. Led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, the AFRC overthrew the elected government in a coup in 1997 (Abdullah and Muana, 1998, Gberie, 2005:101).

At the outbreak of war, President Joseph Momoh was in power, but the RUF 'revolution' against the civilian APC regime emerged with no clear political ideology. Its leader, Foday Sankoh, an illiterate opportunist, had produced a vague populist document about injustice and exploitation - essentially a critique of colonialism – which was based on a document produced by radical exiled university students who were later to withdraw their support for the emerging armed revolution (Abdullah, 2004: 3, Gberie, 2005: 49). Sankoh, a man with a history of political agitation and support for attempted coups, a prison history and a grudge against the APC, emerged from prison in 1978 with ideas about an armed revolution. He tapped into a rebellious student culture whose discontent with the political hierarchy, and whose pan-African ideas and allegiance to Gadhafi's *Green Book* would support his political challenge to the status quo (Gberie, 2005: 78).[17] Ethnicity played no part in the dynamics of the warring factions. The ethnic breakdown of the RUF and opposing CDF, for example, was nearly identical with respect to the two major

[16] *Sobels:* soldiers by day, and rebels by night

[17] The *Green Book:* 'a document which extols an assortment of ideas of naive humanism, anti-capitalist rhetoric and charismatic rule' (Gberie, 2005:49). In the late 1980s, there was evidence of a *Green Book Study Group* located at Fourah Bay College, University of Sierra Leone which was dedicated to the socialist ideology of this publication (Abdullah, 1998).

ethnic groups in the country: 50-60% of the membership was made up of Mende, and 20% Temne (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2004:18).

Figure 4 - Map of Sierra Leone showing strategic towns and borders with Liberia and Guinea

The violence started with a cross-border incursion from Liberia into the villages of Bomaru and Sienga in Kailahun district – the furthest Eastern point in Sierra Leone close to the borders with both Liberia and Guinea (Abdullah, 2004). Mass looting took place along with killings of government military personnel and civilians. The majority of the rebels were former members of Charles Taylor's

National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) whose national demographics included Liberians, Sierra Leoneans and Burkinabes (Keen, 2005:39, Gberie, 2005:59). External actors were to subsequently capture the ideological impetus of the war (ibid). Covert allegiances with Charles Taylor and his civil war in neighbouring Liberia, and support for rebel training from Colonel Gadhafi in Libya, gave the revolution an international dynamic which was to be influential in the protraction of the war and the escalation of violence after 1996 because unhindered access to valuable mineral resources secured by rebels in the Eastern provinces were to fuel the war economy through Taylor in Liberia (Gberie, 2005:96). This area of the country, historically neglected and exploited, was a key target for reforms in the plans for peace.

> *The invasion force and the rebels they recruited have tortured and slaughtered hundreds of civilians* (Amnesty International, 1992: cited by Keen, 2005: 39)

Warfare involved first capturing strategic towns in the remote Kailahun district and then pushing north to the main diamond centre, Koidu in Kono district (*Koidu-Sefadu* on map in Fig.4). Here the rebels were successful in capturing the diamond mines from the government by the end of 1992 (Gberie, 2005: 77). The conflict took the form of guerrilla warfare, where rebels moved along isolated bush paths capturing villages, territory, and terrified recruits through hit and run raids. These raids reached all parts of the country by 1994/95. There was no front line and government troops were scattered thinly across the country (Abdullah and Muana, 1998:184). Major offensives included attacks on the provincial capitals of Bo and Kenema in the South (1994), the university campus of Njala, and the strategic economic targets of the bauxite and rutile mines (ibid). Attacks on smaller towns and villages were carried out by small raiding parties who also set up ambushes on the main roads leading from the provinces to Freetown.

Civilians were subjected to unprecedented barbarism both by the rebels and government forces, which targeted women and girls in particular, children, elders, professionals, and often whole communities with indiscriminate executions and mass mutilations. This was retaliation for civilian reticence to support the revolution. Later on in the war it was retaliation for civilian support for democracy. Gang rape was commonplace. Amputation (including of infants) and mutilation of pregnant women was the trademark of the RUF who also used a method of 'branding'. This involved carving the initials of the rebel militia into the bodies of both recalcitrant combatants and reluctant recruits, tactics which were replicated by the AFRC later in the conflict (Richards, 2005, TRC, 2004: Vol.3, Chapter 3). Looting, arson and terrorisation formed the *modus operandi* for both rebels and disenfranchised government troops alike, whose purpose was to extract as much as possible from the war economy, and whose tactics became indistinguishable from each other as the war in the countryside developed (Adebajo, 2002, Abdullah, 1998, Keen, 2005, Gberie, 2005:118). Children were abducted to carry looted items back to the rebel camps but were quickly absorbed into the rank and file of the RUF to boost dwindling combatant numbers (Abdullah and Muana, 1998:184). Children were also recruited by government forces (ibid).

The treatment of children during the ten year war resulted in a 'lost generation' of young people for the country, a generation which became the youth in the years of post-conflict recovery. They were violated and abused by all armed factions (TRC, 2004: Executive Summary). They suffered abductions, forced recruitment and sexual slavery; rape, amputations, mutilations, displacement (many becoming separated from their parents and ending up as refugees), drugging and torture. Children were also forced to become perpetrators, compelled to violate the rights of others.

Thousands of children were killed during the conflict in Sierra Leone (TRC, 2004: Executive Summary: 56).

There were several different theses to explain the causes of the war but no dispute about its nature or purpose. Despite its revolutionary script which promised the 'second liberation of Sierra Leone', there was nothing revolutionary about the aims of the RUF which took control of the country's diamond resources and attacked any civilians who stood in its way (RUF/SL, 1995). Mass atrocities committed by the RUF against the very civilians it claimed to represent negated any claim the rebels had made to being a coherent and credible political movement for change, although their continuous advance on Freetown implied a determined quest to capture the state (Keen, 2005:41). The RUF offensive progressed across the country with the aim of seizing power in the capital but it had to forcibly recruit combatants along the way because of the dearth of popular support for its campaign (Richards, 1996, Abdullah, 1998, Keen, 2005:42). Forced recruitment often involved ideological brainwashing or coercion using alcohol, drugs, food or women. Often drugs were administered forcibly (Bangura, 2004, TRC, 2004, Keen, 2005:54). Looting and smuggling diamonds helped fuel the war economy as weapons were procured from government troops and also from across the border in Liberia and Guinea (Keen, 2005:51).

> *I was captured in Freetown during the AFRC coup by the Sierra Leone Army and taken to Kono where I was trained to use a gun – an AK-47 … … … We also smoked marijuana and cooked for the squad … … I was given cocaine on my forehead every day and asked to kill people who I thought were enemies. Cocaine was also put into our food when we cooked. [My squad] killed 35 ECOMOG soldiers during the January invasion.* Jusu, aged 10.[18]

[18] Interviewed by Ambrose James of Talking Drum Studio, Freetown March 2000 and reproduced in Rashid (2000), available from http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sierra-leone/lome-negotiations.php, accessed on 01/07/09.

The rebels' tactics of indiscriminately targeting civilians, including widespread sexual violence, slavery and abduction, encouraged the emergence of 'peoples' militias' such as the Kamajor. Their superior bush knowledge gave them a crucial advantage over the rebels. Their counter attacks with a strengthened CDF, military assistance from mercenaries such as Executive Outcomes, and strong support from civilian negotiators, allowed them to push back the rebels and force peace talks (Abdullah and Muana, 1998:184). By 1996, the failure of the NPRC to end the war provoked a strong uprising from civil society which mobilised to hold mass rallies and a national referendum to return multiparty democracy to the country. By the end of 1996, elections had been held, a civilian government installed, and the Abidjan Peace Accord drawn up.

Despite the Accord, fighting continued unabated amid reduced capacity of the armed forces and weak commitment to the settlement both locally and internationally (Jusu-Sheriff, 2000, Keen, 2005). Large amounts of donor funding for DDR failed to materialise and Sankoh's obduracy precluded commitment by the UN to send a peace-keeping mission to the country (Keen, 2005:203). The main bilateral partners, the US and the UK, gave minimal response to the government's request to re-train the army and at the same time insisted that all mercenary forces be removed from the country (Kargbo, 2006). Reduced spending on the military as a result of SAPs compounded this security vacuum and essentially the government was left with no national army to control its territory or protect its citizens (Keen, 2005). Tensions emerged because the 'favouring' of the Kamajor militias at Abidjan meant that there was a perceived international bias towards Kabbah's SLPP government. The security vacuum which followed the Abidjan Accord allowed the RUF to regroup with the disillusioned SLAF to launch their successful coup attempt in 1997.

Until that point, Freetown had remained generally untouched by the impact of the war which had been raging rampant in all parts of the provinces, but a second coup by the AFRC in 1997 brought the rebel war centre stage to Freetown as rebel prisoners were released from jail by mutinous factions within the armed forces and the destruction commenced. External interventions and the support of ECOMOG removed the junta, produced a new ceasefire agreement at Conakry and allowed a quick return to civilian government which was to hold until the next elections in 2002.

The coup of 1997, which was to awaken Freetown to the violence already experienced by millions in the countryside, was to signify the apex of a complex political emergency which was to lead to state collapse (Abdullah, 1998). In January 1999, *Operation No Living Thing*, involved unprecedented atrocities in Freetown committed by returning rebels and the ousted military junta. This tragedy re-focussed world attention on the war in Sierra Leone and the heroic efforts of civil society organisations, in particular religious groups and women's organisations, to end the fighting (Hirsch, 2001: 40). Talks for a comprehensive peace agreement in Togo brought about the signing of the Lomé Peace Accord in June 1999 (Gberie 2005:118). Again, the fighting continued through a further ceasefire at Abuja - signed in November 2000 - but eventually ended after military intervention by the British and others, and peace was declared in January 2002.[19]

This account of the war illustrates the complexity of issues which faced the country during the independence years and many theses have been proposed to explain the fighting. Arguments included the 'excluded intellectuals' thesis which claimed that marginalised professionals became disillusioned with the state,

[19] Speech by the President of Sierra Leone His Excellency, Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah at the ceremony marking the conclusion of disarmament and the destruction of weapons Lungi, 18 January 2002 available from http://www.sierra-leone.org/GOSL/kabbah-011802.html, accessed on 15/06/09. A full analysis of the Lomé Peace Agreement is presented in Chapter 2.

especially after the collapse of the patrimonial system, and the frustration of this 'disaffected intelligentsia' emerged in the form of a revolutionary movement for political change (Richards, 1996, Zack-Williams, 1999: 147). A further thesis claimed that the shadow economy, which emerged in the 1980s, deepened corruption in the APC regime and let to the gradual breakdown of state structures (Bangura, 1997, Zack-Williams, 1999, TRC, 2004, Reno, 2004). Rampant criminality which centred on the capture of the nation's diamonds was also blamed for the war (Gberie, 2005, Campbell, 2004); or intolerant political culture, greed and grievance (Collier, 2000, Abdullah and Muana, 1998, Rashid, 1997). Most commentators acknowledged the problem of a predatory and ineffective state, alienated and unemployed youth and the role of external actors (Gberie, 2005, Bangura, 1997, Rashid, 1997, Zack-Williams, 1999, Reno, 2003, TRC, 2004).

1.5 - CONCLUDING STATEMENT

> *I ask you to ... strive actively for peace, friendship and unity in our country.*
>
> *You are seeing history made this day. Work hard, for you are the future leaders of our country. We will lay traditions of which you will be proud. It will be for you to uphold them and to build upon them in the future.* [20]

The civil war in Sierra Leone could not be characterised by the greed and grievance thesis because the realities were much more complex than that (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008). First, the notions of greed and grievance were not mutually exclusive; both could be asserted in the case of Sierra Leone at different stages of the conflict. Rural youths, for example, easily recruited at the start of the war due to their marginalisation and exploitation by traditional chiefs soon found that the war

[20] Extracts from Sir Milton Margai's message to the people of Sierra Leone on independence day, 27th April 1967, reproduced from Fyfe (1964:342/343)

economy had significant benefits to that of the peace (King, 2007). The armed forces, acting as *sobels*, found similar benefits from war which their government had failed to provide in peace. Second, the war was extremely complex and nuanced and was sparked by a combination of socio-political, cultural and historic factors as well as the very clear inequalities of economic distribution, and other strategic factors in the region which were exploited by externals such as Charles Taylor. Third, the greed and grievance debate assumed that the state itself was exempt from predation practices but the evidence from Sierra Leone shows that state greed was a very significant factor in the country's atrophy to war.

This chapter has explained the complexity and nuance of the civil war and state collapse which was set against a background of historical structures and their legacies. The birth of the nation was supposed to represent a new era of democratic self-government but instead reproduced a predatory state. Bad governance which characterised the post-independence era was a dramatic example of democratic failure, but leadership during the previous colonial regime also had a profound effect on the country's susceptibility to civil war. In the absence of any alternative models of statecraft, the emerging authoritarian regime reproduced the previous colonial system of indirect rule, and the fixation on the state as the only unit of political authority robbed Sierra Leone of the chance to develop its own indigenous methods of population control (see Young, 1994). Due to unnatural constructions of identity by retreating colonists, Sierra Leone had the potential to split into at least two, if not three, different nations yet the introduction of multi-party democracy held assumptions that the Sierra Leone state was a tangible and effective unit, uncontested, with a populace who shared common goals and interests, and where citizenry was expressed as a 'collective self' (Young, 1988). Yet there was no 'pristine meaning' of a single national cultural community and efforts at

democratisation led to a destructive bid for power among competing elites (Young, 1994: 32).

The consensus was that bad governance, endemic corruption and mass abuse of human rights had plagued the nation building project, and that this failure of leadership had stripped the country of its dignity and was the precursor for war. Quotes taken from the TRC-R illustrate the historic feelings of disconnect between state and society:

> *The entire political elite collectively placed their personal and political interests above those of the nation* (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, C.2:68)
>
> *The people had lost all faith in the ruling class to act with integrity and to deliver basic services to the nation* (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, C.2:60)
>
> The exclusionist actions of the APC led to a complete loss of faith in the political system and ultimately gave rise to a general belief that only a revolutionary movement could bring about change *(TRC, 2004: Vol.2, C.2:66)*

Corruption, nepotism and the widespread theft of state assets were characteristics of the state post-independence where political elites hijacked the nation building project and all the benefits that went with it. Marginalisation of the masses continued seamlessly as the new body politic replaced the old in a disastrous façade of democratic process in a myopic attempt at building a nation. 'Terminal colonial politics' in Sierra Leone had created a warped combination of colonial autocracy and constitutional polity (Young, 1994). Once again, ordinary people were left out of the body politic with no channel for effective representation; uneven development remained a serious issue, as did the marginalisation of groups such as the youth or disenfranchised rural professionals, and the politicisation and patronage of the armed forces.

Changes on the international markets brought the systematic and prolonged neglect of the state into sharp relief; the state eventually collapsed because it had no money, no security, no institutions and no authority, and by 1997 its role as sovereign ceased due to its inability to control its territory or protect its citizens, deliver services or unite loyalties (Herbst, 1996, Zartman, 1995a).

It was not realistic to expect democracy to work when the nation building enterprise was incomplete or faulty, or in a system which centred politics on patronage. These construction issues and historic tensions had to be corrected after war to give the post-conflict peacebuilding the best chance of success yet, post-war, persistent powerful undercurrents around the issue of ethnicity had the same implications for national unity and coherence as at the time of independence (Ayissi and Poulton, 2006, Alie, 2006: 26). New fractures, which appeared as a result of the conflict, also had to be accommodated in the reconstruction.

Chapter two now analyses the official documentation produced from the peace negotiations to see what new mechanisms, structures or processes were to be put in place to address the enormous challenges facing the country for the post-conflict reconstruction and for building a peace that would last.

CHAPTER TWO

THE ARRIVAL OF PEACE

MY SIERRA LEONE, a new chapter and era has opened with
Awareness at every door
We must not let go
Because we've known the causes of our woes
It keeps us conscious and awake at all times
With the past we know the present and combined we make the future
Our mistakes have opened the doors of discoveries and our
Discoveries must lead to recoveries

Extract from the poem 'Who will make Sierra Leone?'
RUFP Prisoners at Pademba Road Prison (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 3, Recommendations)

The poem reproduced above was indicative of the desire of ordinary Sierra Leoneans to take responsibility for the problems of their past and the prospects for their future, and to build a new nation together. The text reveals an acceptance and understanding of the mistakes which had led to war and a strong desire to take ownership of recovery.

The analysis of the peace process which follows aims to determine its credentials to help address the complex contributing factors which led to war and the many challenges for peace; in particular the political fractures which had thus far failed to unite Sierra Leoneans, and the chronic lack of good leadership and effective governance which had so bedevilled the independence years for the majority of the population. What Sierra Leone needed badly was a new social contract which could give citizens a stake in governance and which could help to repair the historic and problematic relationship between the populace and the state. What were the

commitments made in the peace settlement which could help to address these burning issues, and what were the longer term ramifications of the wording of the convention for recovery and long term peace?

To facilitate this analysis an interrogation of the documentation is made: the Lomé Peace Accord, the conclusions of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report (TRC-R) and the 'how to' plans for recovery – the National Recovery Strategy (NRS) and the UN's Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). This interrogation aims to discover the strengths and weaknesses of the peace talks, and the plans to reconstruct the country vis-à-vis local priorities for peace, and provides key pointers to potential future challenges for stability. It also investigates how the dialectic of the 'liberal peace' helped to frame the peace talks and the negotiated settlement, and therefore the future structure of the Sierra Leone state.

The chapter first explains the methods for the analysis of the peace documents. In section 2.2 an examination is made of salient sections of the Accord to draw out the *promises for peace*, and additional 'proxy' promises from the TRC-R. These *promises for peace*, which are conceptualized to help the analysis, can be described as those commitments made by government to the general populace of Sierra Leone rather than the promises made by the rebels to end the violence - this is elaborated upon later. A deep analysis of the peace process is then presented in section 2.3, and the plans for implementation of the peace in section 2.4. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the relevance of the peace settlement and recovery strategy for longer term stability, and the challenges for its implementation.

In order to aid the analysis of the peace documents, some clearer definition of the local priorities for peace is required which is relevant to Sierra Leone's war history, political and cultural background. The summary of the priorities set out below is derived from the conclusions made in chapter one. It is described here as the

conceptual framework for peace and is visualised in Figure 5. It must be noted at this point that no claim is being made as to what a peaceful nation would look like, only suggestions as to what a helpful model for reconstruction might look like given the history of the country and the peacebuilding ambitions of local people. The conceptualisation of peace presented below is therefore useful only to codify the main priorities locally, and present a framework for analysis in the chapters that follow.

- Good leadership and good governance
- Economic opportunities
- Respect for and protection of human rights
- Inclusion of marginalised groups
- Resources diverted to the rural areas

Figure 5 – A conceptual 'framework for peace'



2.1 - LEGITIMACY OF THE METHODOLOGY OF ANALYSIS

Two key peace documents are at the centre of this analysis – the Lomé Peace Accord (Appendix 3) and the TRC-R. Although fighting continued after the 1999 ceasefire, the Lomé Peace Agreement is the starting point because it established the genesis of the peace process which was to follow and defined the shape of the nation building project as the country emerged from war. As the legal document, backed by the UN,

which framed the conditions for the cessation of hostilities and the package for reconstruction, and which was authorised by the signatories of the two main protagonists – the GovSL and the RUF – and witnessed by various senior representatives from the international community and in the presence of four African heads of state,[21] the Lomé Accord is the legitimate starting point for this enquiry. As a document which emerged from a negotiated peace, there were serious omissions and inclusions. The second document therefore represents a critical supplement which protects the interests of the majority population not the elites who negotiated at Lomé.

> *the Commission came to the conclusion that it was years of bad governance, endemic corruption and the denial of basic human rights that created the deplorable conditions that made conflict inevitable* (TRC, 2004: Vol.1, Introduction: 11)

Published by the Commission in 2004, the TRC-R produced findings and conclusions about the causes of the war. Its core objective was to promote national reconciliation and the consolidation of peace, to bring about restorative justice and address impunity following the blanket amnesty agreed at Lomé (GovSL, 1999: Articles VI and XXVI).[22] The Commission did not have the capacity, resources or longevity to respond to the needs of all the victims in respect of tangible reparations, so it focused more on truth telling for reconciliation of individuals and communities. Although criticised for its efficacy as mechanism for 'reconciliation' (Huyse and

[21] Gnassingbe Eyadema, President of the Republic of Togo and Chair of ECOWAS; Francis G. Okelo, special representative of the UNSG; Adwoa Coleman, Representative of the Organization of African Unity; the Reverend Jesse Jackson, US Presidential Special Envoy; President Obasanjo of Nigeria, and Presidents Taylor of Liberia and Compaoré of Burkina Faso who had both allegedly supported the rebels

[22] TRC-R (2004), Vol.3b, Chapter 6 (5) and The Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000, article 6.(1) 'The object for which the Commission is established is to create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, from the beginning of the Conflict in 1991 to the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement; to address impunity, to respond to the needs of the victims, to promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered.'

Salter, 2008) its recommendations for longer term peacebuilding through justice for those most affected by the war was paramount for a sustainable peace (Pettersson, 2005, Sesay, 2007). Its final report was a legal document with local legitimacy. Its findings, conclusions and recommendations to address the social, political and economic changes necessary for peace reflected a legitimate and legal framework for post-conflict recovery.[23] Subsequent documents, making all kinds of promises to financial institutions based loosely on ensuring durable peace, were not sufficient to indentify or promote local priorities for peace and the many nuances associated with them.[24] By drawing from the TRC report - a lengthy document chronicling the results of extensive nationwide consultations with the people who lived through the war and its antecedents - the *framework for peace*, outlined above, assumes local legitimacy.

> *If the TRC's recommendations… are fully implemented, they would without doubt act as catalyst for the social and legal reform required to address impunity and establish a culture of respect for human rights in Sierra Leone, as well as helping the social regeneration of battered communities.* (Huyse and Salter, 2008: 131)

To determine the most relevant parts of the Lomé text to analyse, five categories of reform were identified from the Recommendations of the TRC which synergised closely with the conceptual *framework for peace*. These categories were all aligned to specific areas of failed governance (TRC, 204: Vol.2, Chapter 1, Executive Summary and Vol.2, Chapter 3, Recommendations: 43), and guided the structure of the matrix of peace promises (Table 4). Failure of leadership was manifest in several ways: through bad governance, through widespread corruption, through the abuse of human rights and failures in the rule of law, and the misappropriation and

[23] The Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000, Article 5(17), is the legal instrument for this process and charges the government to 'faithfully and timeously implement the recommendations of the report'.

[24] For example, iPRSP (2001), PRSP (2005) and various Letters of Intent to the IMF

management of national mineral resources. These failures form the five categories for analysis of the Accord:

1. Good governance (youth, security services)
2. Anti-corruption measures
3. Promotion and protection of human rights (women, children)
4. Adherence to the rule of law
5. Control and exploitation of national mineral resources

In the Commission's recommendations, youth, women and children represented specific groups for special attention. For the purpose of this analysis, these groups have been subsumed within the five categories noted above, along with the recommendations concerning the security services. This is because the Commission's recommendations for women and children generally fell into the area of *human rights*; for example, the recommendation to ratify the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women and the recommendation for the enactment into law of the Child's Rights Bill. Similarly, the recommendations for youth were generally around inclusion and representation so they have been included in the good governance category noted above. These recommendations for the youth exceeded the usual provisions of democratisation and focused on a much broader engagement of government to cultivate 'political responsibility' in the youth and to develop other proactive programming. Recommendations about the security services have been subsumed within the category of *good governance* because of the local culture of politicising the military and the historic failure of government to provide independent and loyal state security institutions.

When identifying the promises in the Lomé Accord which fell within each category, some were ambiguous in the sense that they could have been identified in two categories, or more. For example, the promise for delivery of basic services such as education and health could be identified as a *good governance* issue, but the analysis has been guided by the framework of the Peace Agreement and this promise has been categorised under *human rights*. The management of strategic resources (Article VII) can also be described as a *good governance* issue, especially considering the historic consequences of economic mismanagement, but this is identified in a separate category (5, above) guided by the recommendations of the Commission's report.

2.2 - ROAD MAP FOR PEACE?

The Lomé Peace Agreement was a compromise document which aimed to be inclusive, but was not. It followed the power sharing paradigm of peace negotiations because neither side had the military capacity to defeat the other (Rothschild, 2002, TRC, 2004: Vol.3A). No blame was apportioned to either party and no explicit acknowledgement was made as to the causes of war, so the analysis which follows generally focuses on the latent rather than manifest content of the document; the unwitting rather than witting promises. What is meant by this is that manifest items are those which are physically present in the document such as a reference to 'good governance' – this was not present in the Lomé document other than in the preamble. Latent content is an item from which an inference can be drawn or interpreted; for example, a reference to *'full public disclosure'* of agreements and transactions infers a reference to the 'good governance' agenda (Robson, 2002: 354). To some extent, the interrogation of Lomé is inferred and interpretative but the interpretation is legitimised by the recommendations of the TRC-R.

The following phrases in the Lomé Accord identify the vocabulary of the *peace promises*:

"shall accord, shall enable, shall be established, the parties agree, shall be set up, have agreed, will be carried out, agree to, shall be, pledge to, shall provide, shall design and implement"

Table 4 – Peace matrix: a summary of the *peace promises* made at Lomé

Area for reform (category)	Peace promise	Parties	Action
Good governance	Transformation of the RUF/SL into a political party – **Article III**	GovSL	P
	Enable members of the RUF to hold political office – **Article IV**	GovSL	P
	Enable members of the RUF to join a broad-based government of national unity through cabinet appointments – **Article V**	GovSL	P
	Establishment of a Constitutional Review Committee – **Article X**	GovSL	C,L,P
	Commitment to constitutional elections – **Article XI**	GovSL	P
	Independent National Electoral Commission – **Article XII**	GovSL	L, P
	Restructuring and retraining of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces – **Article XVII**	GovSL	P
	Commission for the Consolidation of Peace – **Article VI**		
Anti-corruption	-	-	-
Human rights	Guarantee and promotion of human rights (UN and OAU) – **Article XXIV**	GovSL/RUF	P
	Human Rights Commission – **Article XXV**	GovSL/RUF	P
	Truth and Reconciliation Commission to address Human Rights violations - **Article XXVI**	GovSL/RUF	L, P
	Post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction, with special provision for women – **Article XXVIII**	GovSL/RUF	P

	Special fund for war victims – **Article XXIX**	GovSL/RUF	P
	Child combatants – **Article XXX**	GovSL/RUF	P
	Education and health – **Article XXXI**	GovSL/RUF	P
Rule of law	-	-	-
Mineral resources	Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development – **Article VII**	GovSL/RUF	C, L, P

Coding for Action	
C	**Constitutional change**
L	**Legislation**
P	**Process**

Some of the peace promises involved constitutional change or new legislation, and all involved new practices or processes. Most in the *good governance* category were about power sharing arrangements and were concessions for immediate RUF gains in the transitional phase of government. Articles III to V were concerned with the inclusion of the RUF in governance, the freedoms associated with political party formation in a democratic polity, and the legal steps necessary for this process. Analyses of these arrangements and promises and the abuse of the peace process by the RUF leadership have been well documented elsewhere (Rashid, 2000, Bright, 2000, Abraham, 2004b, Abdullah, 2004), but the promises in this category which were relevant for positive longer term reform included the establishment of a new NEC and the reform of the security services. Articles XI and XII confirm the commitment of the government to continue with free and fair constitutional elections, supported through the creation of an independent body (the NEC) with the express mandate of creating a *'level playing field'* for all parties (Article XII (2)). Unsurprisingly, there was no reference in the Agreement to corruption but, bearing in mind the historic reputation of the old NEC as a clientele outfit, the phrasing *'No member of the NEC shall be eligible for appointment to political office by any*

government formed as a result of an election he or she was mandated to conduct' might be interpreted as a nod in the direction of anti-corruption efforts.[25] So too might the promise of *'full public disclosure'* of all *'correspondence, negotiations, business transactions'* with regard to the government's exploitation of the country's mineral resources (Article VII (10)). With regard to military reform, the point of this was to create *'truly national armed forces, bearing loyalty solely to the state of Sierra Leone, and able and willing to perform their constitutional role'*. Lessons had been learned from the failures of the 1996 Abidjan Agreement and the following security vacuum which allowed the RUF to regroup with the SLAF and launch their successful coup in 1997. The promise to reform the military may also have been influenced by the historic politicisation and ethnicisation of the military under the APC regimes which had been contributing factors for political instability and for the disastrous counter insurgency. Consequently, the Agreement promised to recruit members of the armed forces in a way that would *'reflect the geo-political structure of Sierra Leone'* and would include ex-combatants of the RUF, CDF and SLA.

The Accord did not include the interests of all groups involved in the fighting. The views of the key combat group, the AFRC/SLA, and its leader Johnny Paul Koroma were not represented at Lomé. This was due to the common negotiation position of the RUF/AFRC, headed by Sankoh, which had 'pruned' AFRC representation at Lomé to those most amenable to RUF interests (Rashid, 2000). A statement signed by the AFRC/SLA later in the year (September 1999) requested that their interests be included in the peace process. These interests included

[25] In the Accord, there was only one mention of corruption which appeared in the preamble: 'Committed to promoting popular participation in the governance of the country and the advancement of democracy in a socio-political framework free of inequality, nepotism and corruption;' The Kabbah government had already expressed a commitment to anti-corruption measures prior to the peace deal and the Anti-Corruption Act of 2000 mandated the creation of the Anti-Corruption Commission. More details of the activities of this Commission are presented in Chapter 5.

compensation for war widows and access to economic activities such as carpentry, agriculture, and small-scale industry to improve the economic opportunities of ex-combatants.[26]

In the 'good governance' category, the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP) (Article VI) was to be set up to ensure the implementation of the Agreement and to focus specifically on the needs of the victims of war, women and child soldiers in particular. To alleviate marginalisation of the AFRC leadership, Lt Col Johnny Paul Koroma was offered chair of the CCP in his absence. The irony of appointing the leader of the AFRC, accused of war atrocities comparable to the RUF, as chair of the Peace Commission was not lost on the international community. The Commission was subsequently politically and financially marginalised by both national government and international community, but despite this, Koroma achieved a lot in respect of immediate post-war confidence building which included mass voluntary disarmament in the provincial capital Bo (Bright, 2000: 38).

Two relevant promises have been identified in this analysis. The promise to create an independent National Electoral Commission was a significant development for the political landscape in Sierra Leone. The NEC was a key institution for democracy because it enabled multi-party elections to be held in a free, fair and peaceful environment; it controlled the excesses of the incumbent and opened up the whole process to external and internal scrutiny. The NEC was therefore a key institution for the 'good governance' agenda. So too was a reformed military; to neutralise a powerful state security institution and institution of democracy was a major step forward to correct the troubled political history of Sierra Leone. Both

[26] Position Statement of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) dated Saturday, 18th September 1999, located at Sierra Leone Web: http://www.sierra-leone.org/AFRC-RUF/AFRC-091899.html, and accessed on 01/07/09

these promises had sound resonance with the recommendations of the TRC and the *framework for peace* (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 3: 232-239, 201-202).

PEACE PROMISE 1 – INDEPENDENT NEC

PEACE PROMISE 2 – REFORM OF THE ARMED FORCES

Promises for the protection of civil, political and human rights – drawn from the Sierra Leone Constitution, the UN Declaration on Human Rights and the AU African Charter on Human and People Rights, were detailed in Articles XXIV to XXVI. Given the systematic abuse of human rights by successive governments in the post-independence years and the gross abuses committed by both government and rebel forces during the conflict, these promises were fundamental for both the immediate reconciliation process and longer term peace-building. The imperative was to build trust between ex-combatants and civilians, but also to build trust between the state and its society (Bright, 2000, TRC, 2004). Promises under the human rights section (Article XXIV (2)) included detail such as the *'protection of freedom of expression and association'* and the *'right to a fair trial'* and *'participation in governance'* – this had resonance with the past and the one party state, and the intimidation and oppression of political opposition under the APC regime. The promises to create two new Commissions; the *'autonomous quasi-judicial'* Human Rights Commission and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, tapped into post-conflict imperatives to address grievances stemming from atrocities committed during the war, but there were longer term implications too. The promise to *'promote Human Rights education throughout the various sectors of Sierra Leonean society'* and the request that local civil society and human rights groups *'help monitor human rights observance'* show a longer term commitment with potential for much greater awareness about human rights and new channels to

process complaints. This sort of language reflected the rhetoric of the 'liberal peace' where governments were expected to respect the rights of their citizens as a sign of commitment to 'good governance' and the international norms of state behaviour. There were other significant promises under the Human Rights section. The Commission for Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction was to provide *'special attention'* to the needs of women; there was to be a special fund for war victims and *'particular attention'* accorded to the issue of child soldiers. Finally, the government promised to provide free primary school education but was more cautious in its *'endeavour'* to provide extended schooling or *'affordable primary health'* care.

There were two important findings in the analysis of the human rights section of the Agreement. First, despite many promises associated with 'human rights' there was no mention or promise of judicial reform to secure the most fundamental of human rights – access to justice.[27] Indeed, the TRC-R stated that *'The starting point in establishing the rule of law is the creation of an independent, impartial and autonomous judiciary',* and wide ranging and far reaching reform of the judiciary was recommended by the TRC-R to secure and guarantee human rights protection and also to control discretionary governmental power (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 3: 131).

> *Inequitable law, separate court systems, lack of access to courts, few lawyers, and a confusion of administrative and judicial roles all conspired to prevent the application of the rule of law in Sierra Leone. Courts rarely protected human rights or policed administrative irregularity.* (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 3: 130)

[27] Unlike the former Abidjan Agreement which included in Article 24 - *'The Parties agree that the independence of the Judiciary shall be strengthened in accordance with its role of ensuring the fair and impartial dispensation of justice in a democratic order.'* A copy of this agreement can be found at Conciliation Resources - http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sierra-leone/abidjan-agreement.php, accessed on 28/12/09

Despite the absence or reference to the rule of law at Lomé, there was an unwitting acknowledgement of the weakness of the country's judicial systems in Article VII, para.7 (management of mineral resources); that the government may (if necessary) *'seek the assistance and cooperation of other governments and their instruments of law enforcement to detect and facilitate the prosecution of violations of this article'*.

The second important finding was the explicit promise by the GovSL for the *'immediate implementation'* of the TRC's recommendations. This was of paramount importance for peace because the weaknesses and omissions of the Lomé Peace Agreement, such as the absence of a commitment to judicial reform, mentioned above, were to be corrected and supplemented by society-wide consultations through the TRC.

PEACE PROMISE 3 - PROTECT AND PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS

The management and exploitation of national mineral resources was another key point of analysis. This was because, although there were disputes about the role of diamonds as a key factor for the war, what was agreed was that the historic mismanagement and exploitation of the nation's wealth by corrupt political elites led to collapse of the economy and ultimately collapse of the state (Gberie, 2005, Zack-Williams, 1999, Richards, 1996, Fanthorpe, 2001, TRC, 2004). Agreement to secure and monitor mineral extraction; '*the legitimate exploitation of Sierra Leone's gold and diamonds, and other resources'* was therefore highly contested at Lomé (Rashid, 2000: 26). The decision to offer Sankoh leadership of the new Commission for Strategic Mineral Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD) was regarded as the biggest concession made by the government (Bright, 2000: 39). The broader context for the management of mineral resources, however, had direct relevance for peace:

> *The proceeds from the transactions of gold and diamonds shall be public monies which shall enter a special treasury account to be spent exclusively on the development of the people of Sierra Leone, with appropriations for public education, public health, infrastructural development, and compensation for incapacitated war victims as well as post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction. Priority spending shall go to rural areas.* (Article VII:6)

Additional promises were made for a transparent and accountable process (Article VII, paras.10 and 11) *'to make the exploitation of gold and diamonds the legitimate domain of the people of Sierra Leone'* (para.14). Together, the various promises made under Article VII provided a framework for better management of the economy, the accountable exploitation of natural resources and their proceeds, and a commitment to the transfer of ownership of these resources from rebels and political elites to the citizens of Sierra Leone.

PEACE PROMISE 4 – PUBLIC OWNERSHIP OF PUBLIC GOODS

Lomé and the accompanying TRC-R can now be reduced to the principal promises for peace which provide a comprehensive blue print which has the potential to address some of the challenges for building long term peace.

1. **The promise to create an independent NEC**
   This addresses the issue of equal participation and access to government, political freedoms, a level playing field for all political parties and a commitment to democratic processes and institutions
2. **The promise to reform the Sierra Leone Armed Forces**
   This is important because of the historic tendency of the armed forces to destabilise government and terrorise citizens.
3. **The promise to protect and promote human rights**

   This had potential to address government's propensity to disrespect civil and political rights, and to promote a society wide acceptance of the rights and dignity of all individuals especially women and children.

4. **Public ownership of public goods**

   The effective and transparent management of the national economy, the exploitation of mineral resources for the sole good of the civilians of Sierra Leone, improved economic opportunities for marginalised groups

   Additional proxy promises through the TRC, are as follows:

5. **Judicial reform and the rule of law**

   Essential for the protection of human rights and for the division of powers in a democratic polity – democratic institutions to check the excesses of the executive and failed leadership of the past

6. **Anti-corruption**

   To address the many imperative recommendations of the TRC-R in respect of bad leadership and the behaviour of political elites

7. **Good governance**

   The imperative recommendations in the TRC-R on good governance were almost exclusively concerned with the behaviour of political elites and establishing an ethos of good, impartial, accountable leadership to improve the relationship of trust and reciprocity between citizen and state, and in addition to that was the 'national emergency' of youth unemployment

2.3 - ANALYSIS OF THE LOMÉ PEACE ACCORD

> *The Sierra Leone government was under a moral obligation to lead the way in the search for peace – an obligation it did not always fulfil* (Bright, 2000: 41)

Compromise agreement

In contrast to the previous peace deal brokered in Abidjan where the RUF was under pressure to compromise, at Lomé they were on the offensive (Abraham, 2004b) which was, in part, due to the increased international interest in the cessation of hostilities, at any price (Keen, 2005). The compromises at Lomé, however, involved unconstitutional 'political surgery, done in the name of peace' and an explicit disregard for the wishes of the electorate (Bright, 2000: 39). The 'despicable amnesty' scandalised Sierra Leoneans and was greeted with condemnation by

international human rights organisations (Gberie, 2005: 51). The feeling of injustice was aggravated by the slow start of the TRC due to lack of funding and the various ceasefire violations.[28] The local reaction to power sharing and a blanket amnesty for RUF atrocities prompted a series of public strikes (Abraham, 2004b). The protests, organised by the Civil Society Movement, reflected public outrage at the challenge power sharing posed to their hard won fight for democracy. *'We're fighting for democracy. We cannot see democracy being tampered with by rebels who have destabilised the nation'*.[29]

The outcome of the promises

The short term compromises made by the government at Lomé were never intended to come to fruition. The RUF was not offered a 'senior' cabinet position or the parastatal and diplomatic jobs promised in the Agreement. Further, the unclear wording of Article VII meant there was great confusion as to the role of the CMRRD and it was never fully constituted; the Council of Elders (Article VIII), whose mandate was to manage any conflicting interpretations of the Agreement, was never set up (Bright, 2000). These failures may have been due to lack of finances and other resources as well as the lack of will, the expectation that Sankoh did not intend to keep his promises, or the priorities of the international community which meant uneven application of the peace plan (Bright, ibid). Control of mineral resources through the CMRRD meant that the RUF still had the means to prosecute the war (Gberie, 2005: 51). Although the RUF had promised a ceasefire in exchange for control of natural resources, almost immediately it broke this promise by kidnapping UNAMSIL troops and murdering peace protestors (Rashid, 2000, Bright, 2000).

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[28] See Steve Coll, *The other war,* Washington Post, 9th January 2000 and Human rights Watch *Letter to Kofi Annan,* 6th July 1999, http://hrw.org/english/docs/1999/07/06/sierra5754.htm

[29] Sierra Leone News, 17/06/99, available from Sierra Leone Web: http://www.sierra-leone.org/Archives/slnews0699.html, accessed on 06/06/08; see also Abraham (2004)

Both protagonists were not fully committed to their short term peace promises and those who were excluded appeared to behave with more dedication to the peace process, Johnny Paul Koroma of the AFRC, for example. Vice-president Soloman Berewa admitted later that no-one expected Sankoh to show any commitment or respect for the peace deal and that, sooner or later, he would commit crimes outside his amnesty period and could be re-arrested and stripped of his cabinet post and all other entitlements under the deal (Berewa, 2001: 55-56). The pressure from the international community to broker a deal was immense. Signing the deal, under whatever conditions, was imperative to secure international support for reconstruction even at the expense of justice and democracy for the local populace. The weakness of the Agreement was its 'elitism'; the exclusion of the historically marginalised and disgruntled mass of youth who had been victims or perpetrators of the war, and the AFRC leadership. There were no promises or commitments to the youth of Sierra Leone as a specific marginalised group. Prioritising the RUF leadership reflected a myopic approach to the complexities of the conflict and the role played by government forces and other rebel groups. No representatives of the renegade soldiers were present at Lomé and although civil society was present, no provision was made for the youth (Gberie, 2005:157). In the Abidjan Agreement (1996) provision was made for this group under Article 26(e) to *'provide job opportunities in a systematic and sustainable way for the people, especially the youth'*. The machinations of Foday Sankoh were all about securing the best deal for himself not the thousands of loyal combatants under his command who faced uninspiring reintegration into a hostile society and collapsed economy. But the 'revolutionary script' of the war had long since been diminished to that of greed and the quest for power at the centre.

A further weakness of the Accord was the lack of focus on the socio-economic dimensions to the war - a departure from the promises at Abidjan for reconstruction, substantive parts of which were not replicated at Lomé. For example, the promises of equal opportunities for the rural and urban poor, equitable distribution of the nation's resources and job opportunities for the youth, judicial and police reform and *'probity in government'* were all absent from the second peace plan (see Gberie, 2005).

Although Lomé was weak in its exclusionary process and contained promises for a 'quick fix' peace deal so as to engender the flow of international aid, the longer term peace promises made by the government to its citizens were important. Bright described these as embodying *'the hope of millions if respected and which in essence addresses the major issues which are at the bottom of the conflict'*. Bright argued that Lomé was far more than a dispute solving mechanism. The potential beneficiaries also included ex-combatants, war victims and the wider citizenry because the deal was to *'encompass the setting up of solid and secure socio-economic structures in post-war Sierra Leone as a factor of security'*. (Bright, 2000):

> *The proceeds from the transactions of gold and diamonds shall be public monies which shall enter a special Treasury account to be spent exclusively on the development of the people of Sierra Leone, with appropriations for public education, public health, infrastructural development, and compensation for incapacitated war victims as well as post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction. Priority spending shall go to rural areas.* (GovSL, 1999: Article VII, 6)

This promise alone had the potential to correct, or at least assuage, the deep societal grievances which gave fuel to such a destructive war.

The recommendations of the TRC

In all the analyses on war in Sierra Leone, and the official and unofficial documentation which supported peace, the question of tackling bad governance and

failed leadership was compelling. Failed leadership was described by the TRC in the following terms:

- Unrestrained greed, corruption and bad governance
- Undemocratic practices such as obstacles to participation, lack of accountability, discrimination and marginalisation of certain groups, outlawing political expression
- Poverty, deprivation, economic marginalisation
- Uneven development policies for the Western area compared to the provinces
- Abuse of human rights and contempt for the rule of law

In the absence of many tangible 'good governance' promises in the Accord, the recommendations of the TRC-R were crucial because the continuation of corruption, discrimination and marginalisation could reinforce historic power struggles among the elite and the rest of society which had previously *'suffocated the growth of democracy and good governance'* and *'nurtured a rebellious attitude among the youth'* (TRC, 2004: Vol.3A: 212).[30] The TRC-R reinforces the *framework for peace* with a specific vision of good government which would:

1. protect the rights of all citizens through an independent and professional security sector and justice system with strict adherence to the rule of law;
2. rule through transparent and accountable democratic processes allowing equal access to public goods and public resources for the benefit of both citizens and nation, and being responsive to demands from civil society and the broader citizenry at large
3. secure and exploit all proceeds from mineral extraction for the sole purpose of improving the lives of all Sierra Leoneans through development in all parts of the country, equally

[30] See also the UNAMSIL submission to the TRC, Vol. 3A (70)

4. provide economic opportunities to citizens through good management of the state and endeavour to protect the national economy from the consequences of global fluctuations and crises

5. control its territory and borders through an efficient and loyal military

2.4 - PRIORITY INTERVENTIONS

The National Recovery Strategy (NRS) was the short term plan to stabilise the country after the arrival of peace. Its mandate was to produce an overview of the post-war recovery needs in Sierra Leone and to lay the foundation for the consolidation of peace and a transition towards sustainable development (Moore et al., 2003). Three main components for recovery were identified: government, civil society and the economy. Good government, a civil society which could monitor and challenge it, and an economy which could support its functions were prerequisites for the sustained peace and development of the country (GovSL, 2002: 12). Based on needs assessments around the country, strategies were included which would address short term emergency interventions as well as long term development goals. This document was the central point of reference with regard to practical, benchmarked objectives for peace and in 2003 the official assessment of the NRS concluded that it had *'all the needed interventions to address the key causes of the conflict'* (ibid: Executive Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations). The following areas were priorities for the reconstruction:

1. *Restoration of State Authority*

The rebuilding of government infrastructure and institutions at all levels including district administration and councils, police, courts and prisons, and native administration i.e. the reconstruction of state machinery to restore its sovereign legitimacy throughout the country.

2. *Rebuilding Communities*

For example, resettlement of IDPs and refugees, the reintegration of ex-combatants, health, water, sanitation, education, child protection, social services and shelter; essentially providing the very basic conditions necessary for people to reconstruct their communities and survive.

3. *Peace Building and Human Rights*

The two central components being the TRC and Special Court; but also the mainstreaming, sensitisation, education and training on HR issues into all aspects of governance and society. The specific nature of the war - the gross abuses of human rights and the culture of impunity - were seen as a serious issue capable of restricting the sustainable reconstruction of communities.

4. *Restoration of the Economy*

The main priorities identified were the agriculture sector for food security; increased production from the mining industries; transport and communication infrastructure; and improved access to micro-finance. Micro-finance was identified as a potential mechanism for absorbing significant numbers of the unemployed into the country's large informal economy.

There were many short and long term benchmarks under the four main pillars for recovery. Table 5 (below) summarises the plans relevant to the *framework for peace*.

Table 5 - National Recovery Strategy: priorities for long term peace-building

Priority area of intervention	**Description**	**Peace Promise**
(1) consolidation of	▪ District council elections	1, 7
	▪ Increased strength and presence of police	2, 5
	▪ JPs and magistrates courts throughout the country	5, 7

state authority	▪ Rehabilitation of provincial prisons and increased number of prison service staff	5, 7
	▪ Rehabilitate court barries and chiefdom police	2, 5, 7
(2) **re-building communities**	▪ Child protection and social services to vulnerable groups – child soldiers, disabled and handicapped	3, 7
	▪ Establishment of basic services: primary education, primary health care, access to water and sanitation, home rehabilitation	3, 4, 7
(3) **Peace-building and human rights**	▪ Human rights sensitisation and training	3, 7
(4) **restoration of the economy**	▪ Food self-sufficiency, surplus, trading and economic opportunities ▪ Increase official diamond exports and start production of rutile ▪ Increase micro credit loans, especially to rural areas ▪ Improved and sustainably maintained road network throughout the country	4, 7 4, 7 4, 7 4, 7

There was clear potential in these benchmarked objectives to address the longer term issues for peace; for example, extending the reach of the state to all areas of the country and introducing local elections and the rule of law into all provinces would go a long way to improving security and appeasing citizens who felt that their needs were not represented due to the previous centralisation of state authority. In addition, the delivery of basic services and infrastructure to all areas of the country would go somewhere to redress the urban bias of previous governments and would support implementation of the Lomé promise to direct resources to the rural areas. The combination of human rights sensitisation and the strengthening of law enforcement provision had potential to encourage the return of a sense of dignity and security among communities, and ideas around the restoration of the economy also had great potential to address mass unemployment through increased micro credit, expansion of agricultural activities and reform of the mining sector.

The plans for restoration of the chieftaincy tradition, however, had potential to reconstruct a historically contentious system as far as the youth of Sierra Leone was concerned. The TRC-R, which was published after the NRS, called for a national dialogue on the chieftaincy system so that chiefs could return to their *pre-colonial* traditional roles and functions because the colonial system which abused traditional rule was deeply resented by traditional long-standing hereditary houses. The TRC-R therefore called for a return to chiefs' first and primary loyalties – their subjects - not to political parties or the state (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 6, Recommendations: 256).

The NRS was something of a hybrid document combining the local vernacular with global terminology. This was not surprising as the document was to inform the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (iPRSP) which was wedded to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). There were numerous references to 'good governance', for example, and the inclusion of 'human rights' and 'civil society'. The benchmarked objectives in the NRS stopped short of tackling the issues of good leadership, which were more difficult to quantify, by focusing on capacity issues rather than good governance benchmarks. Good governance, corruption and capacity were, however, 'cross-cutting' themes in other official documents written to engage the international community and this more than made up for the lack of commitment made to good governance elsewhere in the UNDAF or iPRSP for example.

The benchmarks of the NRS were supported and supplemented by the 'expected outcomes' of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) which focused on long term recovery through international engagement for development in the country. Drawing from the national priorities outlined in the NRS, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and the Millennium

Development Goals (MDGs), the UNDAF was a blueprint for long term development and peace and included policy targets which could support the *framework for peace*. The UNDAF was the operational framework for the UN's Peace-building and Recovery Strategy and was engaged with the issues of corruption and lack of capacity (human, community and state) which cut across all co-operation strategies. Additional strategies for gender equality, women's rights, youth education and empowerment were also included. The main UNDAF target areas were similar to those of the NRS and synergised with the *peace promises*, but they went further to include 'poverty reduction and integration' outcomes linked to the iPRSP and the global targets of the MDGs. In Table 6 (below) the UNDAF has been reduced to the 'outcomes' for peace which were relevant for the *framework for peace*.

Table 6 - United Nations Development Assistance Framework: selected outcomes

Area of Cooperation	Expected Outcome	NRS Benchmark	Peace Promise
(1) Poverty reduction and reintegration	Increased access to employment and income generation opportunities for poor people	4	7
	Increased access to quality social services, including shelter	2	4, 7
	Increased food production, household food security and farm incomes	4	7
(2) Human rights and reconciliation	Increased awareness and respect for human rights at national level, including the adoption/amendments of national laws as per international obligations	3	3
	Improved capacity of law enforcement agents in the respect and protection of human rights and in conflict resolution at national and local levels	1	3, 5
(3) Good governance, peace and security	Decentralisation policies adopted and local government restored and effectively functioning	1	1, 7
	An effective, efficient and accountable justice system established	1	5, 7
	Public sector reform for efficient and accountable service deliver	2	4, 7

	Security institutions and personnel strengthened	1	2
(4) Economic recovery	Stabilised and competitive economy	4*	4, 7
	Increased private investment and employment	4	7

In most areas, the UNDAF reflected the declared objectives of the NRS. For example, the delivery of basic services to 'priority areas of need' in the provinces and improving road infrastructure to stimulate rural markets and assist agro-based livelihoods including assisting the implementation of micro-credit schemes (UN, 2003: Table1, Programme Framework: 9). But the key departure of the UNDAF from the NRS was its plans for economic recovery (ibid: Table 1, Programme Framework: 13). These focussed primarily on macro-economic reforms and employment generation from the private sector. In contrast, the NRS included great detail about the need for reform of the mining sector to reduce illegal activity and provide new employment opportunities. In particular, the NRS described in detail the strategy required to kick-start and support the rural economy, to ensure food security, promote surplus and increased economic opportunities for trade through agriculture.

What this analysis shows is that there were major areas of synergy between local plans for recovery and development and those contained in the international community's blue print, yet assumptions were made about the method required to deliver the outcomes. Market economics was the model for reconstruction and, like multiparty democracy, was assumed to be the solution for the recovery of the nation. This was indicative of the 'liberal peace' in action as a framework for national recovery; a framework which made flawed assumptions about fragile and challenging local conditions and the ability, capacity and will of the Sierra Leone state to adopt widespread liberalising reforms.

Another interesting point about the UNDAF was its preoccupation with monitoring the various outcomes because a significant portion of the budget was enveloped for this. For example, the budget for monitoring poverty reduction was US$5m which represented around 40% of the overall budget in this area ($12,600m).

The post-conflict challenges for implementation – environment, capacity and dependency

> *the challenge is enormous, as are the financial and human capacity constraints* (GovSL, 2002: 3)

> *the physical devastation within the country, the exodus of skilled Sierra Leoneans, the disruption of schooling, high numbers of traumatised war victims, the destruction of authority systems, and deeply rooted social problems, particularly the neglect of youth, were all part of the environment in which the Lomé agreement was to succeed or fail* (Bright, 2000: 40)

In reconstruction, the tendency of the international community was to ignore the limited capacity of the state and to push ahead with overambitious programming ((Moreno, 2000, cited by Cheru, 2002: 215). In the Peace Agreement, at least eleven Articles mandated the support of the international community for their implementation giving some indication of the poor capacity of the Sierra Leone state to instigate and sustain its own peace process. There was therefore great pressure on the government to come to any sort of deal which would end the fighting and secure external support (Keen, 2005, Gberie, 2005). Despite chronic capacity issues, the Lomé Agreement committed to establishing no fewer than thirteen new Commissions or Committees:

New Commissions

- Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC)
- Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP)

- The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)
- The Human Rights Commission (HRC)
- National Electoral Commission (NEC)
- The Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD)
- National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
- National Commission for Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

New Committees

- Ceasefire Monitoring Committee
- Constitutional Review Committee
- The Committee for the Release of Prisoners of War and Non-Combatants
- The Committee for Humanitarian Assistance
- The Provincial and District Cease-fire Monitoring Committees

Additional Bodies (macro-economic reform)

- National Revenue Authority
- National Commission for Privatisation

These extra burdens were to put a huge strain on the limited human, technical and financial resources of the state. The bad governance preceding the war and the destruction caused during the conflict meant that the state faced severe problems for revenue collection and the effective utilisation of resources. The failures of leadership had been manifest at all levels of public life including throughout the civil service and bureaucracy, and this had stripped the state of its capacity to effectively collect revenues or pay wages (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 2: 67). Figure 6 shows how government revenue failed to keep up with expenditure especially during the two years after Lomé where the deficit rose to an average of around 16% (2000 and 2001). The civil service, police, army and judiciary all felt the impact of low

revenues post-war (Reno, 2003). State infrastructure; buildings, equipment, technology, skills and human resources had all been severely damaged by the war; capital flight had removed potential revenue flows associated with commercial enterprise, and the criminalisation of the mining sector had depleted the national treasury still further. This crisis of capacity and resources meant greater dependency on the international community for aid, most of which could not easily be absorbed and channelled into peacebuilding projects.

These realities of the post-conflict challenges failed to resonate with the decision making process for recovery which included widespread programming for liberalising reforms.

Figure 6 – Sierra Leone revenue to expenditure 1996-2001



Sierra Leone interim PRSP and PRSP (2005-007)

Recovery … is seen as the process of building capacity, both human and economic, for the Government and Civil Society to be able to take responsibility for all aspects of the future development of the country. (GovSL, 2002: 11)

This emphasis on *capacity building* was the philosophy of the NRS and was echoed in the UNDAF. It was repeated in all official documentation concerning the recovery and development of the country (World Bank, 2006, GovSL, 2001, Moore et al., 2003, IMF, 2007).[31] In the aftermath of war, Sierra Leone was a state almost totally dependent on the international community to fund and resource its recovery and this dependency had implications for the local integrity of the peacebuilding project and the ability of the state to act independently.

> *Good governance is dependent on … the available of appropriate human resources, means of service delivery, effective mechanisms for paying salaries … outreach to district and chiefdom levels, and communication* (GovSL, 2002: 12)

2.5 - CONCLUDING STATEMENT

This chapter has made a thorough analysis of the peace documents to investigate their credentials for correcting the problems of the past to face the challenges of the future. The Lomé Accord had something to offer for the long term peacebuilding, but not much. It was an exclusionary document, constructed to stop the fighting. Some of the promises it contained were steps in the right direction but in the absence of any radical change to the existing structures of government and in the presence of vastly reduced state capacity to deliver much of anything at all, they were rather shallow. A highly controversial compromise document, Lomé excluded the voice of the broader citizenry and was unconstitutional in its promise to appoint potential war criminals to public office and to offer blanket amnesties.

[31] See also Letters of Intent to IMF (2002, 2003, 2005, 2008) available from IMF website at http://www.imf.org/external/np/cpid/default.aspx?gType=CPID&selCountry=Sierra+Leone&DType=Letters+of+Intent+-+Memoranda+of+Economic+Policies&selLang=Select+Language&selMonth=Month&selYear=Year&selMonth1=Month&selYear1=Year, accessed on 07/07/09

In contrast, the TRC-R represented the local voice on post-war priorities. More plausible in its conclusions about the peacebuilding project, it was a legal document which legitimately and comprehensively 'filled the gaps' left from Lomé. The TRC-R was more realistic about the capacity of the state to reform quickly and focussed primarily on the behaviour of political elites. Although challenging, the solutions for a peaceful Sierra Leone drawn from the TRC-R were much less complicated and ambitious than those recommended in the documents produced to garner international support and feed into the PRSPs. The wish lists in the blue prints for peace were unrealistic by any standards and the project of capacity building was not a natural partner to quick win reforms expected by external actors, because the quick win reforms required significant state capacity in themselves. The NRS and the UNDAF combined to form a comprehensive blue print for recovery, but despite their similarities there was some departure in the focus on reviving the economy. The main contradiction was the emphasis on growth for poverty reduction and the alignment of recovery with the MDGs. This was to involve a statebuilding enterprise which was to smother any notions of local 'discoveries' informing the local recovery. A strategic deficit had emerged as ownership of the peacebuilding seemed to have shifted from the broader citizenry to internal and external elites who were involved in constructing new promises to secure assistance for recovery. The local plan for peace appeared to be absorbed into a bigger, more complex paradigm for peace amidst pre-determined norms and values of the international system which were unable to engage with the local challenges because of their inflexibility. The emerging tensions between the external and internal priorities for reconstruction meant the relocation and re-identification of the political economy of peace. Lomé had secured the consolidation of governing structures which had failed to serve the populace in the past but without a radical change post-war, was it realistic to assume that familiar

liberalising policies would unite a nation and produce a more equal and fair society? Was it possible that the new model, on an old theme, would have the flexibility to address the local challenges for peace as well as the many global expectations?

Something was already looking a little faulty with the blue print for peace. The claim of liberal peacebuilding - that it was inclusive and locally sensitive - was rather shallow in the trajectory of the reconstruction of Sierra Leone. What was imagined to be a home grown project morphed into something different and the vocabulary of the Lomé Accord was just the genesis of dialectic on recovery which was to create a strategic deficit in the location of the political economy of peace.

> *…distressingly, the Commission did not detect any sense of urgency among public officials to respond to the myriad challenges facing the country. Indeed, the perception within civil society and the international community is that all efforts at designing and implementing meaningful intervention programmes, such as the National Recovery Strategy … … are driven by donors rather than the national government. This is lamentable.*
>
> (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 1, Executive Summary: 21).

CHAPTER THREE

REFORM AND INTERVENTIONIST POLITICS

Chapter two conceptualised a working *framework for peace* which illustrated the local priorities for long term peace. To understand the interventionist politics associated with the peacebuilding and reconstruction, and the impact of those politics on local peacebuilding priorities, chapter three now makes an investigation into the model for reconstruction and the programming involved to see what new mechanisms were put in place to help support local needs and local concerns and the many local challenges for peace.

To facilitate the analysis, an interrogation is made of various documents including the PRSPs, Letters of Intent and HIPC to ascertain what conditionalities were attached to loans, and for what purpose, so that a comparison can be made between the government's promises to the IFIs, and those made to local citizens. The analysis draws on work by Luckham which claims that the goals of international actors may be 'mutually incoherent or may conflict with those of national stakeholders in post-conflict states' (Luckham, 2004: 501). What follows, therefore, is an investigation into potential areas of dichotomy or contradiction, complementarity or consistency, between international goals and those of local people.

The information is organised loosely around two themes; macro economic reform and 'good governance', and the chapter opens by presenting the history of conditionalities in Sierra Leone. Section 3.1 explains the concept of statebuilding in terms of its relevance for peace and the delivery of development and security. Section 3.3 goes on to analyse the politics of reconstruction and engages with the

concept of 'good governance' to determine its relevance to the governance challenges of the local peacebuilding plan. Section 3.4 analyses the politics of donor intervention in the promotion of democracy and the chapter closes with an analysis of the main priorities for the reconstruction.

3.1 - HISTORY OF CONDITIONALITIES IN SIERRA LEONE

Similar to most impoverished nations whose national economies were imploding under the weight of debt repayments, Sierra Leone undertook structural adjustment programming to secure additional loans from the IFIs during the 1980s. SAPs represented conditional lending which demanded increased government support to agriculture but at the same time the 'rolling back' of the state through the liberalisation of its economy (Thomson, 2004: 183). Conditional lending meant that the IFIs became the dictators of Sierra Leone's public policy, exposing the fate of the local economy to the global market. SAPs became very controversial across the continent as countries paid out more in debt servicing than they received in foreign exchange leaving no funds to reinvest in state infrastructure, industry or services. The result was increased unemployment and reduced public goods (ibid: 187). Poverty deepened in Sierra Leone. The imposition of cuts in rice subsidies were described as 'political suicide' by Siaka Stevens who handed over power to Joseph Momoh the same year (Stevens, 1985). SAPS had a detrimental effect on political stability across the continent and Sierra Leone was no exception. As noted earlier, they hastened the crisis of patrimonialism which threatened the legitimacy of the state. The country was subjected to further substantial structural reforms under Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) from 1991-1998 but the intensification of the war stymied the completion of those reforms (IMF/IDA, 2002: C9).

New thinking on conditionalities blamed the failure of SAPs on the inability of nation states to 'own' their development because policies were imposed from outside without local consultations. A post-Washington consensus emerged in the late 1990s which claimed to be not only a 'new theory' of development, but a 'new process' for development by involving wide ranging consultations with local people to establish local 'ownership' of the project (Stiglitz, 1998). The plan included the notion of 'democratic, equitable and sustainable development' which was something of a departure from the former Washington consensus because the idea was to raise living standards as well as GDP, standards which could be measured using health and literacy indicators (ibid).[32] Thus the MDGs were born; concerned with political, social and environmental stability as well as economic stability, they aspired to produce a multisectoral, intersectoral, holistic, balanced and humanist approach to development (Cheru et al., 2005: 2/3).

The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPCI) was the mechanism designed to correct the ownership issue around national policy for development. New conditionalities on loans shifted the emphasis from *policy modality* to *policy processes* and their outcomes. It was believed that *process* conditionality would succeed where *policy* conditionality had failed because drawing local stakeholders into consultations would legitimise the reforms (Foster et al., 1999: cited by Booth, 2003:7, Easterly, 2006, Stiglitz, 1998). Recognising that SAPs had failed and national governments needed to be involved, the HIPCI therefore became the new instrument to legitimise debt relief. The key element was submission by national governments of PRSPs setting out a *country led strategy* for development and poverty reduction although these strategies had experienced very mixed outcomes

[32] '*higher GDP is not an end in itself, but a means to improved living standards and a better society, with less poverty, better health, and improved education.'* GBERIE, L. (2000) *First stages on the road to peace: the Abidjan process.* London: Conciliation Resources.

previously across the continent (Booth, 2003). In Sierra Leone, writing the PRSPs involved the participation of a broad range of local stakeholders who were invited to 'buy in' and 'take ownership' of the liberalising agenda (Paris, 2004). The GovSL was to engage widely with its society to produce tangible ownership of its development policy. This was good news for the peace given the exclusionary nature of politics in the past, and yet the purpose of consultation was to establish how best to implement an already agreed template of reform not to encourage fresh thinking by locals on the pressing issues facing the nation.

The Sierra Leone PRSPs set out the government's wide ranging pledges to secure lending from the IMF and credits from the WB, and also support from development agencies (Booth, 2003). They also contained various promises for 'good governance'. The argument went that 'good governance', of which democracy was a central tenet, meant that those in positions of responsibility would be held accountable for their actions, or inactions, and citizens would have a voice in decision making and programme implementation (World Bank, 2005: 5).

The documents did not represent a 'blue print' for peace but a blue print for reform which could garner international assistance for recovery. Crucial for stabilising the national economy was securing substantial debt relief under the HIPC2 therefore the PRSPs made the right pledges to mainstream anti-poverty measures into national policy through a system of 'good governance'. The iPRSP was required for HIPC Decision Point and the PRSP, which involved broader consultations with stakeholders and the government meeting critical 'performance criteria', was required for Completion.

The papers were deeply problematic in respect of their potential to divert national resources away from pressing local concerns, and also in their assumptions that 'democracy' would bring good government. Further, the consultations did not

leave room for debate about the structures within which reform would take place; an export oriented and open economy, for example, and a multi-party system of democracy. The PRSP process was not without its critics who argued that PRSPs generally consisted of 'vague statements of aspirations' not based on any assessment of previously failed policies, and were garnered through a consultation process 'less than completely inclusive of interest groups'. The consultation process also included no mechanism to deal with contentious stakeholders who might fail to agree on the way forward (Booth, 2003: 15, Easterly, 2006: 127). Others noted that HIPC 'performance criteria' put too much strain on the economies of weak states especially at a time of 'make or break' in fragile post-war transitions (Castillo, 2008: 92, Fayolle, 2006), a point taken up by Keen who explained the impact of economic structural reforms on the DDR; absorbing former combatants into communities, for example, was undermined by reduced economic opportunities brought on by adjustment (Keen, 2008: 188, Hanlon, 1996). The first twenty six countries to qualify for debt relief under HIPC went on to spend more on debt servicing than health care and most countries never reached the point where they could sustain their debt. Many were servicing debt at the cost of widespread malnutrition reflected in poor social indicators such as premature death and excessive morbidity (Cheru, 2007: 76). In the case of Sierra Leone, channelling national wealth out of the country in debt servicing did not help the recovery effort. This was a serious issue for peacebuilding, a point acknowledged by the World Bank which argued that in post-conflict states, the documents should 'look and feel very different from other countries' because of the priority to consolidate peace, and 'development strategies should look different in countries facing a high risk of conflict, where the problems and priorities are distinctive' (World Bank, 2003: 14, Collier et al., 2003: 6).

Despite the critique of the HIPC process, the analysis in this chapter centres on the conditionalities of the IFIs because these institutions held the key to vast flows of aid for Sierra Leone's post-conflict recovery and exercised a powerful and broad sphere of influence. They had preferred creditor status and without their approval it would be hard for a country like Sierra Leone to obtain finance from other sources or secure private investment (Thomas and Allen, 2000). The conditionalities attached to their loans far outweighed the demands of bilateral and multilateral donors although IMF prioritisation of macro-economic reform within the broader framework of 'good governance' influenced donors' areas of policy too (Cheru, 2007). For example, Britain gives aid conditional upon IMF policies (Stiglitz, 1998) and most Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) was associated with the conditionalities of 'good governance' and 'sound economic practices'.

Figure 7 gives an overview of the levels of assistance received by the GovSL from the major donors and financial institutions in the post-conflict period, and shows the split between grants and loans where relevant. Grants to Sierra Leone outstripped loans by a ratio of around 3:1 (Fig.8) but, despite this, it was the conditions imposed on loans by the IFIs which took precedence. Such conditionalities defined the model for rebuilding state institutions and improving methods of economic management, the logic underpinning the reform being that states could export themselves out of a crisis by integrating their economies into world markets. Exports also produced dollars to repay loans, important for servicing debt (Cheru, 2007). The GovSL had little alternative but to buy in to the liberalising agenda and in doing so to get its 'house in order'. Its Letter of Intent (2006) made a point of thanking the IMF and World Bank for their support, *'which was instrumental in garnering assistance from the international community for... development efforts'* (GovSL, 2006). For these reasons the following analysis of

interventionist politics is centred on governance reforms stipulated by the IMF and WB and includes data retrieved from the PRSPs, Letters of Intent and HIPC documentation.

Figure 7 – Summary of grants and loans to Sierra Leone 1999-2006



All data sourced from OECD - http://stats.oecd.org and Sierra Leone Development Assistance Coordination Office - www.daco-sl.org on 08/08/08.

*data for 2006 only for Islamic Development Bank but further loan of $10million approved in 2007 sourced from Islamic Development Bank direct (accessed on 12/08/08) at: http://www.isdb.org/irj/portal/anonymous/idb_news_details_en?mcpFlag=MCP&NE_MCPCountry=Sierra%20Leone&idbNews=IDB%20extends%20US_%2010%20million%20for%20food%20security%20and%20poverty%20alleviation%20in%20Sierra%20Leone.xml&fileTitle=IDB%20extends%20US$%2010%20million%20for%20food%20security%20and%20poverty%20alleviation%20in%20Sierra%20Leone.xml

Figure 8 - Total loans and grants to Sierra Leone 2000-2006



sourced from Sierra Leone Development Assistance Coordinating Office, accessed on 12/08/08 and available at: http://www.daco-sl.org/encyclopedia/5_part/5_1idb.htm:

3.2 - LIBERAL STATE BUILDING AND ITS CRITICS

The IFIs' conditional loans complemented 'liberal peace' philosophising. No recovery could be made without the strong state institutions to deliver it, so the Western model of liberal democracy was marshalled in for the state building project to re-establish workable political institutions, to re-build the national economy and to regenerate civil society - central goals in UN multi-dimensional peace operations. The chronic incapacity of state institutions in Sierra Leone, the result of previous regimes and the civil war, was a case in point for the institution building enterprise as was the legal justification for building the capacity of the state – generically known as *jus post bellum* – which was concerned with the capacity of local government to fulfil its international obligations. Global instruments such as International Humanitarian Law, International Human Rights Law, International Criminal Law,

International Refugee Law, International Development Law and International Economic Law allowed external actors the legitimacy required to set conditionalities for post-war support and allow broad based interventions (Chetail, 2009a, Stahn, 2007). The argument that to establish durable peace it was necessary to build up government institutions legitimised the reconstruction. Thus peacebuilding became associated with the state building project as the foundation for war to peace transitions and influenced policy at the UN, World Bank, IMF and OECD (Fukuyama, 2004, Paris and Sisk, 2007).

Fukuyama's *three phases of statebuilding* is a useful framework to explain the process in Sierra Leone (Fukuyama, 2004: 135-136). The first phase - post-conflict reconstruction - centred on the twin concerns of stability and security, essential for a nation emerging from violent conflict where state authority had collapsed. Activities included the co-ordination and reform of the security forces and police, humanitarian assistance and technical assistance to restore electricity and water supplies, and build bridges etc. As already noted, the UNAMSIL, British military training and the activities of many other local and global actors were very successful in completing this first phase. The second phase involved the strengthening of state institutions, in particular those institutions which could collect and process taxes to channel into development, apropos the peace agreement. Reform of the institutions which supported the national economy was therefore prioritised. Fukuyama describes a good state institution as one which is transparent and which efficiently serves the needs of its 'clients' – the general populace. Therefore institutions also needed to be democratic. Indeed, democratisation was a principal component of reconstruction efforts and democracy assistance in Sierra Leone received healthy funding from various donors who introduced a myriad of democratising initiatives and programming. The third phase of state building aimed

to strengthen weak states by supporting the provision of various state functions such as education or the rule of law.

The notion of state reconstruction from outside was not without its critics. Focussing on reconstructing the Sierra Leonean state without the simultaneous reconstruction of its social fabric (which collapsed at the same time) would not correct the 'long term degenerative disease' of state failure, for example (Zartman, 1995b). Reconstruction would require a 'keen sense of indigenous orders, customs, and ways of doing things' rather than predesigned templates from outside (ICG, 2004, Kumar, 1997, Zartman, 1995a).[33] There was also the danger of resuscitating *dysfunctional* states (Kraxberger, 2007, Hanlon, 2005). Paris described the liberalising model as an 'all purpose elixir' and 'universal antidote to conflict and misery' (Paris, 2004: 37). Even the concept of the state itself was highly contested, especially on a continent with colonial arbitrary state boundaries which bore no resemblance to the natural and historic topography of communities, cultures or religion. The Western notions of 'good governance' and 'statehood' could therefore be irrelevant to some local populations; indeed, there were no examples of sovereign entities in the African context with any 'empirical statehood' (Clapham, 2002, Ellis, 2005, Ayoob, 2001).

Significantly, the 'intellectual logjam' involved in reconstructing nation states - which had previously proved to be unviable as a units for development - stifled indigenous African plans for more meaningful units of social interaction and cohesion (Herbst, 1996). This theme is echoed in the work of Krasner and Fukuyama who questioned the idea of prioritising effective stateness over 'self-determining' states, the irony being that reconstructing a state which is 'politically independent

[33] 'In general, restoration of stateness is dependent on reaffirmation of the pre-collapsed state' (Zartman, 1995b:268) and see Fukuyama (2004) for a discussion about weak states and their international legitimacy

and autonomous, self-governing and geographically distinct' involves predetermined models imposed from outside often producing 'quasi-statehood' lacking efficacy and legitimacy (Krasner, 2005b, Fukuyama, 2005, Bell and Freeman, 1974, Jackson, 1990). In sum, there was no consensus about what a state was, was not or should be, and therefore no consensus on the state-building project.

Given this lack of consensus, faith in post-conflict liberalisation was something of a leap in the dark; a theoretical leap which assumed a successful western model could be transposed to any society, even fragile states emerging from conflict. Further, there was little global evidence of any successful state reconstruction projects implemented by the international community (Fukuyama, 2004) and lessons learned from previous attempts were as 'enlightening in the negative as in the positive' (Zartman, 1995: 267).

Within the liberalising framework for state reconstruction, 'governance' became the new vocabulary of interventionist approaches to successful peacebuilding. This was to involve a top down, multi-layered, multi-level process incorporating civil society as well as state and global politics (Richmond, 2005: 178). Richmond encapsulated this notion with his concept of 'peacebuilding as governance' (ibid). Post-SAPs documentation reflected the new rhetoric as democracy and good governance emerged as key elements for building strong economies (Southall, 2006: 163, Ghali, 1992, Stiglitz, 1998).[34] It could even be argued that the international debate on governance has been reduced to little more than what kind of state is required to support the global markets (Taylor, 2007). The IMF embraced this notion of liberalisation because it was presupposed that market oriented economies and political democracies were mutually reinforcing, but this

[34] See also the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), available from http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html, accessed on 23/09/08

oversimplification of the notion of governance tended to discount the impact of situational and historic factors for the nation building project (Brinkerhoff, 2005). In addition, this simple marriage of liberal ideologies sidelined the interesting debate about how best to govern states with 'limited statehood' – those which had collapsed after war or which had failed in some way. Governing such geographical areas was a complex process which necessarily involved state and non-state actors (both local and global) and which could be better described as 'governance without government' than 'good governance' (Risse, 2006).

Nevertheless, the WB considered 'good governance' to be an essential part of the strategy for raising living standards, and a primary requirement for economic recovery, a view supported more locally by the Organisation of African Union (Harbeson, 1994: 7, Ake, 1993: 242).[35] The rhetoric also influenced many bilateral arrangements; the long term partnership agreement between the UK and Sierra Leone, for example, included the Poverty Reduction Framework Arrangement and the Improved Governance and Accountability Pact (IGAP) which committed to priority governance reform in ten key areas, (DfID, 2004).[36] Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, 'good governance' vocabulary gradually became more visible in UN documentation, and the promotion of 'good governance' an acknowledged part of UN conflict prevention strategies when the concepts of democracy, development and peace became conjoined in the rhetoric.[37] This theme is expanded upon later after a presentation of the detail of macro-economic reform.

[35] Bretton Woods Committee Conference, Africa's Finance and Development Crisis, Washington, April 1990

[36] These were: anti-corruption; auditor general and PAC reports; procurement; civil service reform; service delivery; Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI); decentralisation; non-state actors; money laundering and elections (DfID, 2004)

[37] Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding: Reinforcing the Key Role of the United Nations Parliamentary Hearing at the United Nations, 13–14 November 2006, United Nations, New York – General Assembly Document A/61/703 accessed from the United Nations Official Documents System on 18/09/07, http://www.un.org/documents/

3.3 - THE MODEL FOR RECONSTRUCTION

The politics of macro-economic reform

> *For Sierra Leone to achieve long-term debt sustainability, it is of the utmost importance that the country achieves high and sustained growth through the maintenance of macroeconomic stability, continued pursuit of structural reforms, ... prudent debt management policies and avoiding a new build-up in debt.* (IMF/IDA, 2002)

What was needed to address the priorities for peace in the economic domain was improved management of the national economy, good governance and leadership, with the goal of creating jobs and extracting profits from national wealth to redistribute to local citizens, equally.

Under the IMF's Post Conflict Programme, $50.7m was loaned to the country for resettlement, rehabilitation of infrastructure, and administrative and institutional capacity building essential for effective economic management (Riddell, 2005: 121). The World Bank loaned $238.62m between 2000 and 2004 for the country's HIV/AIDS crisis, economic recovery, administrative restructuring, social action, privatisation, institutional reform and the rehabilitation of its educational and health sectors.[38] The politics which came along with this assistance included reducing the role of government in the economy, improving the environment for the private sector and the private management of public enterprises (IMF/IDA, 2002). These penetrating macro-economic reforms were lauded as the best way forward for economic stability, growth and the reduction of poverty (IDA, 2005, IMF/IDA, 2002, DfID, 2004).

[38] Information available from World Bank at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/SIERRALEONEEXTN/0,,menuPK:367829~pagePK:141159~piPK:141110~theSitePK:367809,00.html, accessed on 30/07/09

Cheru (2008) gives more detail on the various reforms deemed necessary for 'exporting oneself out of an economic crisis' - summarised as follows:

Sierra Leone – summary of macro-economic reform for recovery

- The reduction or elimination of price controls and subsidies
- The removal of trade barriers and opening of the local economy to global competition
- Increasing interest rates to fight inflation and attract savings
- The privatisation of public enterprises (or the privatisation of their
- The reduction of the role of the state in the economy and public services
- Devaluing the local currency to promote exports

The promises made in the iPRSP and National Recovery Strategy were successful in bringing about positive decisions in respect of the country's eligibility for HIPC status and also in expediting assistance under the PRGF (IMF/IDA, 2002). The Letter of Intent issued in conjunction with the iPRSP reaffirmed the commitment of the GovSL to prioritise economic growth and the reduction of poverty (goals which are believed to be complementary), to contain inflation and to improve gross external reserves. Growth was expected to be supported by the reopening of rutile mining, the recovery of agricultural production, the expansion of industry, services and through construction, and the expansion of the fishing and mining sectors. This was to involve both public and private investment (GovSL, 2001). The government committed to good fiscal policy and fiscal management, open and transparent processes, the creation of a social security system and increased incentives for private sector investment and production to drive economic growth (ibid:19). New trade policy would reduce state protectionism and be enhanced by a liberal trading and exchange system, and also privatisation. All these assurances secured US$21 million in emergency funds from the IMF in 1999/2001, the approval of a further

US$169 million over three years from 2002 to 2004 and US$46.3 million over three years from 2006 to 2008 under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), with a further $18.8 million disbursed in 2009.[39] In November 2006, Sierra Leone reached HIPC Completion Point and qualified for debt relief.

The IMF's three key measures of macro-economic stability were sustained economic growth (between 6-7%), inflation below 5%, and 1.9 months import cover in reserves.[40] Table 7 shows the country's record on these measures during the post-conflict period. The country did well in sustaining economic growth but failed to achieve the stated inflation levels which rose to around twice the target by 2004 impacted by rising prices on the global markets, particularly rice and fuel.

Table 7 – Sierra Leone performance criteria indicators 2000 – 2009 [41]

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
GDP Annual	3.8	18.2	27.4	9.5	7.4	7.3	7.4	6.8	5.5	4.5e
Average consumer prices	-0.9	2.6	-3.7	7.5	14.2	12.0	9.5	11.7	14.8	10.6e
Gross international Reserves	49.6	52.0	84.6	59.4	124.9	168.3	184.2	207.7	209	-

e = estimate

The package of reforms was designed to protect debt servicing not necessarily the peace but the documents also contained commitments by the GovSL which would not only please the lenders but could also support the *framework for peace* (GovSL,

[39] IMF Press Release 99/62, IMF Press Release 01/39, IMF Press Release 06/94, sourced at http://www.imf.org/external/country/sle/index.htm?type=9998#8, accessed on 09/09/08

[40] In 2007, for example, Sierra Leone had 4.6 months of import coverage: Letter of Intent (2008) available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2008/sle/120508.pdf, accessed on 03/08/09

[41] data from IMF Data Mapper http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php and World Bank

2001: Memorandum). For example: the improvement of tax administration, service delivery and establishment of mechanisms to track public expenditure (III/17, IV/21); the commitment to a 'substantial increase in outlays on services targeted to the poor, especially in the areas of education, health and rural infrastructure' (III/17); a new salary and benefits package for the SLA to help secure the peace, including benefits for the relative of the killed, the wounded or missing (IV/20); and provision of regular economic activity for ex-combatants (IV/41) (ibid).

In the rhetoric, the reforming agenda of the IFIs complemented many of the goals in the peace documentation. The issue was the structural framework to deliver those goals – indistinguishable from that of old. A further problem was capacity; the broad reach of reform was well beyond the scope of the weakened government, especially as the main priority was to maintain performance indicators to secure debt relief. As a framework for peacebuilding, the PRSPs had severe limitations. The priority remained the servicing of external interests not those of the local community.

The politics of 'good governance'

> *The strategy will emphasise the continued implementation of sound economic policies to attain macro-economic stability within an overall framework of good governance* (GovSL, 2001)

The concept of 'good governance' and, in particular, democratic 'good governance' was central to peacebuilding because violent conflict was often the result of political repression and dysfunctional governance systems. In addition, 'good governance' was required to absorb large amounts of aid in order to satisfy development outcomes (Mani, 2009). The concept was problematic, however, because it did not necessarily fit with local ideas of good governance and the danger was that external social engineering risked rupturing local ideas and modes of political process (Krause, 2005).

In Sierra Leone what needed to be corrected in the post-war programming was the issue of bad *government* and corrupt leadership, the legitimacy of government, the lack of mass participation and the absence of a strong society. Because of the link between governance and peace which influenced the programming of reconstruction in Sierra Leone, and because of recommendations in the TRC-R for good governance and good leadership, some generic definition is required to analyse the relevance of the concept for peace in the locale. The World Bank's project, Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), included six dimensions of governance designed to indicate how 'good' it is: voice and accountability, political stability and the absence of violence, government effectiveness, and regulatory quality, the rule of law and control of corruption. Figure 9 (below) compares the indicators of 1998 with those of 2003 and 2008:

Figure 9 - World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators – selected dates[42]



Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2009: Governance Matters VIII: Governance Indicators for 1996-2008
Note: The governance indicators presented here aggregate the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. The WGI do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the World Bank Group to allocate resources.

The indicators show that between 1998 and 2008 Sierra Leone experienced a remarkable improvement on two 'good governance' indicators. The indicators for 'voice and accountability' reflected the return to multi-party democracy, decentralisation, peaceful transfer of power, and the improved freedoms of both the print and broadcast media as well as a firmly established and growing civil society. Political stability improved due to the end of war and with the emergence of free, fair and peaceful elections in 2002, 2004 and 2007. There were also smaller

[42] World Bank - http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc_chart.asp, sourced from Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2007: Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006 Note: The governance indicators presented here aggregate the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. The aggregate indicators do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Countries' relative positions on these indicators are subject to indicated margins of error that should be taken into consideration when making comparisons across countries and over time.

improvements for both 'government effectiveness' and 'regulatory quality'. 'Rule of law also improved slightly over the post war period recovering from signs of deterioration in 2003. The area of most concern was 'corruption' where the figures show a significant deterioration over the period selected.

The international community decided what 'good governance' looked like by creating a system of measures to monitor it (Fig.9), so what were these conditionalities associated with? The IMF emphasised the need for 'good governance' in economic management, public financial management and regulatory control for example, and these desirable qualities of governance were promoted when providing policy advice, financial support and technical assistance. The IMF limited this conditioning to the economic aspects of governance, however - the aspects that could have a positive macroeconomic impact as far as performance indicators were concerned.[43] For example, 'transparency and accountability' were required solely for monitoring the progress of macro-economic reform. Similarly, the World Bank had a non-political approach to conditionalities on governance (Marquette, 2003: 61). Conditionalities for economic reform were particularly successful in stabilising macro-economic performance and strengthening public financial management (IMF/IDA, 2006: 9), and a more detailed account of the outcomes of this area of reform is presented in Chapter 4.

In contrast to IFI conditionalities, donors took a more holistic approach by aligning policy programming to broad democratisation efforts which included all manner of activities such as anti-corruption, human rights, judicial reform and multi-party elections (Marquette, 2003: 62). The Cotonou Agreement, which shaped the

[43] These are "improving the management of public resources, and supporting the development and maintenance of a transparent and stable economic and regulatory environment conducive to efficient private sector activities" - see the IMF's Approach to Promoting Good Governance and Combating Corruption — A Guide, http://www.imf.org/external/np/gov/guide/eng/index.htm, accessed on 01/04/08 and see also The Role of the IMF in Governance Issues: Guidance Note, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/govern/govindex.htm, accessed on 01.04.08

development relationship between the EU and the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACPs), was quite robust in its emphasis on 'good governance' in the political sphere, for example the Agreement included a procedure which could quickly deal with violations of 'good governance' objectives - such as corruption (Article 97). Serious cases would be referred to the Joint Parliamentary Assembly and could involve suspension (EC, 2000). The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) committed both developed and developing countries to 'good governance' and *mutual accountability* for development aid, along with the more predictable commitments to local *ownership* and donor *alignment* of all policy programming (OECD, 2005). The rhetoric on 'good governance' became central to aid planning and its delivery, and had an influence on the willingness of donors and lenders to commit resources to Sierra Leone. Democracy became synonymous with good governance and anti-corruption, as did development (Abdellatif, 2003, Marquette, 2003). This was most apparent in the type of activities donors were willing to support. Figure 10 (below) gives an overview of DfID's assistance for the period 2002-2007, and shows the political nature of aid to Sierra Leone; around $69 million targeted at governance reforms – 41% of the total spend.

Figure 10 – DfID 2002-2007: summary of programme resources to each sector by percentage



All data sourced from Evaluation of DfID country Programme (DfID, 2008)

Across all definitions of 'good governance' the consensus was that it represented a *process* of exercising power rather than a list of expected outcomes or 'ends' (Abdellatif, 2003: 4), yet the local definition was more concerned with the *people* who exercised power rather than the process per se.

What was the local definition?

The concept, broadly defined by the EU to include the principles of openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence, was hotly contested among the ACP countries generally and no clear or universally accepted definition was agreed (House of Lords, 2006: 233). Because of the difficulties measuring it, there were objections to its admission as a conditionality from the EU (EC, 1998, cited by Crawford, 2000: 96). The World Bank's conceptualisation was heavily criticised by African intellectuals who questioned its relevance locally (Mafeje, 2002: 15, Mkandawire, 2003, Hyden, 2000).

The local definitions from Sierra Leone are drawn from the NRS and the TRC-R.

National Recovery Strategy – Good Governance
Enhancing financial management
Institutional restructuring: NRA, civil service reform and divestiture of state firms
Reforming government procurement procedures
Combating corruption through the ACC
Re-activating local government administration
Strengthening the judiciary and legal system
Implementing the national Strategic Planning and Action Process [44]

The lengthy wish list of the NRS very much aligned with that of the main financial institutions and donors, and resembled the sort of 'ventriloquism' or 'guessing game' played by national governments to secure much needed assistance (van de Walle, 2005, Easterly, 2006: 129). The TRC-R picked up on this distorted vernacular when it referred to the 'lamentable' lack of urgency to respond to local challenges in the attempts to align requests for support with donor priorities (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 1, Executive Summary: 21). The concept of governance as envisaged by the TRC-R was predicated on the fact that Sierra Leoneans yearned 'for a principled system of governance (TRC, 2004: Vol. 2, Chapter 1, Governance). It produced a list of imperative recommendations including fifteen areas for governance reform, all but one involving the behaviour of political elites and corruption. This was a simple model aligned more to a reformed attitude of political elites than reformed government institutions. The definition of 'good governance' among ordinary people in Sierra Leone was a responsive state, under their control.

The iPRSP contained much to support this vision:

[44] A consultative process which engaged more than 2,000 citizens across the country in a structured dialogue on national vision and development priorities, with the aim of fostering participatory and development policy-making and feeding into the major document for long term development, Vision 2025: available from http://www.daco-sl.org/encyclopedia/4_strat/4_1v2025.htm, accessed on 22/07/09

> *"[to] ensure that transparency and accountability is an integral part of the culture in Sierra Leone. The Good Governance programme will put in place a more decentralized, transparent and proactive system of governance with built-in checks and balances to minimize, corruption in government and public administration with civil society playing a key role in the planning and monitoring of policies and budgetary oversight ... ... The thrust will be on grassroots participatory democracy ... ... decentralisation of functions and authority, respect for human rights and checking abuse of power."* (GovSL, 2001: 71)

In contrast to the simple local notion of good governance, what was the feasibility of implementing the more ambitious reforms of the international community? The framework in the PRSPs consisted of three central pillars; good governance, revival of the economy and pro-poor growth, and human and social sector development (GovSL, 2001, GovSL, 2005). The commitments of the PRSPs bore close resemblance to the vision of peace outlined in Chapter 2, but compared to the simplicity of the TRC-R, the promises represented huge undertakings on the part of the government and international community. For example the commitments on expenditures on education, health and sanitation (IV/42) and the commitments to build democratic institutions and embed democratic procedures, including the strengthening of the judiciary and rule of law, and the establishment of an Anti-Corruption Commission (IV/43) (GovSL, 2001: Memorandum). There remained serious issues around capacity. The NRS repeatedly stressed the point that none of the reforms could take place without enhancing human capacity within government, rebuilding government infrastructure and increasing government income base (NRS:12) and these points were acknowledged throughout the IFIs documentation. The government could not have been clearer about the urgent need for extensive technical assistance to re-establish the efficacy of institutions for planning and implementation of development programmes (GovSL, 1999a:39, 40). In particular,

assistance was requested for training and capacity building for revenue collection – a requirement which was acknowledged by the IMF.[45] The government specifically requested assistance in statistical database monitoring, public sector reform programming and building capacity in the provinces (GovSL, 2001).

3.4 - THE POLITICS OF DONOR INTERVENTION

The process of state reconstruction in Sierra Leone was supported by a multitude of bilateral and multilateral aid agency and NGO initiatives (Riddell, 2005). By far the biggest contributor during the immediate post-war period (1999-03) was the United Kingdom with a contribution of around $245,820m.[46] The 2002 elections were a central point of reference for most of the activities and programming of donors, and the consolidation of multi-party democracy in the country was a priority both locally and globally to ensure legitimacy of the post-conflict government.[47] The major international donors for these activities were the UK's DfID, USAID, the European Commission, UNDP and the Commonwealth, who channelled most of their assistance through intermediary INGOs due to the belief that most local intermediaries did not have the capacity to absorb, manage or utilise the support of donors (Sesay, 2005: 20). Despite claims of 'capacity building' not much was in evidence. Intermediaries such as the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD), the International Foundation for Electoral Assistance (IFES) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) among others, were recruited by donors to implement their programming.

[45] 'the strategy of supporting the authorities' program is predicated on the need to rebuild Sierra Leone's administrative and institutional capacity', IMF Press Release 99/62, IMF Press Release 01/39, IMF Press Release 06/94, sourced at http://www.imf.org/external/country/sle/index.htm?type=9998#8, accessed on 09/09/08

[46] Source www.oecd.org/dac/stats/crs

[47] Article XI, Lomé Peace Agreement

The data on financial estimates of international assistance for the democratising project are difficult to assess but total aid flows from the major donors amounted to over US$361m in 2002 alone (Sesay, 2005). New democratic state institutions to be constructed and supported included the SLAF, the NEC, the judiciary and parliament, local councils, the Anti-corruption Commission, Human Rights Commission, civil society and free media. At the same time, the restructuring of the economy included a new National Revenue Authority, Institute of Public Administration and Management and National Privatisation Commission in line with IMF conditionalities. The Democracy Template sets out the state institutions which need to be reconstructed in the project:

Figure 11 - The Democracy Template

Democracy Template		
Sector	**Sector Goal**	**Type of Aid**
Electoral Process	Free and fair elections	Electoral aid
	Strong political parties	Political party building
State Institutions	Democratic constitution	Constitutional assistance
	Independent, effective judiciary and other law-oriented institutions	Rule of law aid
	Competent, representative legislature	Legislative strengthening
	Responsive local government	Local government development
	Pro-democratic military	Civil-military relations
Civil Society	Active advocacy NGOs	NGO building

	Politically educated citizenry	Civic education
	Strong independent media and unions	Media strengthening, union building

Reproduced from Carothers (1999:88)

There was a significant burden of responsibility on the donors who committed to assist the post-war reconstruction. Caution was needed because the speed of reconstruction could put too much load on a fragile and fledgling political system or reconstruct the problems of the past (Ayoob, 2001, Riddell, 2005, Jackson, 2007, Hanlon, 2005). As noted earlier, donor programming involved a complex array of financial and technical support to all the main functions of national and local governance and Figure 12 (below) summarises the democracy assistance programming to support the 2002 elections.

Figure 12 - Summary of democracy assistance activities in Sierra Leone - elections 2002



Reproduced from (Cubitt, 2006)

As promised at Lomé, the national election body was to take on conflict management as part of its mandate by creating a level playing field for full representation in government. It was to contribute to democratisation, rather than de-rail it by operating in former biased and unaccountable ways, so in 2002 an Act of Parliament

was signed into law by President Kabbah to set out the ground rules (The Electoral Laws Act, 2002). Historically, the NEC had a reputation for corruption; infiltrated by APC cronies it was mistrusted by civilians and opposition parties alike, and so the creation of an independent and professional body was an important component of the peacebuilding. Corrupt and threatening behaviour within the NEC had been rampant because there had been no external or non-partisan monitoring of its activities but this situation changed dramatically in the post-war era (Sesay, 2005). Led by IFES, assistance included the training of staff, IT support, the supply of printed materials such as ballot papers, the procurement of equipment such as ballot boxes and the computerisation of voter registration.[48] The Commission relied heavily on technical and logistical support from UNAMSIL for the 2002 elections because it lacked the necessary vehicles and communications to deliver an election to international standards (Europa, 2002: 9). Despite very difficult conditions and high numbers of refugees and IDPs, the NEC successfully completed the registration of voters. As part of the reforms, a voter education programme was launched and new electoral laws drawn up to include specific codes of conduct for political parties. All parties were supported through computer training, poster campaigns and civic education programmes, and additional funding was given to civil society organisations to help with voter education and monitoring activities (Sesay, 2005).

In the outcome, however, the reformed NEC was heavily criticised as inept and un-cooperative, and serious irregularities were unearthed. Complaints were made by civic groups about under age and double voter registration; the rural districts of Bonthe and Pujehun recorded a 100% voter turnout, for example (Europa, 2002). There were further complaints over partisan tactics of the NEC; the main grievance being the bias shown towards the government - partisan tinkering reminiscent of the

[48] International Foundation for Election Systems http://www.ifes.org/

past - and political parties were frustrated with the lack of support (CarterCentre, 2002, Europa, 2002). In Bombali, for example, parties did not receive information on the location of polling stations until the morning of the elections and as a result they were unable to send party agents to monitor the process (Europa, 2002:20). Rural communities were neglected in voter education, awareness raising and monitoring activities, and the change in electoral system and poor education meant that even some political party candidates failed to understand the process, confused by the new multi-member status of constituencies (Europa, 2002, Sesay, 2005: 47). NEC performance in the subsequent local elections of 2004 (the first for over thirty years) brought universal condemnation of the newly reformed commission.

Ahead of the 2007 elections the UNDP launched an Electoral Reform Project aimed at completely restructuring the NEC and recruiting staff through a rigorous selection process.[49] A clean sweep of the commission left all but two members of staff (experienced officers in field operations and coordination) still in their posts.[50] This rigorous exercise was successful in producing a competent and independent Commission solely responsible for organising and supervising elections across the country. Widespread global and local praise for the NEC indicated a successful transformation of a once corrupt and patronage outfit into an independent and professional national institution.

> *The NEC has so far organised the elections in a transparent and impartial manner. It has managed the challenges posed by these elections in a proficient and competent manner. This has resulted in credibility for the institution across the political spectrum as well as from national observers and civil society groups.* (Europa, 2007)

[49] United Nations Development Programme, Sierra Leone - http://www.sl.undp.org/contact.html
[50] Personal interview with representative of the NEC, Freetown, 23rd November 2006

Reform of the SLAF was undertaken through intensive re-training and re-equipping programmes (Ginifer, 2004), the idea being to create a new army, properly screened, and trained to respect the ethics of soldiery and civil authority (Bangura, 2000). This programming was spearheaded by the British Ministry of Defence in collaboration with IMATT to produce a national military defence force; effective, accountable and professional, at an appropriate size thus transforming the dangerously violent and political nature of the SLAF with its associated propensity to destabilise government.[51] IMATT was scheduled to remain in Sierra Leone to undertake this rigorous and thorough programming until 2010, reflecting the commitment made by the international community to centre military reform in the peacebuilding and reconstruction. Some concerns remained about the lack of democratic accountability within the military and also the sustainability of the forces when aid withdrew and the government had to maintain the successful reforms from its own meagre budget (Ginifer, 2004). Subsequent reports suggested, however, that improvements to the professionalism and accountability within the armed forces remained strong with few incidents of indiscipline.[52] Both NEC and SLAF successes were heavily subsidised and managed by the international community and, as stand-alone projects, were universally praised (ICG, 2008).

There was, however, a distinct lack of funding in respect of human rights, a key component in the *framework for peace* and documented as an essential part of the democratisation/good governance programming. Consequently progress was very slow with grave concerns about human rights abuses still remaining in 2007 (Human Rights Watch, 2007). Figure 13 (below) shows the proportion of the UNDAF's

[51] A potential coup plot involving the former leader of the AFRC Johnny Paul Koroma was discovered by British military personnel in April 2002 (ICG, 2008)

[52] Human Rights Watch, Sierra Leone Country Report 2006, available from http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01/11/sierra14713.htm, accessed on 28/09/08 and

annual budget which was spent in the area of human rights: just over $5m which represented only a small fraction of the total which was mostly targeted towards poverty reduction programming. Debt servicing was also criticised for redirecting funds which could support human rights, but concessions were not made by the IFIs for countries emerging from war with pressing human rights concerns (Cheru, 2007: 69).

Figure 13 - UNDAF Programme Resource Framework



Data sourced from UNDAF (UN, 2003)

The passing of the 'Gender Bills' in June 2007 was a positive, if delayed step forward in respect of women's rights although there was still underrepresentation of women in government (EU, 2007).[53] New legislation was adopted to protect children through The Child Rights Act 2007 which fell in line with the international norms of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, but legislation outlawing certain forms of child labour

[53] The Gender Bills 2007: The Domestic Violence Act, The Devolution of Estates Act and the Registration of Customary Marriages and Divorce Act.

remained elusive by 2009.[54] The low priority afforded human rights meant long delays in setting up a Human Rights Commission (GovSL, 2006a, IMF, 2007)..

Strengthening the rule of law and reform of the justice sector was an area which received considerable donor funding but most of this was spent on the creation of the Special Court set up jointly by the Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations to compensate for the blanket amnesties granted at Lomé. Its mandate was to try those who bore the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law, and Sierra Leonean law, from 30 November 1996 and by 2007, eleven people stood indicted.[55] This was one of two key projects spearheaded by the international community in respect of justice and reconciliation. The second was the TRC. These two vehicles for transitional justice were very controversial.

In 2000, the TRC was set up with a budget of around $6.5 million but was suspended after the abduction of UN peacekeepers by the RUF later that year. It wasn't until after the 2002 elections that the commission resumed business. Most sessions of the TRC were poorly attended by both the general public and those people who were expected to testify as more media coverage was given to the activities of the Special Court (Grant, 2005). Although the TRC had no powers to prosecute or punish, there were concerns that any investigations undertaken by the TRC on evidence submitted at the sessions might lead to witnesses being subpoenaed by the Special Court (CarterCentre, 2002). This highlighted the problematic nature of transitional justice in peace-building - a highly contentious component of interventionist policies (Baker, 1996). In contrast to the TRC, the Special Court was inaugurated in 2002 with an initial budget of $58 million, later increased to $80 million, and had a mandate to run for three years, although war crimes were still

[54] The convention on the Rights of the Child adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20th November, 1989, and its Optional Protocols of 8th September, 2000;

[55] See The Special Court for Sierra Leone, http://www.sc-sl.org/index.html, accessed on 29/09/08

being tried in 2009. Most of the main war criminals never came to trial because they were either dead or unaccountable.[56] Chief Hinga Norman, however, the leader of the CDF and a much revered figure in Sierra Leone, was being tried at the Court for atrocities committed under his command when he died in custody in 2007. The trial was controversial locally; in some parts of the country Norman was remembered as the CDF chief who collaborated with the Kamajo and supported the successful British deployment against the RUF. In contrast to this controversial arrest, Charles Taylor was taken to the Hague for prosecution due to security concerns but even this indictment caused ambivalence among Sierra Leoneans.[57] Taylor had his loyalists in both Monrovia and Freetown. The Special Court's mission, the arrest of high profile suspects, aimed to show that a culture of impunity was no longer to be tolerated in Sierra Leone and yet the Court failed to increase local confidence in the justice system as resources to reform the local justice system were mostly inadequate (Stone, 2005, Ginifer, 2004).

> *Is the world only interested in the prosecution of a handful of notorious criminals while people in the country must continue to make do with a collapsed judicial system and the same venal petty officials who compounded the problems that plagued civil society in the country before, during and after the war?* (Gberie, 2005:212)

> *The justice system needs a complete overhaul, from laws through judges.*(ICG, 2003)

The ACC was a joint initiative between the GovSL and UK-DfID. Set up as the flagship mechanism for improved transparency and accountable in government post-

[56] For example, Foday Sankoh died in hospital whilst in UN custody in 2003; Sam Bockerie (a member of the RUF high command) was murdered in Liberia shortly after his indictment the same year and Johnny Paul Koroma of the AFRC fled to Liberia and his whereabouts remained unknown SFCG (2007a) *Elections special: Sierra Leone.* Freetown: Search for Common Ground. .

[57] This ambivalence among citizens reflected the worry that the Court may bring to justice too few of those who committed the most serious crimes and yet other citizens feared the Court would jeopardise the fragile peace by stirring up memories of the war (Gberie, 2005)

war, it aimed to put a stop to rampant corruption but by March 2007, DfID had withdrawn all funding for this initiative following a damning report on its efficacy and the commitment of the government of the day to assist its function. Bearing in mind the importance placed upon anti-corruption measures by the TRC, this failure was a major setback for peacebuilding. A full analysis of the failure of the ACC is presented in Chapter 5. Another area which attracted substantial technical and financial support was decentralisation. Decentralisation of central government functions was an important area of reform for peace and was documented as a priority in both the NRS and TRC-R as part of good governance. Promises in the iPRSP pre-empted the recommendations of the TRC but the commitments were consistent with the local vision and the promises made for socio-economic reform in the Peace Agreement. Decentralisation of authority was a significant change and a direct response to the problems of central government and urban bias which so bedevilled governance in the past. The PRSPs contained strategies to reactivate local government administration and decentralise central government functions (GovSL, 2001: 3.2, a/112, GovSL, 2005: 5.2.1/b). The lack of voice at local level was acknowledged by internal and external policy makers as an important contributing factor for war, the TRC-R also called for the principles of local government to be enshrined in the Constitution and the NRS stated that 'the elected government must be extended throughout the country in order to effectively exert its authority and improve its provision of services to the people of Sierra Leone (p.12). Local council elections were held in 2004 under a project to decentralise governance spearheaded by the World Bank (World Bank, 2005). This included the Rapid Results Initiative (RRI) which planned to 'boost and empower' local councils in the districts, yet the funding structure of the new councils ensured that political power remained at the

centre (Fanthorpe, 2005). This point will be returned to in Chapter 5 where a thorough analysis is made of the local government project.

3.5 - ANALYSIS: PRIORITIES, CAPACITIES AND STRUCTURES

Richmond's argument that the contemporary peacebuilding project has been subsumed within the liberal statebuilding enterprise is supported by the analysis of the official documentation presented above (Richmond, 2008: 105, ICG, 2003). The local rhetoric on the peace morphed into the larger and much more challenging project of statebuilding legitimised by internationally agreed goals on poverty reduction (PRSPs) and the need for national governments to service debt (HIPC). Essentially, peacebuilding was about the implementation of an 'operational checklist, involving fixes to various institutions and processes, without tackling underlying political dynamics' (ICG, 2004). Peacebuilding was certainly formulaic and the model for reconstruction promised little change to historic structures, apart from perhaps, the programme for decentralisation.

Liberalising checklists had the potential to redirect limited local resources - human, technical and financial - to areas which were not priorities for local peacebuilding, and this complicated the process of national recovery after war (Cramer, 2006, Ottaway, 2002, Talentino, 2002). Despite the lack of consensus on peacebuilding among both policy makers and opinion formers the liberal set of assumptions about how to end conflicts prevailed (Richmond, 2004). Given this global template for reconstruction after war, were the interventionist politics relevant for the *framework for peace*?

Complementarity

There was a degree of complementarity between the conditionalities imposed by the IFIs, the objectives embedded in donor programming, and the pressing local need for change. Much of the PRSP dialogue conflated well with the *framework for peace* and even the commitments of the Letters of Intent held much promise to address local imperatives - for example, the improved and transparent management of the economy. The reforms dramatically increased revenue flows to the national treasury (see Chapter 4) which vastly improved the prospects of war reparations to the poor and vulnerable. Reforms also brought about sustained growth in GDP, closely associated by theorists with increased economic opportunities for the previously unemployed. Commitments for judicial reform, found everywhere in the documentation, could strengthen the rule of law for the protection of human rights. This was central to peacebuilding because it synergised not only with the explicit promises made in the Peace Accord but also with many of the TRC recommendations. The Anti-Corruption Commission also had potential to improve the transparency and accountability of government, and to reform the bad practices of political elites which had become inherent in the body politic.

Reform of the NEC and the SLAF had a profound impact on the durability of the peace as many combatants were successfully demobilised and integrated into a modern force, and free and fair elections brought about the installation of a legitimate government. Decentralisation was also a major step forward because it could help address the historic tensions around over-centralised power and the marginalisation of the countryside. The challenges lay in the weakness of the state, its chronically low capacity and the prioritising of reforms. Assumptions about the reformed behaviour of political elites and the ability of the liberal model to effectively deliver the peace were also of concern given the leap of faith required to

believe in the transformation. Liberal statebuilding is a slow process. In the best of circumstances it requires capacity and commitment. Slow progress can undermine peacebuilding by failing to produce a social contract relevant in the locale (Richmond, 2009: 181).

The character of the new state ... the same shape, but better governed

All the positive goals and objectives listed in the documents were framed within the paradigm of liberal theorising. This theorising held assumptions that growth would lead to job creation; democracy would secure good government; elections would bring meaningful participation and responsive political elites, and transparent processes would lead to transparent practices (Cooper, 2008). Liberalising of the economic and political spheres would be complemented by the presence of a dynamic civil society.

The aim of all this was to build a functioning single unit from a fractured nation state to absorb the country into the international system of states, enmesh its economy into global markets and embed international norms and values in its society (Pugh, 2005, Duffield, 2001). Yet these aims were based upon shallow knowledge of the country's political history and its priorities for peace:

> *The strategy of supporting the authorities' programme under the emergency post-conflict assistance policy is predicated upon the need to rebuild Sierra Leone's administrative and institutional capacity, which was disrupted by the civil war.*[58]

This statement makes the assumption that war reduced the capacity of the state not two decades of corrupt miss-rule which was followed by a war. The new structure of the state was to be almost indistinguishable from that of old. The same shape, but

[58] IMF approves US$21 million in emergency post-conflict assistance for Sierra Leone, 17/12/99, sourced at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1999/pr9962.htm, accessed on 09/09/08

better governed. And better governance would come through multi-party democracy - through the old and unworkable system of ethno-politics turned upper class rule. Liberalisation for peace might just have missed the point in Sierra Leone.

External constituency – ownership

The conditionalities for reconstruction not only placed extra burdens on the state but constrained its choices for reform. Despite claims of local ownership attached to PRSPs, the GovSL had limited scope to design its own recovery and meet local demands for peace. Despite the claims of IFIs that ownership was secured through 'consultation'; Sierra Leoneans did not own their reconstruction, or their peacebuilding because 'consultations' were garnered for 'clearly agreed international development goals' (Cheru, 2007, Easterly, 2006).

> *tying debt relief to conditions determined by creditors undermines African priorities and initiatives and afford creditors an inordinate degree of control over the running of African countries* (Cheru, 2007:79)

The idea behind the PRSPs was important for Sierra Leone given the exclusionary forms of politics which characterised the country's history. The PRSP process meant that the government was obliged to discuss poverty issues and plans to tackle it with local citizens; in so doing, politicians would be more likely to take the issues seriously because their future careers depended on it (Booth, 2003:25). But the externally driven template for reform rather scuppered this objective because it undermined sovereignty and had consequent implications for democracy; the choices of democratically elected leaders were dictated by a powerful external constituency - a constituency which was not accountable to the local citizenry and yet the intended target of peacebuilding was the masses not the elite (Cousens et al, 2001, Lederach, 1997).

The political economy of peace was therefore detached from the influence of grass roots stakeholders and had a dangerously familiar structure to the political economy which led to war when local people had no influence on the shape of or benefits from the national economy. If the PRSPs successfully opened up new spaces for domestic policy dialogue, where some local stakeholders got the chance to voice their opinion and defend their interests, what could happen when, in the outcome, nothing changed?

Capacity

State capacity was a further issue. The post-war physical and political environments presented significant limitations for the reconstruction project yet the wish list of post-conflict reform contained in the reconstruction blue prints, and the additional conditionalities from donors, overburdened the weak state which had pressing local concerns. The ambitious list of reforms required capacity to deliver them and yet constrained capacity was an issue which littered the documentation and was, in itself, the subject of interventions. Interventions to build capacity were patchy and often involved embedding international staff in state ministries. For example, the UK's Department for International Development (DfID) funded the position of the Director General at the Ministry of Mineral Resources, this position was held by a consultant Canadian national provided by Adam Smith International (Cooper, 2008). The extent of the commitment of external actors to building local capacity was summarised by the NRS Assessment which noted that, in the area of economic reform, no sustainable local capacity had been created to implement existing projects 'let alone implement new ones' (Moore, 2003). Without effective capacity building across sectors, dependency would remain and local needs would not be met. Eight years after Lomé and despite repeated acknowledgments of the weak institutional

and administrative capacity of the government, the Letter of Intent (2008) describing economic and financial developments under the 2007 programme highlighted the continuing challenges of weak institutional and human capacity (GovSL, 2008). This was supported by the findings of the IMF's Poverty Reduction Strategy review of 2008 which stated that:

> *The lack of a comprehensive civil service reform continues to pose a serious challenge to Government as the required capacity to implement, monitor and evaluate programmes is still lacking in line ministries.* (IMF, 2008)

Despite the dearth of capacity building over time, the government made ground in economic recovery and improved fiscal management. As early as 2001 the government had exceeded the prime target for revenue collection: 'fiscal performance ... was marked by excellent performance on the revenue front'. The government's lack of capacity, however, prevented it from reaching the target for capital outlays which were 'substantially below budget' (IMF/IDA, 2002: 17). This highlighted the IFIs priority of collection over delivery. Some capacity was being built; but to do what?

3.6 - CONCLUDING STATEMENT

This chapter set out to investigate the reforms which came along with interventionist politics to determine how they could help address local challenges for long term peace stability (Newman, 2009: 29). Although the global model of peacebuilding and reconstruction could be more accurately described as statebuilding, was there enough flexibility in the model to accommodate local priorities for peace? The investigation found that external support for recovery significantly influenced the nature, sequencing and trajectory of local reforms within quite a rigid structure of governance.

Through the package of reforming policies based on a donor driven approach to peace, it was found that the new model aimed to build a state which was hardly distinguishable from the old (Cheru, 2007). This was problematic because, in Sierra Leone, statebuilding could not be peacebuilding unless something radical changed in the governing structures which had led to state collapse; changes which could relieve political tensions and lead to more equitable allocation of resources (Ballentine, 2005). The statebuilding project was legitimised and justified by the acceptance of poverty reduction strategies into domestic policy and restructuring the national economy to service debt. The nation building project, a central prerequisite for peace in the country, appeared to have been hijacked by external agendas which involved the imposition of a western notion of good governance measured on predetermined development indicators. Although some of the promises and commitments made by the national government to external actors were complementary to those made to its citizens, the sheer breadth of reform required enormous local capacity for its delivery.

Consequently, burning local concerns were somewhat de-prioritised because the state lacked the capacity to honour all the commitments for reform requested by the lenders and the donors. Some were prioritised over others; debt servicing and poverty reduction taking precedence over human rights and justice, for example, as scarce resources were redirected to comply with conditionalities. The preparation of the PRSPs involved the creation of several new committees: the Inter-Ministerial Committee, the Poverty Reduction Steering Committee, the Poverty Reduction Working Committee and the Poverty Alleviation Strategy Coordinating Office. Power therefore became located external to the locale making the process of participation rather futile; this had potential to profoundly affect democratisation when local people believed their democratically elected government was accountable

to them. It was conceivable that the demands of a powerful external constituency were adding to the challenges for peace.

Various assumptions were made about the statebuilding project and its peacebuilding potential. That democracy would bring inclusive and good governance, for example or that 'good governance' meant good government and responsible leadership; that better economic management would come through export oriented reforms; that growth would bring jobs and that decentralisation would redirect resources to the impoverished and marginalised rural areas.

The following chapters analyse empirical evidence from the locale to see how the statebuilding project worked out in practice.

CHAPTER FOUR

PUBLIC OWNERSHIP OF PUBLIC GOODS

Chapter four investigates how macro-economic reforms and liberalising policies helped to deliver the peace by supporting local priorities for resource redistribution and engaging with the challenge of poor economic management. More specifically, the chapter investigates the role of interventions in the creation of new and sustainable job opportunities, improvements to the delivery of services, in securing sound economic management and the redirection of resources to rural areas (GovSL, 1999b).[59]

There were various promises for reform in the iPRSP which could directly address the concerns of the TRC-R and support the promises at Lomé (GovSL, 2001: paras.113-121). The analysis which follows therefore centres on the PRSPs and official reports on their progress; it includes other government documentation and new legislation, and various unofficial documents from the mining sector including commentary on conditions in diamondiferous areas of the country. The analysis takes as its starting point for analysis the commitments made for the 'Medium-Term Phase' of reform in the iPRSP because this was less centred on stability and security (known as the Transitional Phase) and more centred on longer term development (GovSL, 2001: Chapter 3.2).

The chapter opens with an investigation of the progress of macro-economic reform to see how well the government did vis-à-vis better management of the economy in general. The analysis deepens the good governance theme by investigating the role of political elites in transforming their economy, the challenges they faced in the post-war environs, and the costs of liberalising reforms on the

[59] And also the Sierra Leone Constitution 1991

peacebuilding project. In section 4.2 there follows an investigation into the efficacy of the state in controlling production, trade and exports in the mining sector and the extent to which the proceeds of mining were redirected to the local community. An interrogation is made of the relevant government initiatives to reform the mining sector and a summary of post-war revenue flows - from natural mineral resources to the national treasury - is presented, in particular the revenues from diamonds and gold as identified by the government at Lomé (Article VII, 6). Finally an analysis is made in section 4.3 of the impact of reformed economic management on key development indicators such as poverty, education, health, infrastructure and economic inequalities. Special focus is drawn to the livelihoods of artisanal and small scale miners, and development in rural communities to determine the extent to which economic opportunities and general conditions improved in those areas.

4.1 - MANAGING THE ECONOMY

> *Their commitment to the PRGF-supported program remained unwavering and all quantitative PC for end-June and end-December 2007 were met, except those related to domestic revenue and concomitantly their poverty related expenditure.* (IMF, 2008:81)

General Trends 1999-2007

The two key aims for the post-war economy were stabilisation and growth (Castillo, 2008:4). The GovSL stuck to its commitments for macro-economic reform in line with interventions from the IFIs, and legislation abounded so as to create an 'enabling' environment for private investment and to address historic issues of bad economic management. For example, the Investment Promotion Act (2004) was designed to attract foreign investment in all sectors and help to create employment opportunities, and the Core Mineral Policy (2003) aimed at encouraging value added activities to the mining sector industries (DDI, 2008). Further legislation was passed

which was to have an impact on regulating public financial management; the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (2005), the Public Budgeting and Accountability Act (2005), the Public Procurement Act (2004) and the National Revenue Authority Act (2003).

Significant progress was made in the quest for stability over the post-war period with 'rapid economic growth' resulting from buoyant activities in the agriculture, mining, construction and service sectors (IMF/IDA, 2006). This growth may not necessarily have been directly attributed to macro-economic reform (although Kimberly may have made an impact) [60], because the absence of war on the economy was bound to have huge benefits and the rehabilitation of agricultural land vastly increased production in that sector making an important contribution to economic growth.[61] Although levels of inflation began to rise towards the end of 2006, partly reflecting global price rises and the depreciation of the Leone, fiscal performance improved with respect to IFI targets (ibid). In a summary of the country's performance under the PRGF 2002-2006 it was noted that, despite capacity constraints, the government had 'generally met' the quantitative performance criteria with regard to payment arrears, international reserves and external debt, but not for domestic financing of the budget (IMF/IDA, 2006: 7, Box 2). A gradually deteriorating situation with regard to domestic revenue collection gave cause for concern but not enough concern, however, to delay the HIPC completion point when the country's $1.6 billion external debt was forgiven (ICG, 2007).[62] Low domestic

[60] The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: an internationally recognized certification system for rough diamonds which established national import/export standards aimed at combating the illegal diamond trade. In November 2002, 52 governments ratified and adopted the Scheme, which was fully implemented in August 2003.

[61] In 2003, for example, agriculture contributed approximately 47% of GDP (although it started from a very low level). This compared very favourably with a 20% share from mining and a 23% share from services (DfID, 2008).

[62] See Jubilee Debt Campaign, *Sierra Leone gets debt cancellation, finally*, 18th December 2006, from

revenue collection was blamed on several factors: inadequate tax enforcement and the inability of governing authorities to broaden the existing tax base especially from customs and excise (GovSL, 2006); expenditure overruns on the wage bill; and shortfalls or delays in external budget support (IMF/IDA, 2006: 7). The government's perspective was different, blaming the delayed flows from donors on reduced capacity to collect revenue.

> *'by the time the donors came up with the funds ... we had lost a lot in terms of revenue we could have collected ... and [we then had to pay] arrears that had collected in that year'* [63]

After a high of 15.4% of GDP in 2003, domestic revenues fell by a third to 10.8% of GDP in 2007, falling short of the target figure by 2.4% GDP (IMF, 2008: Table 2.3). The shortfall led to severe cuts in government expenditure on poverty reduction related activities (ibid: 35). After increasing to 4.4% of GDP in 2006, poverty reduction expenditures fell to 3% in 2007 against the target of 5%; this followed previous 'significant' shortfalls in poverty outlays in 2005 amounting to Le 34 billion (around $11.5 million or 1% GDP) (GovSL, 2006). The GovSL gave 'weak planning' in the priority areas of education and health as an explanation for this (ibid) although the IMF blamed inadequate collection efforts across revenue departments and 'uncertainties created by the election process' (IMF, 2008b). Inadequate spending on poverty related programming meant that few of the MDGs would be reached and several were already seriously off-course, for example child mortality and maternal health (EU, 2007).

Despite capacity constraints, the necessary Performance Criteria (PC) for continued funding were generally met even during the radical deterioration of

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http://www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk/Sierra%20Leone%20gets%20debt%20cancellation,%20finally+2801.twl, accessed on 12.08.09.

[63] Personal telephone interview with the SLPP Minister for Finance, Mr John Benjamin, 11/12/08

performance during the fiscal year 2006. This success contrasted markedly with the inability of the government to achieve the 'performance criteria' for peace summed up by DfID: 'There has been a positive trend in pro-poor policy formulation but with substantially less progress on implementation (DfID, 2008: 5.15). Assuming that poverty related expenditure would help the progress of peace, which as discussed previously is a tenuous and contested link, the failures of government to target revenues to pro-poor activities mean that this hypothesis cannot be tested. This is a point to which we shall return in the Conclusion.

The Progress of Good Governance

> *The goal of a PFM system is to support the achievement of fiscal discipline, strategic and efficient allocation and use of funds, value for money and probity in the use of public funds.* (IMF, 2008a: 39).

Although the quantitative indicators of economic management revealed a mixed performance it was possible that the *process* of economic management had improved as a result of reforms. With support from the international community, various programmes and initiatives were launched to improve management of the economy within the 'good governance' framework.

DfID, the country's largest bilateral donor, committed over £160 million between 2002 and 2007 to programming in Sierra Leone and around 41% of that spend went on governance reforms (around $69 million); this was an exceptionally high proportion compared to DfID's expenditure allocation in other parts of Africa (DfID, 2008: Table 5), despite delays in getting any sort of official country strategy signed and in place until February 2008 (DfID, 2008: 3.3). A management team was trained specifically to use the Records Management Capacity Assessment System (IMF, 2008a) and good progress was made vis-à-vis the payment of civil services salaries helped by donor funding of key positions such as Inspector General of

Police, Accountant General, and High Court Judges etc. Through the creation of a 'Civil Service Training College', the World Bank helped to support capacity building for the Institute of Public Administration and Management. Institutions such as the National Revenue Authority were strengthened which helped the government become much more effective at revenue generation and collection (ICG, 2007, Brown et al., 2005) and the National Privatisation Commission became operational (GovSL, 2003).

These are examples of the type of technical, logistic and financial support afforded the GovSL for capacity building and reform in the economic domain but the actualisation of this programming was often problematic. The Senior Executive Service Programme for example, supported by UNDP funding, stalled because of disagreements between government and donors as to the preferred implementation strategy, and funding was subsequently withheld (IMF, 2008a:16). To counter the lack of capacity within the government structure for programme implementation, DfID established Project Independent Units (PIUs) which had the effect of drawing qualified and competent middle level bureaucrats away from the state into better paid jobs, further diminishing its capacity (DfID, 2008: S22). The EU Joint Strategy Report (EU, 2007) noted serious capacity constraints in all line Ministries which prevented the government from delivering the Poverty Reduction Strategy across all areas. This was a serious challenge for peace because the implementation of development programmes relied heavily of the efficacy of the bureaucracy and the capacity of line ministries to deliver. For example, the Ministry of Trade and Industry was 'unable to formulate or implement effective trade policies' and the impact of this was the inability to co-operate with other government ministries or sustain an effective dialogue with the private sector, and also the incapacity to effectively represent Sierra Leone's interests at regional or international negotiation

forums (DfID, 2008). Lack of human capacity and weak institutional arrangements for project implementation mean that large amounts of aid are difficult to administer and absorb, this presents increased opportunities for corrupt activities (Castillo, 2008: 25). In the final evaluation, there was 'little evidence that donor support to building capacity within government has been effective' (DfID, 2008: 5.21) but conversely, the creation of a monitoring and evaluation unit within the Development Assistance Coordination Office (DACO) was fully operational by the end of 2007. This is relevant because, despite the serious capacity constraints on domestic functions, the main fiscal targets set by the IFIs were generally met and reporting mechanisms for macro-economic activity were functioning. Departments and agencies had improved their methods for strategic planning which meant that proposed budgets could be presented and approved by parliament with the minimum delays. Although there was little evidence of the implementation of reform recommendations, internal audit units for all key ministries were established by 2007 and annual accounts, although suffering from previous backlogs which had delayed external budget support in 2006 (IMF/IDA, 2008), were almost up to date at the end of the period under study. This success can in part be attributed to the close working relationship of the World Bank with key ministries in its mission to promote development (Stiglitz, 1999: cited by Harrison, 2004). However, there were other concerns especially over the identification and elimination of corruption, and procurement procedures, but also the late publication of full audited accounts, the appropriate use of competitive tendering and the willingness of the government to hold their agencies to account for mismanagement misdemeanours (EU, 2007; IMF, 2008a).

Despite the passing into law of various instruments to improve financial management and, in particular, to curb the serious problem of corruption, in 2006

Transparency International downgraded Sierra Leone from 126th out of 159 countries in 2005 to 142nd out of 163 countries which reflected growing impatience and frustration both locally and internationally on the inability of the government to get this problem under control. International Crisis Group did not pull any punches:

> *Stop-gap measures focus on trying to insert accounting mechanisms at the final stages of the revenue process, by which time much has already disappeared.* (ICG, 2004)

> *The civil service is massively politicised and opaque. It has no code of conduct or asset disclosure requirements. Poor pay and conditions provide little motivation for change.* (TIRI, 2007)

Reform in the civil service was also disappointing and government struggled to control expenditure in the pay-roll (Letters of Intent, 2003 and 2005). The problem was that lowering of the government wage bill entailed job losses or reduced wages for lower ranking officials so as to protect the wages of higher ranking staff. Around 14,000 of 16,000 members of the civil service remained on the lowest grade which meant greater incentives for corruption (IMF/IDA, 2008). Skilled professionals from all sectors were in very short supply and the best were tempted to move to NGOs where the pay was better; ironically, donors were by-passing ministries in attempts to keep the government wage bill down. As a result, there was no evidence of successful capacity building projects for the central civil service despite repeated reviews and recommendations; progress towards transparency and accountability was also stymied (DfID, 2008: 5.22, IMF/IDA, 2008). Despite the government's explicit claim to 'reinforce the fight against corruption' (GovSL, 2003) there were continuous promises for more transparency and accountability in all sectors (GovSL, 2006). The conflation of 'lack of capacity' with the 'fight against corruption' produced a prominent argument in the rhetoric between GovSL and IFIs. For

example, in the GovSL's Letter of Intent 2003 lack of capacity in the ACC was blamed for its inability to bring cases to litigation. In 2008 there was still no agreed reform strategy or clear vision of the future size and shape of government, and many reforms had not been implemented (Thomson, 2007, EU, 2007). Mismanagement in public spending remained a serious problem which ultimately hurt the implementation of reform.[64]

Private Sector

Another criticism levelled at the government was that it was not fully committed to its promise to improve the climate for the private sector (GovSL, 2001, GovSL, 2005: 5.3.3). In a 2007 report, the World Bank judged Sierra Leone to be one of the 'worst regulatory environments in the world for business and the private sector' (EU, 2007: 11), and on its 'ease of doing business index' the country was ranked 168 out of 175 in 2006.[65] Both foreign and local investment was stymied by conditions in Sierra Leone. Levin and Gberie listed a catalogue of serious impediments not least that it was a very expensive place to register a business. Legislation was confusing, building permit processes were problematic and the taxation system discriminated against non-nationals or small companies. Further, they argued that 'pervasive corruption increases invisible costs and corporate risk' (Levin and Gberie, 2006). This marginalisation of the private sector had dire consequences because it limited economic opportunities for the unemployed youth and any associated revenue generating opportunities for the government. It also eliminated increased revenues from corporate taxation. The informal sector thrived as the cost of doing business

[64] 2009 Index of Economic Freedom from the Heritage Foundation, detail on Sierra Leone available from http://www.heritage.org/Index/Country/SierraLeone#financial-freedom, accessed on 12/08/09

[65] World Bank, Doing Business Data Sets, from http://www.doingbusiness.org/, accessed on 15/10/08. It should be noted that by 2008 the country had a made a considerable improvement on this, moving to 156 position out of 181 countries.

legitimately in Sierra Leone made it more profitable for small enterprises to be extra-legal (Brown et al., 2005). In the government's defence, being a post-conflict country with the reputation for 'blood diamonds' it was difficult to attract private investment to the sector (Cooper, 2008). Koidu Holdings, for example, was granted tax concessions to tempt further investment in the country. Delayed donor support also didn't help; DfID's Private Sector Development Plan, for example, was postponed from 2005 to 2007 due to problems appointing a coordinating consultant and 'the elections' (DfID, 2008).

Liberalisation of the Sierra Leone economy was frustratingly stymied. Privatisation, a key reform under IFI provisions which prompted promises by the government to target twenty four state-owned enterprises to 'enhance the efficiency of government operations and collection of additional revenues' (GovSL, 2006: 19), failed dramatically perpetuating the 'critical mass' of inefficient and unaccountable parastatals with huge debts (Jabbi and Kpaka, 2006). Sierratel, for example, the state-run tele-communications company was 'so riddled with corruption' that employees salaries were repeatedly delayed prompting a sit down strike in 2006 (ibid). The service of this state-owned provider was equally inefficient and this was reflected in the unprecedented growth and success of mobile networks throughout the country. The promised privatisation of three state-owned enterprises for 2007, including two banks, did not materialise (GovSL, 2008: 35). The assumption that private investment could be drawn into failing national authorities was rather missing the point of local conditions and the challenges the country faced for development. Privatising the National Power Authority, for example, would involve investing 'millions of dollars to get the infrastructure right ... it is not just a question of producing power for someone to buy'; because of the large amounts of wastage along the collection and distribution lines, the charges of private power would be so

high 'nobody could afford it'.[66] Added to this, international companies cited corruption in all branches of government as an obstacle to investment.[67] This was not the sort of climate to tempt private investors into state owned enterprises.

Summary

The analysis of the medium term macro-economic and structural reforms in this section reveals a mixed picture. The IFIs were happy with general trends in the economy and, despite some shortfalls towards the end of the period with regard to revenue collection, the situation generally improved and was considerably more effective than it was previous to or during the war due to the successful work of the National Revenue Authority (Brown et al., 2005).[68] Trade increased in line with World Bank conditionalities for an export oriented economy and this brought sustained growth and economic recovery. In addition to this, the shadow economy was reduced, channelling extra revenues into the treasury. Although there were problems with corruption, transparency and procurement etc. good progress was made on reporting mechanisms such as the monitoring and evaluation of programming and also on general auditing. The government was therefore successful in meeting the IFI's performance criteria to secure continued funding for reconstruction, but not the performance criteria necessary to honour the commitments made in the post-conflict political settlement (section 4.2 below).

Several years on from Lomé there remained grave concerns about the efficacy, accountability and transparency of governance (Brown et al., 2005, Thomson, 2007, ICG, 2004, Zack-Williams, 2008). The donors themselves also had

[66] Personal telephone interview with SLPP Minister for Finance, Mr John Benjamin, 11/12/08

[67] 2009 Index of Economic Freedom from the Heritage Foundation, Sierra Leone's score of 47.8 on the index put the country 156th out of 179 country rankings – detail available from http://www.heritage.org/Index/Country/SierraLeone#financial-freedom, accessed on 12/08/09

[68] For example in 1991 tax revenue collection amounted to 6% of GDP and in 1997 the figure was 5.4% sourced from UNHDR and IMF http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1999/pr9962.htm, accessed on 01/12/08

questions to answer. Relocating valuable local human resources for the implementation of externally driven programming added little to the wider capacity building project and this fed into the government's proclamations of inadequate capacity to deliver the peace. Important questions remained about the ultimate beneficiaries of improved revenue flows and increased aid and about the genuine commitment of local elites to reform their procedures and behaviour (Thomson, 2007, Brown et al., 2005). For example, new legislation appeared to have little impact on full liberalisation and improved management of the economy and there were more serious concerns about the government's ability to maintain macro-economic stability and pro-poor growth, especially in the wake of inflated world food prices which would have an impact on consumption. This would put pressure on government to lower taxes thereby reducing revenues not increasing them (IMF/IDA, 2008). The sudden drop in the value of the Leone in August 2009 caused greater hardship to consumers who were already suffering from high global prices for rice and fuel. The Leone had remained fairly stable in the post-war war era at around 3,000 to the US Dollar, or 5,000 to the British Pound. In August 2009 the Leone lost significantly against both currencies.[69] Exposure of the fragile local economy to the global markets had a heavy toll on the poor.

4.2 - GOVERNING MINERAL EXTRACTION: THE RESOURCE CURSE?

> *The Government commits itself to propose and support an amendment to the Constitution to make the exploitation of gold and diamonds the legitimate domain of the people of Sierra Leone, and to determine that the proceeds be used for the development of Sierra Leone, particularly public education, public health, infrastructure development, and compensation of incapacitated war*

[69] The Leone dropped to around 5700 to the Pound and 3400 to the Dollar in August 2009 due to increased world demand for the dollar, see Standard Times Press http://standardtimespress.net/cgi-bin/artman/publish/article_4103.shtml, accessed on 10/08/09.

> *victims as well as post-war reconstruction and development.* Lomé Agreement, Article VII (14)

Reform of the mining sector is at the centre of this analysis because of the role it played in fuelling and prolonging the war, its significance in the settlement package, its relevance for economic growth and stability as the main driver of the economy, the livelihoods it provides and impact it has on rural communities, and because it was a central goal of both the NRS and the iPRSP. The main concern was to get mining operations functioning and contributing to national coffers, and to improve accessibility to the diamondiferous areas following their control by rebels during the long period of war. The promise was to make the process more transparent and accountable, and to improve the livelihoods and conditions of the returning population of small scale miners and artisans (GovSL, 2001: 91). This development was to take place alongside increased efforts to open up the sector to private investment and capital intensive large-scale mining with the view to forming an 'integrated mining economy' (GovSL, 2001: 116). The purpose was to reinvest diamond capital back into the local economy to provide impetus for development (Maconachie and Binns, 2007a).

The Resource Curse

The political history of Sierra Leone and the eventual collapse of the state indicated that the country's wealth of natural resources had been somewhat of a 'resource curse'. This was because it had helped induce and perpetuate patronage politics, and had contributed to underdevelopment, corruption, political instability and eventually violence and war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005, Brown et al., 2005, Collier, 2007). The 'lootability' of diamonds in Sierra Leone meant that the war cost very little to the rebel forces and this engendered a prolonged insurgency. Indeed, the war was lucrative for those involved at all levels, the economy of war being more rewarding

for many people than the dividends of peace under the previous APC regime. Therefore, control of diamond mining in the post-war era was an imperative for the future stability and security of the country.

Much has been written on the political economy of diamonds in Sierra Leone and its relationship to the 'greed and grievance' thesis (Keen, 2005; Smillie, 2000; Richards, 2003; Maconachie and Binns, 2007a; Berdal, 2001) and that easy access to natural resources fuelled conflicts because there was no cost to rebels who had 'opportunist' motives; this situation is distinct from rebel 'idealists' who are prepared to bear the costs of war for the benefits of longer term reform (Weinstein, 2005; Elbadawi, 2002). The characteristics of the war in Sierra Leone indeed became more criminal than idealistic. The nature of the war was more complex than that but these arguments are profoundly relevant for peace in Salone first, because of the 'lootable' nature of alluvial diamond mining in the country and second, because of the presence of a number of ex-combatants who did not take part in the DDR and who were potentially still at large in the countryside, such as the Kamajor militias (Grant, 2005). Lootability refers to the high value-to-weight ratio of diamonds and the ease of access to their geographical deposits. For example, diamonds were found on the ground after heavy rain or could be extracted using tools as simple as sieves and shovels. With alluvial mining there were relatively few diamonds per hectare and therefore areas were not fenced off; people often found themselves living among potential finds. Consequently, it was almost impossible to control the production and trade of this type of mining compared to Kimberlite mining, for example, which involved heavy machinery extracting from deep reserves within Kimberlite pipes (Maconachie, 2008).

In 2003/04 Kimberlite diamond production came into force in Sierra Leone and contributed to the sharp rise of export earnings around that time, although alluvial

mining continued to be by far the most lucrative form of extraction. In 2006, for example, the value of rough diamond exports from alluvial digging by small scale artisans and small scale companies amounted to around 90% of official diamond exports; of the 604,000 carats valued at US$125.3 million, 492,000 carats valued at US$101.9 million were extracted from alluvial mining (DDI, 2008). However, the country's Kimberlite reserves were estimated to be worth over US$2 billion (ibid) and these were mined by the only company using deep excavation techniques, Koidu Holdings. Kimberlite reserves were good news for Sierra Leone because of the prospects for the type of diamond mining which was much less problematic for government to control and tax, and the connection between 'lootable' precious gems and political instability (Maconachie, 2008; Olsson, 2006). However, in the immediate post-conflict environment, artisanal diamond exports were considered to be the primary avenue for 'direct poverty reduction through trade' (DDI, 2008), and the consensus was that better governance in the sector would fix the problem (Ocheje, 2006, ODI, 2006). This conflated with the view that the main development issues in Sierra Leone were accountability, transparency, corruption (Maconachie, 2008); that the most potent curse was bad government itself.

Governing Mineral Extraction

> *The proceeds from the transactions of gold and diamonds shall be public monies which shall enter a special Treasury account to be spent exclusively on the development of the people of Sierra Leone* ... Lomé Peace Accord, Article VII (6)

> *For the export or local resale of gold and diamonds by the Government, the CMRRD shall authorize a buying and selling agreement with one or more reputable international and specialized mineral companies. All exports of Sierra Leonean gold and diamonds shall be transacted by the Government, under these agreements.* (ibid) (5)

Figure 14 (below) gives a clear indication of how exports from mining were skewed towards diamond production and how diamond revenues dominated the economy in the years immediately after the war although by 2006 good revenues also began to flow from gold, bauxite and rutile production (Table 9, below). Increased annual mineral revenues were forecast from the planned modernisation of gold and diamond mines; this was predicted to raise revenues to over $370 million compared to around $215 million in 2007 (Table 9) (World Bank, 2005). Some analysts believed that there was potential for gold mining to overtake diamonds as an economic currency and export material because of large, uncovered deposits;[70] a belief which was supported by new finds in 2007 when deposits of gold-bearing hard rock were discovered after sampling in Canadian laboratories.[71] This was very good news for the country as analysts concluded that productive alluvial mining could soon be exhausted but would be replaced by different forms of mineral extraction (Cooper, 2008).

Figure 14 – Sierra Leone mining exports 1999-2007



[70] World Gold Council '*Sierra Leone gold primed to take over* diamonds', 09.08.06, accessed on 24/10/08 from http://www.gold.org/news/2006/08/09/story/4619/sierra_leone_gold_primed_to_overtake_diamonds

[71] World Gold Council "New gold zone in Sierra Leone", 18.10.08, accessed on 24/10/08 from http://www.gold.org/news/2007/10/18/story/7836/new_gold_zone_in_sierra_leone

The GovSL planned to regulate the extractive industries through new initiatives and legislation, and to build on its own Certification Scheme – in 2000 the country had initiated a scheme in accordance with UN-SCR1306. The main purpose of reform was to encourage more production through legal channels so that subsequent revenue flows could be redirected back into local communities. Key initiatives included the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), the Diamond Area Community Development Fund (DACDF) and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) which the government passed in 2007 enabling receipts to be open to public scrutiny (DDI, 2008).

The KPCS, the 'gold standard' mechanism for voluntary corporate social responsibility supported by over 70 governments worldwide, was adopted in Sierra Leone in 2004 and the reformed National Revenues Agency was given responsibility for implementing the scheme (Maconachie, 2008: 7). Although other factors played their role, it was possible that the KPCS was influential in the context of growth in the diamond economy as official exports of rough diamonds increased markedly after 2003 (Table 9) (Cooper, 2008). More recent reports concluded that although Kimberley had in part been successful in increasing revenues to the national treasury, there was still an extensive illicit trade in rough diamonds taking place in parallel with the certification scheme (GlobalWitness/PAC, 2008).

To support the certification schemes, The Banking Act 2000 aimed at broader reform; for example, to create a more efficient banking and financial system, to support the valuation work of the Gold and Diamond Office (GDO), to facilitate the export of rough diamonds and the payment of the 3% export duty. There were several legislation changes with regard to reform in the governance of the mining sector. The Mines and Minerals Amendment Act 1999 was an attempt to gain control

of the mining, dealing and exporting of 'precious minerals' and to reduce the incidence of smuggling by tightening up the licensing process.[72] The Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development Act, (1999) brought into law the promises made at Lomé, and was designed to bring all activities in the gold and diamond mining sector under government control and to commit to the exclusive appropriation of monies for development from the Special Treasury Account (Part V, 14:1). The Mines and Minerals Amendment Act 2004 increased the prison term penalties for unlawful possession and smuggling of mineral resources, although the fines for such offences were repealed.[73] The Investment Promotion Act (2004) was passed to attract domestic and foreign capital into the industry and also allow development of 'value added' industries such as cutting and polishing (The Core Mineral Policy, 2003).[74] Although the Diamond Cutting and Polishing Act came into force in March 2007, it wasn't until 2008 that these value added activities were put firmly on the agenda to improve growth of revenues from the sector and to create new job opportunities.

Additional legislation included The National Commission for Social Action Act (2001);[75] this was a new commission to oversee reconstruction and sustainable development, and consolidated the activities of the former National Commission for Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation as created by the Lomé Accord (Article XXVIII, 1). This raft of new legislation indicated that the government was

[72] GovSL, The Mines and Minerals Amendment Act 1999, being an Act to amend the Mines and Minerals Act 1994, 22/07/99, available from Sierra Leone Web at http://www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/1999 and accessed on 27/10/08

[73] GovSL, The Mines and Minerals Amendment Act 2004, being an Act to amend the Mines and Minerals Act 1994, 01/07/04, available from Sierra Leone Web at http://www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/1999 and accessed on 27/10/08

[74] The Core Mineral Policy (2003) was designed to align laws and regulations to international standards and improve the conditions of small-scale miners

[75] Available at Sierra Leone Web, http://www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/2001-13.pdf, accessed on 31/10/08

committed by law to improve governance of the mining sector and to actively encourage private investment for growth.

A further initiative in this regard was the DACDF. Introduced in 2001, its main purpose was to reduce the number of illegal transactions in the alluvial sector by returning a percentage of the diamond revenues back to the diamondiferous communities and to improve conditions in the mining areas which were particularly hard hit during the war. Kono, for example, suffered greatly from the damage caused to infrastructure and from land degradation as the rebels, seeking to maximise their war dividend through open alluvial mining, caused rampant destruction across the countryside. The DACDF initiative was a practical response to the Lomé promises and an incentive for diamond sector workers to barter their gems through legal channels. The scheme aimed to be 'participatory' in nature by including mechanisms for local consultation in diamondiferous communities; this would allow people to get involved in resource management and take on responsibility for decision making about their community's development (Maconachie, 2008: 10). Mining chiefdoms benefited commensurate with the number of mining licences issued and the value of gems recovered from their territory (Maconachie and Binns, 2007a). The funds were targeted at the development of infrastructure such as schools, clinics, markets, roads, bridges, water supply, waste disposal, community centres or court houses; also, community agriculture, especially post-harvest crop processing (drying floors and storage facilities) and vocational skills training centres.[76]

[76] See Sierra Leone Ministry of Mineral Resources, Background Paper on the establishment of the Diamond Area Community Development Fund (DACDF), http://www.slmineralresources.org/docs/DACDF_Background.pdf, accessed on 30/10/08

Table 8 – Number of mining licences issued to end of 2004 by province [77]

	Northern Province	Southern Province	Eastern Province
No. of licences	143	372	1798
No. of chiefdoms	9	24	21

Due to the structure of the funding, beneficiaries of the DACDF were localised; around 60 chiefdoms were eligible but most were located in the Eastern Kono district due to high density artisanal mining there. By the end of 2004, 1798 licences had been issued in the Eastern Province compared to 143 in the Northern Province, for example; the average per chiefdom in the Eastern Province was 85 compared to an average of 16 for diamondiferous chiefdoms in the North (Table 8, above). Consequently, large areas of rural Sierra Leone were left out of the deal. Of those that weren't, there were problems with the management of the funds and many of the intended outcomes for development did not materialise.[78] Whole communities failed to benefit from the DACDF because of its narrow target, however individual members of other communities, including chiefs, did benefit and due to irregularities and concerns raised by the GovSL High Level Diamond Steering Committee, disbursement of funds was suspended during 2004, although around $850,000 was still paid to mining chiefdoms in that year (PAC and NMJD, 2006). A major shortcoming of the DACDF was that it was not implemented for large industrial ventures despite the fact that they had the largest socio-environmental 'footprint' and owed a lot to local communities (Le Billon, 2008).

The allocation of the DACDF, to be returned to mining communities for development, represented 0.75% of the 3% export tax on diamonds. This figure was

[77] Background Paper (ibid)

[78] Sierra Leone Ministry of Mineral Resources, sourced at http://www.slmineralresources.org/ and accessed on 29/10/08

therefore only 25% of government revenue accrued from diamond exports. The decision to allocate this proportion to local communities was agreed at a government cabinet meeting on 20th December 2001 by the political elite of the day.[79]

From 2001-2004, a total of nearly $1,923,000 was paid out to mining chiefdoms.[80] The impact of this was mixed; there were positive accounts as well as negative such as the successful construction of a multi-purpose community complex in the Lower Bambara Chiefdom of Kenema District. No funds were disbursed in 2007 owing to 'the elections'; it is not clear why this should be the case although local cynics suggested that election year was an expensive year for the government in respect of bribes and vote buying.[81] Decentralisation meant that local authorities also became beneficiaries of the fund; by the end of 2005 around US$2.8 million had been allocated to over 60 chiefdoms and also 13 district and city councils.[82] For example, in 2005, 455 mining licences were issued to the Sandor Chiefdom in Eastern Province and an amount of Le 525,131,769 (around $175,000) was disbursed including 20% due to the District council. Reports from the chiefdom indicated that the money was used to rehabilitate the Native Administration police quarters and lock-up - a contentious use of community funds decided upon by local elites and resulting in the strengthening of chieftaincy power - and the less contentious community health centre (Maconachie, 2008; Maconachie and Binns, 2007a).

There were various problems officially associated with the implementation of the DACDF. These included the method of determining who got what in the process

[79] See Sierra Leone Ministry of Mineral Resources, http://www.slmineralresources.org/dacdf.html, accessed on 30/10/08

[80] Sierra Leone Ministry of Mineral Resources, Background Paper on the establishment of the Diamond Area Community Development Fund (DACDF), http://www.slmineralresources.org/docs/DACDF_Background.pdf, accessed on 30/10/08

[81] Various interviews with senior member of the opposition APC party in Freetown, March 2007.

[82] Diamond Area Community Development Fund - Stakeholder Consultation Meeting, July 16, 2008: Ministry of Mineral Resources, Sierra Leone, from http://www.slmineralresources.org, accessed on 30/10/08

and whether the main decision maker on development agendas should be the local council, city council or the chiefdom. Also, the precise constitution of the Chiefdom Development Committee was contested; there were no project selection criteria or application guidelines. The lack of oversight mechanisms meant it was impossible to discern whether funding reached the intended beneficiaries and there was minimal reporting or monitoring of the project implementation.[83]

In addition to these concerns over the official mechanisms of the project and despite the 'participatory' nature of the initiative, there appeared to be a general lack of awareness among the regular population of their purpose. This meant there was limited contribution to the decision making process, especially among the women and the youth (Maconachie and Binns, 2007a). The lack of reporting vis-à-vis which projects (if any) the funds had been spent on meant that the quest for transparency and accountability was profoundly compromised, but this was not altogether surprising as capacity at the micro-level for the implementation and monitoring of complex local initiatives was conspicuous by its absence. The DACDF initiative had made the assumption that local people had the necessary skills for official reporting; Chiefdom Development Committees (CDCs) were supposed to monitor the process but these were made up almost entirely of rural elites yet concerns were rife among local people that some chiefs were pocketing the funds themselves (Temple, 2005: cited by Maconachie and Binns, 2007, Jackson, 2007, Maconachie and Binns, 2007b).

The Shadow Market

Most reports on the KPCS in Sierra Leone concluded that smuggling and illegal mining continued apace (DDI, 2008, Levin and Gberie, 2006). Despite a 'monitoring

[83] Sierra Leone Ministry of Mineral Resources, Background Paper (ibid)

unit' in the Ministry of Mineral Resources, consisting of poorly paid monitors, attempts to control smuggling and illicit trade were largely ineffective; violation of the regulations continued and smuggling remained rife as studies found that a large percentage of Sierra Leone's diamonds continued to be handled through illicit channels and old patrimonial networks (GlobalWitness and PAC, 2004, Maconachie, 2008, Jackson, 2007). There was evidence that a shadow economy still existed despite the KPCS. In 2006 it was estimated that around 50% of diamonds were leaving the country illegally (PAC and NMJD, 2006). This figure represented the value not the volume of trade; the caratage of illegal trade was much higher involving larger and better quality gems (Levin and Gberie, 2006). After an examination of the artisanal sector in 2005, Peace Diamond Alliance (PDA) estimated the real value of diamond production to have been in the region of US$400 million compared to the official figure of US$142 million (Table 9) (PAC and NMJD, ibid). This is unsurprising bearing in mind the 'lootability' of the diamonds, the lucrative international market, the system of bribes involved in legal chains and the complex and costly business of acquiring licences (ibid). An artisanal mining licence cost around $270 but after 'hand-shakes' the price could exceed $330 (Levin and Gberie, 2006). Motivations for redirecting diamonds away from licit channels were dependent upon a 'range of risk/reputation/opportunity cost calculations' that local actors made on a day to day, diamond to diamond, basis (Cooper, 2008). Although illegal mining had been curbed somewhat through the KPCS, smuggling remained a big problem and some reports suggested there was also significant smuggling of gold (World Bank, 2006).

In addition to the DACDF, another initiative to curb smuggling was to give tax incentives; this meant that producers could save 0.5% of export tax for values over $10 million (foreign nationals) or $1 million (Sierra Leone nationals). This

regressive taxation system aimed to increase the amount of diamonds being exported legally rather than increase government revenues from greater volumes of natural resources leaving the country and was the direct opposite of usual progressive taxation systems; an indication of the size of the problem facing the Sierra Leone government (GlobalWitness and PAC, 2004). With regard to efforts to reduce corruption, these met with resistance in some quarters because conflicts of interest still existed among some government officials, and also among some chiefs. Land rents were subject to non-transparent and sometimes self interested 'handshakes' by some chiefs who were also unable to account for their spend from DACDF (DDI, 2008, Maconachie and Binns, 2007a). This continuation of old practices was problematic and was assisted by the restoration of the chieftaincy system in the reconstruction process (Jackson, 2005, Fanthorpe, 2005, Maconachie and Binns, 2007a, Peters et al., 2003). This had an impact on the youth because the relationship between the chieftaincy administration and the community remained unequal and the decision making exclusive, practices similar to the past (Maconachie and Binns, 2007b). Land rights also remained elusive to most of the returning youth population and this further strained their relationships with local chiefs. Diamond related corruption remained widespread at higher levels too, as witnessed by the arrest of Minister for Transport, Momoh Pujeh, for illegal diamond dealing by the Anti-Corruption Commission (Jackson, 2005).

Revenue Flows from Mineral Resources

Table 9 – Value of Sierra Leone mining exports – US$ 000s [84]

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Diamonds	1,245	10,067	26,023	41,732	75,970	126,653	141,834	125,305	141,566
Gold	6	-	3	31	54	162	264	1,063	2,985
Rutile								28,501	38,146
Bauxite								23,573	32,706
Ilmenite								1,063	1,201
Total	1,251	10,067	26,026	41,763	76,034	126,815	142,098	179,505	216,604

Over the post-war period, alluvial diamonds provided by far the greatest proportion of mining revenue to the National Treasury. The country's diamonds were of a very high quality with the potential to produce outstanding stones such as the 969 carat 'Star of Sierra Leone' discovered in 1972. The average 'run-of-mine' carat value was higher than almost any other diamond producing country in the world and diamond production was the country's major source of foreign exchange, important for debt servicing (GlobalWitness and PAC, 2004). It provided work for more people than any sector after subsistence farming and was credited with the responsibility for half a million livelihoods (Jackson, 2005). As a sector, mining and quarrying employed about 14% of the total labour force, between 200,000 and 300,000 people (World Bank, 2006).

[84] Diamond figures data for 1999-2003 sourced from Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) at http://www.pacweb.org/e/images/stories/documents/2006-03%20ddi-dealing%20for%20development-full%20report.pdf, accessed on 19/10/08 and data for 2004-2007 sourced from Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) at https://mmsd.mms.nrcan.gc.ca/kimberleystats/publicstats.asp, accessed on 19/10/08; Gold figures: 2004 and 2005 sourced from World Bank Report (2006) - Sierra Leone: adding value through trade; 2006 and 2007 figures sourced from Bank of Sierra Leone annual report and statements of account accessed on 19/10/08 from http://www.bankofsierraleone-centralbank.org/; Rutile, Bauxite and Ilmenite figures: sourced from Bank of Sierra Leone annual report and statements of account accessed on 19/10/08 from http://www.bankofsierraleone-centralbank.org/

Figure 15 – Value of rough diamond exports 1999-2008 [85]



As Figure 15 illustrates, revenues from the export of rough diamonds rose dramatically from a low of just over US$1 million in 1999 to a high of around US$142 million in 2005; high levels were sustained for the following two years. The discrepancy between the 2006 and 2007 figures reflects the global market value – US$208 compared to US$235 – because the caratage output was almost the same for both years (Table 11). The Kimberley Process was credited with the increased revenue flowing into the national treasury but mining companies, including Koidu Holdings, also boosted revenues by providing royalty payments from artisanal miners which were not previously collected.[86]

85 Data for 1999 – 2003 sourced from Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) at http://www.pacweb.org/e/images/stories/documents/2006-03%20ddi-dealing%20for%20development-full%20report.pdf, accessed 09/11/09 and data for 2004-2009 sourced from Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) at https://mmsd.mms.nrcan.gc.ca/kimberleystats/publicstats.asp , accessed 09/11/09
The KPCS production and trade statistics might not be comparable to respective national statistical agency's production or trade data due to differing conceptual and methodological practices employed in gathering and reporting these data. Also, there is no guarantee that data are reliable and error free because governments submit their own data, but every effort is made to ensure that it is https://mmsd.mms.nrcan.gc.ca/kimberleystats/public_tables/ExplanatoryNotesforPublicReleaseofKPCSInformationVersion4%200.pdf.

86 Diamond Intelligence Magazine, "Sierra Leone's diamond export values rise but volumes remain constant" , accessed from http://www.diamondintelligence.com/magazine/magazine.asp?id=5916 on 28/01/08

The total value of mining exports for the nine year post-war period was over US$820 million. This could have been higher if tax concessions were not given to companies such as Koidu Holdings. In the diamond sector the value of exports was almost US$700 million producing government revenues from the 3% export tax on diamonds of around US $21 million. This is calculated as an estimate of the possible maximum because of the regressive taxation system mentioned earlier, but it is justified because of other revenues on diamonds for example fees for licences; export, mining, dealers and dealers' agents. An export licence was $40,000 and a dealer licence between $2,000 and $5,000 dependent upon the applicant's nationality (GlobalWitness and PAC, 2004). This meant that revenues from licences could effectively double the revenue into the treasury from diamond mining. For example, in 2004 export taxes on diamonds amounted to $5.2 million of which $2.9 million represented licence fees (PAC and NMJD, 2006). In addition to export tax and the licensing system, there were other methods of taxation for diamond industry activities including income tax at corporate level (30%). Exporters and dealers paid income tax, and holders of mining leases paid a minimum of 3.5% although the government found collection of some of these taxes very problematic (Levin and Gberie, 2006). Dealers and agents also paid taxes to local councils. For example, in Kono district these amount to around $167 per annum being a town council tax on the dealer's office and a tax on the diamond scale (Levin and Gberie, 2006).

What this summary reveals is that, given the various taxation demands imposed on the sector, a potential figure of $40 million dollars revenue from diamond mining over the period would not be unrealistic. A large part of the tax, however, was taken up on expenditure for maintaining the Kimberley Process itself and for the regulation and management of the licensing system (GlobalWitness and PAC, 2004). Table 11 gives the breakdown. The 0.75% disbursement to the Gold and

Diamond Office (GDO) was used to pay staff; $1 million was allocated in 2004, for example (PAC and NMJD, 2006). As the value of exports grew over time, the disbursements to each area increased proportionately. Staff at the GDO received salary increases to around $5,100 per annum (2005) considerably reducing the temptation for workers to engage in corruption or unethical practices; but this trend was in marked contrast to the conditions afforded the lowest level mine workers in the remote areas of rural Salone.

Table 10 – Breakdown of 3% export revenue by beneficiary

DACDF Special Account	GGDD	General Revenue Account	External valuator	Monitoring
0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	0.4%	0.35%

Mining communities continued to experience the greatest poverty and social exclusion despite the increased wealth being extracted through diamond mining (Thomson, 2007, Brown et al., 2005, GlobalWitness, 2007). By 2007, exploitation, poverty and poor working conditions were still characteristics of the industry (GlobalWitness, 2007). Environmental rehabilitation and land reclamation both remained remote aspirations despite clauses in the Core Mineral Policy to protect the environment from the impact of mining (PAC and NMJD, 2005). Although child labour had been reduced somewhat, the incidence of child workers in the mining sector remained problematic due to the absence of other livelihood opportunities in the area; large numbers of children, many living independently, continued to be exploited by miners and exposed to the dangers of hazardous and sometimes illegal work (Boas and Hatloy, 2006, Thomson, 2007). The emergence of Kimberlite mining in 2003/04 held better prospects for control of the sector but big corporate operations meant different problems for the locals. Community members protested in

response to Koidu Holdings' attitude to an environmental impact assessment in 2004, for example, the perception being that of a 'large foreign company trampling on the rights of poor and unprotected indigene' (PAC and NMJD, 2005: 9). More recently police opened fire on demonstrators seeking compensation from the company, killing two locals.[87] Subsequent to this incident mining was halted but resumed shortly afterwards when the company was cleared of all charges after an 'amicable discussion' between the government and the company when Kono residents and interested civil society organisations were not invited.[88]

The point to be made here is that reform of the mining sector had very little tangible benefits for the local community despite increased exports and the DACDF. It also led to deforestation across large areas, in some cases whole districts, which led to health problems, the loss of biodiversity and alternative livelihoods (ibid). Most benefits went to chiefs or foreigners and growing frustration was detected among mining communities by researchers working in the Kono District (ibid); even through legal trade local people benefited far less than other nationals. For example, according to government figures in 2007, Hussein Makie, a Lebanese 'diamantaire', exported the greatest amount of diamonds from Sierra Leone with more than 269,499 carats worth US$55 million while Koidu Holdings occupied second place with 147 376 carats valued at US$28 million, a company whose shares are solely owned by an Israeli national, Beny Steinmetz. Whatever the final amount of taxation revenues from mineral resources, and it is impossible to quantify the exact figure, 75% of the proceeds did not go to local communities.

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[87] *Sierra Leone Police Open Fire on Locals Protesting Mining Practices* (2007), sourced from Voice of America News at http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2007-12/2007-12-14-voa41.cfm, accessed on 04.11.08 and *Diamond Mining halted at Sierra Leone's Koidu mine but only after two protesters die* (2007), sourced from Mines and Communities (MAC) at http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=8351, accessed on 04.11.08

[88] Campaign for Just Mining Press Release, 23rd May 2008, available from http://www.nmjd.org/press%20releases/CJM%20PRESS%20RELEASE%20MAY%202008.pdf, accessed on 18.08.09.

Table 11 - Diamond export revenue flows -1999-2008 [89]

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Value US$ 000s	1,244.8	10,066.9	26,022.5	41,732.1	75,969.8	126,652.6	141,833.6	125,304.8	141,565.7	98,772.2
Tax Revenue 3% US$ 000s	37.3	302.0	780.7	1,252.0	2,279.1	3,799.6	4,255.0	3,759.1	4,247.0	2,963.2
Volume/Carats	9,320	77,372	222,521	351,859	506,723	691,757	668,636	603,566	603,623	371,261
US$/Carat	134	130	117	119	150	183	212	208	235	266

89 Data for 1999-2003 sourced from Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) at http://www.pacweb.org/e/images/stories/documents/2006-03%20ddi-dealing%20for%20development-full%20report.pdf. Data for 2004-2008 sourced from Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) at https://mmsd.mms.nrcan.gc.ca/kimberleystats/publicstats.asp. The KPCS production and trade statistics might not be comparable to respective national statistical agency's production or trade data due to differing conceptual and methodological practices employed in gathering and reporting these data. Also, there is no guarantee that data are reliable and error free because government submits its own data, but every effort is made to ensure that it is https://mmsd.mms.nrcan.gc.ca/kimberleystats/public_tables/ExplanatoryNotesforPublicReleaseofKPCSInformationVersion4%200.pdf.

Summary

> *Government's policy is to continue to improve the livelihood of small scale miners and to provide a conducive environment to attract private investment into capital-intensive large-scale mining as well to ensure environmentally friendly mining practises.* (GovSL, 2001: 116)

In response to demands for better governance, GovSL made creditable efforts to establish initiatives and legislation which could improve the management of the mining sector. Substantially increased revenue flows from this sector indicated a good level of success in this regard. Legal channels of production became busier necessarily reducing illegal trade and contributing to growth and tax revenues. Despite this, government only regained partial control of diamond production and illegal channels continued to flourish and the perpetuation of patrimonial networks could only undermine government attempts to grow the formal economy.

There are several issues that Section 3.1 raises in connection with the peace promises and the liberal peacebuilding project. The TRC recommendations called for a higher percentage of export taxes to go to local communities because it would bring genuine improvements to quality of life direct from diamond revenues, yet 75% of mineral revenues were not directed towards development, large amounts being channelled into management of the KPCS and into government's central account (Maconachie and Binns, 2007a, Levin and Gberie, 2006: 36, TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 3, Recommendations: 471). With a 'net-negative' impact of mining on locals it is not surprising there was resistance to legalising activities when it was not in peoples' best interests to behave legally.

Second, there was evidence that chiefs misappropriated part of the DACDF and continued to patronise old networks. Decision making tended to marginalise the

youth and some chiefs did not take on the responsibility of controlling mineral resources for the benefit of their communities. Chieftaincy politics appeared to be alive and well and undiminished by international intervention - corruption, inequities and mismanagement remained (Fanthorpe, 2005). New laws did not address issues of land and property rights (see Section 4.3) and continuing traditional practices held potential to reignite conflict among the youth. In 2008 new legislation aimed at modernising and rationalising land and property rights was drafted but not passed by parliament and it was reported by Peters that many ex-combatants 'openly stated their readiness to return to the bush to fight if the democratic process does not result in a better deal for excluded youth (Peters, 2002). The pilfering tactics of local chiefs appeared to be replicated at higher levels in government in respect of diamond related corruption. In 2007 an ICG report stated that 'significant official corruption and meddling still impede development of a rational and transparent industry' (ICG, 2007).

Finally, a myopic focus on the diamond industry for development crowded out other potential development areas to generate alternate livelihood opportunities for locals such as agricultural or forestry. This was due to the 'short termism' mindset of the private sector with regard to returns on investment, gains from the agricultural sector taking longer to materialise.[90] Diamond industry development failed to hit its target for regenerating mining communities and although Kimberley was successful in decreasing illegal flows, the main purpose appeared to be securitisation not development (Cooper, 2008). Strong growth in the diamond sector did not benefit local communities or the workers themselves. In Section 4.3 the extenuating factors of this marginalisation are explained.

[90] Personal telephone interview with SLPP Minister for Finance, Mr John Benjamin, 11th December 2008

4.3 - DEVELOPMENT OF SIERRA LEONE

> *'When you are hungry you are tired. It is difficult to concentrate in school. You fall asleep. Your stomach hurts like you have worms. You fight. It is so hard; you cannot do anything except think of food.'* (A boy in Mathinka, a village in Bombali District, Northern Province, PRSP: 22) (GovSL, 2005: 22)

There follows an analysis of the impact of macro-economic reforms vis-à-vis improved livelihoods opportunities and better living standards for the poorest members of the community (TRC-R, 2004). Various documents provide the data for this analysis including the PRSPs, the GovSL Letters of Intent, IMF and UNHR Reports, and unofficial reports from the diamond mining sector and elsewhere.

General progress and how it is missing the poor

> *Government will create 'the basis for sustainable economic recovery and progressive improvements in living standards, especially for the poor. These policies will be backed by implementation of sector programmes in the key economic sectors including agriculture and mining as well as infrastructure development in the transport, energy and telecommunications sectors.'* (GovSL, 2001: 113)

The liberalising model for peace associates economic growth with reduced poverty over time but it is difficult to give an accurate measure of poverty in Sierra Leone or to detect any change in the incidence of poverty because the data is so variable. For example, HD Reports have used the concepts of 'absolute poverty' or 'poverty line' interchangeably over time, and other reports use definitions such as 'food poor', 'total poverty' or 'extreme poverty'. In some instances, data for rural areas is available but not for the total population (UN-HDRs) and there seems to be no consensus across the data sets. For example, some reports indicate an increase in the incidence of poverty in Sierra Leone, and some a reduction (GovSL, 2007b).

Despite this confusion, certain statements can be made. An integrated household survey in 2004 carried out to inform the PRSP revealed that poverty remained widespread in Sierra Leone. Twenty six per cent of the country's population was food poor (extreme poverty) which meant that they couldn't afford a basic diet. This meant 1,248,000 people could not afford the primary basic necessity of food, calculated in the report at less than a dollar a day or the lower figure of Le 1,033 a day (PRSP:21). Other indicators of poverty remained alarmingly unsatisfactory despite substantial payments from the PRGF. When added to the number of people who lacked other basic necessities such as safe water, sanitation, shelter and education (calculated at a figure of Le 2,111 per day), the incidence of poverty rose to around 70% of the population (ibid). Income inequality also remained high - the lowest 20% of the population benefited from only 7% of consumption whereas the highest 20% accounted for 46%. 80% of people living in rural areas remained below the national poverty line compared to 15% in Freetown so disparities between the peninsula and the provinces remained profound.[91] There was also no change in gender disparities with women's earnings at around half the levels of men in 2005, consistent with same indicator figures over the previous four years (HDRs). More recent figures suggested that growth had not benefited the poorest eight years after Lomé. According to the GovSL's Letter of Intent (2006) the incidence of income poverty remained at around 80% (less than a dollar a day) and in 2007 poverty remained widespread as did high unemployment, poor infrastructure and weak institutional and human capacity.

A government survey in 2007, supported by DfID and the World Bank reported that an increased number of the population were experiencing food

[91] GovSL Integrated Household Survey 2003/04, available from http://www.statistics.sl/SLIHS_REPORT.pdf, accessed on 12/11/08.

insecurity (food poor): 35.7% compared to 26% in 2004 (GovSL, 2007a). Here, it should be noted that this survey used different methodology to the 2004 survey when poverty was measured through consumer expenditure surveys. The 2007 CWIQ survey gathered information on indicators of poverty i.e. access, utilisation and satisfaction with social services. For example, food insecurity was equated to having difficulty meeting food needs 'often or always' rather than being calculated as a direct monetary measure. Among the regions, in 2007 the lowest incidence of food insecurity was Western (16.6%) and the highest was Northern (48.7%) (GovSL, 2007a: Table A2.1). This reveals a continuing large disparity between the peninsula and the provinces.

On other indicators, 61% of the population did not have access to a safe water source; in the district of Moyamba, no pipe-borne water was available to any households. 55% of households had no access to safe sanitation including basic covered pit latrines. In Bonthe district this figure was exceptionally high at 75% (GovSL, 2007a). Over half the population had no access to medical services (54.5%) and the disparity between the Freetown peninsula and the rest of the provinces was again substantial; 75.2% compared to an average of 39% respectively (ibid). Enrolment in primary education, however, recorded a significant improvement; yet around 25% of children aged between the years of 6-11 had no access to primary education, the rural areas suffering most (IRCBP, 2008). For example, less than 50% of households in Bonthe and Pujehun had access to a primary school within 30 minutes walk but all households in the Western area did (IRCBP, ibid). Out of those who did have access to primary education 62.4% were not satisfied with the service, mostly because of the inadequate supplies of teaching and learning materials and the high costs involved for poor parents (ibid).

The poorest of the poor engaged in artisanal mining activities. The increase in diamond trade going through legal channels created wealth in that sector and was a main driver for economic growth but this did not benefit the diamond labourers, many of whom continued to live on less than a dollar a day - some diggers experiencing days without food (Levin and Gberie, 2006, DDI, 2008, PAC, 2008). There was no notion of 'minimum wage' or 'minimum working conditions' as normal remuneration for labourers was a 'discretionary share' of the profits. This varied dependent upon the individual digger's skills of negotiation which meant little livelihood security for them or their families (Levin and Gberie, 2006). Because there was no viable alternative to diamond digging in terms of livelihoods, labourers put up with the poor conditions and bad pay; most cited poverty and 'survival' as reasons they went into mining (PAC and NMJD, 2006, Maconachie and Binns, 2007b). The industry remained exploitative despite the serious consequences of such attitudes to local labour in the past; illness remained endemic and drowning or suffocation was not uncommon (Cooper, 2008, PAC, 2008).

Nationally, income distribution was skewed against the mining areas. Kono district – at the heart of diamond production and home to the highest concentration of artisanal miners - had a poverty level of 79.6% compared to the agricultural area of Pujehun District which had a poverty level of 59.6%; and urban Kono 56.3% compared to Freetown 17.1% (PAC and NMJD, 2006). Despite promises 'to improve the overall standard of living of miners – who are among the poorest people in the country' (GovSL, 2005, 5.3.4) reports from miners working in Tongo Field, an historically deprived area of the country, described their environment as a 'slave field' (PAC, 2008). The town had 'hardly any functioning medical facility' and women gave 'birth on motorbikes' during the journey to the nearest hospital miles

away at Panguma (PAC, 2008). Visible evidence of the DACDF benefiting the town was a new office built for the Chairman of the local Chiefdom but most people felt the Fund had no relevance to them (ibid:16). As the most diamondiferous area of the country and therefore the most profitable, Kono had a 'scandalously high' level of poverty and facilities such as roads, schools and clinics were the 'worst in the country' (PAC, 2008).

> *While mansions have been built in other places with resources from here, we live in squalor, with the basics being anything but basic.* Emmanuel Murray (digger), Tongo Fields, Eastern Sierra Leone (PAC, 2008:16)

Rehabilitation and reconstruction - agricultural Areas

Food security was the central focus for programming in the PRSPs and with this in mind, the aim of the government was to prioritise investment in the agricultural sector. The idea was to increase food cultivation and production, and promote the export of tree crops so as to improve the incidence of food security, create jobs, increase exports and help rural development (IMF, 2008, IMF, 2007). Agriculture was a major contributor to growth and employed the highest proportion of the active labour force; about two thirds. All farming was small scale using manual methods, and subsistence farmers were among the poorest of the population (IMF, 2008, GovSL, 2005). Between 2002 and 2005 support was given to farmers in the form of seed, fertilisers and some heavy machinery, and government expenditure on this sector remained robust throughout the period until 2007. Most heavy machinery was delivered in 2005 when donors acknowledged the investment the government had made in agriculture, which had risen from 2.7% to 5.6% of GDP over the period. Equipment was donated through bilateral arrangements with China, Iran and Libya

(GovSL, 2006) and by 2005 projects up and running in the sector amounted to $13.5 million with further projects planned for 2006 amounting to $59 million (ibid). Up to 2006 there was a steady increase in agricultural production in most areas; rice, cassava, sweet potato, groundnut, livestock and fish and between 2002 and 2005, rice self sufficiency rose from 57.4% to 69%. Groundnut production was almost double its target in 2005 and in 2006 cassava production exceeded the target by half (IMF, 2008).[92] Despite these successes, production was not sustainable contrasting dramatically with figures for the following year (2007) where most outputs failed to meet their targets, despite increased tractorisation and acreage for crop production.

Table 12 – Percentage achievement of PRS target for four main crop areas – 2005-2007

Crop	2005	2006	2007
	% achievement of target	% achievement of target	% achievement of target
Rice (paddy)	102	100	73
Cassava	118	142	59
Sweet Potato	119	91	94
Groundnut	175	104	103

Table 13 shows the generally good performance of all main crops against the PRS targets during 2005 and 2006 but shortfalls in 2007 on three. This is particularly marked given the previous 'over-performance' of crop production, especially cassava and groundnut. Figure 16 illustrates the dramatic reduction in the production of these two staples during 2006/2007. These falls were attributed to diminished

[92] Groundnut production achieved 175% of target figures in 2005, and cassava production achieved 142% in 2006 (IMF, 2008b)

budget allocation to the agricultural sector that year which resulted in reduced use of fertilisers and chemicals and lower numbers of farm holdings (IMF, 2008).

Figure 16 – Cassava and sweet potato production 2002- 2007



Data sourced from IMF, 2008 and from MAFFS Progress Report 2006 at http://www.daco-sl.org/encyclopedia/1_gov/1_2/MAFFS/maffs_progress_report.pdf, accessed on 25/11/08

Although domestic agricultural production was very successful, inadequate funds were made available for food security activities to capitalise on this success and the delayed disbursement of funds from donors did not help the situation (IMF, 2008: 79). The EU criticised the lack of any 'sound or comprehensive agricultural policy' which could be sustainable beyond the immediate post-war era (EU, 2007). Despite promises for increased micro-credit facilities to low income families (GovSL, 2005: 5.3.2e) lack of credit for farmers and entrepreneurs in the sector thwarted economic opportunities and the expansion of livelihood choices in the countryside (IMF, 2008: 79). There was no improvement to irrigation systems which meant that farmers relied on the periodic heavy rains to sustain their crops; limited post-harvest facilities such as grain stores, covered drying floors, refrigeration etc. stifled the maximisation of food security opportunities in the countryside. Further, the non-existence of rural electrification was manifest in the inability of farmers to add-value to production through activities such as large scale processing and increased

numbers of effective labour hours each day. Weak feeder roads, vehicular and river transport meant extreme difficulties and expense in accessing markets and ports which means that local farmers could not take full advantage of high world prices for their products (IMF/IDA, 2008, IMF, 2008).

Infrastructure

> *The overall objective of Government Policy in this sector is to rehabilitate the transport infrastructure and transform it into an efficient, safe and reliable system.* (GovSL, 2001: 118)
>
> *The Dam is expected to provide reliable electricity supply to a greater proportion of the country, including a large number of rural areas. At the same time, donor financing will be sought to support rural electrification*. (GovSL, 2001: 120)
>
> *That dam! It will never happen in my lifetime.*[93]

In the PRSP, the GovSL promised to invest in the supportive infrastructures of energy, power, road and transportation networks, and communications (5.3.2), and by December 2006 street lighting had been installed in Freetown – the first for decades (ICG, 2007). By 2009, major road junctions appeared to be lit but the rest of the capital was still in darkness.[94] Attempts to improve general electricity supplies were not successful due to the delayed completion of the Bumbuna Hydroelectric project. The Bumbuna dam project, 200 km northeast of Freetown in the Tonkolili district was first started three decades ago. Problems with its completion were the corrupt and ineffective practices of the previous APC regimes, the theft of transmission cables and extensive destruction during the war. The government entered into expensive contracts with independent suppliers to counter the failures of the National Power Authority which involved questionable procurement procedures

[93] Focus group discussion with members of the Sierra Leone Diaspora, Bradford, June 2007

[94] Field visit to Freetown, May 2009.

(IMF/IDA, 2008). It took until late 2007 to secure alternative short term supplies to the capital; supplies to other provincial towns failed due to the unavailability or very high price of fuel (IMF, 2008: 58). An EC report in 2007 stated that less than 10% of the Sierra Leonean population had access to electricity and that this deficit had a detrimental effect on private investment as potential businesses had no assurance of supplies (EU, 2007). In addition, targets for the improvement of water and sanitation utilities were not met (IMF/IDA, 2008).

The picture with regard to improved communications systems was much better. The liberalisation of the telecommunications industry had led to the establishment of five mobile 'phone companies and the network grew to penetrate 80% of the country helped by investments of over $125 (IMF, 2008). The availability of good internet connections and local services for access to the Net grew significantly in some areas outside the capital (ibid:59). There were also improvements to the road networks, but these were limited. 50km of gravel roads were rehabilitated and 1200 km of trunk roads constructed and maintained (IMF, 2008), but the benefits of this did not reach many rural area

Private investment and land reform

Growth in the private sector is argued to be particularly important for reducing poverty (IMF, 2008). The inability of the government to attract private investment was compounded by persistent traditional land laws, and the collapse of production in 2007 was helped in part by minimal participation of the private sector in agriculture (GovSL, 2006). Rural land in Sierra Leone belonged to elite landed families and other lineage networks, and the customary system allowed paramount chiefs to approve all land issues in an archaic system of traditional law which essentially represented the country's land administration system (Unruh and Turray,

2006). Non-elite families had no secure land, labour or marital rights. Post-war this continued to be a major problem among young people in the countryside because it kept them poor and dependent and land reform is therefore an important part of peacebuilding as well as crucial for private investment (Richards, 2005, Fanthorpe, 2001). Yet there remained a very strong sense of the 'inalienability of land' even after 'sensitisation' activities on civil and human rights among rural populations and their Paramount Chiefs. People did not want to give up that sense of security (Unruh, 2003). Consequently, trying to promote private investment and other interests outside the urban and peri-urban areas was nigh impossible to do (Unruh and Turray, 2006). Three pieces of new legislation were drafted for approval into law; The Land Policy, The Law Reform Commission and The Commercial Lands Act. At the time of writing, the issue of land and property rights had still to be addressed (DDI, 2008).

Creating economic opportunities?

There are no accurate or reliable figures on current unemployment levels in Sierra Leone although the consensus is that the issue is of growing concern, nationally and internationally (ICG, 2008, DfID, 2008, SLPP Manifesto 2007, APC Manifesto 2007).[95] But is it clear that economic growth did not equate to sustainable increased job creation (IMF, 2007). Figure 17 gives an indication of the type of economic activities which people engaged in, either part time or full time, paid or unpaid (GovSL, 2007a). The illustration shows around 11% employed in the private sector compared to around 5.5% by the state and over 80% of economic activity in the informal/family/farm business. According to an EU Report, around 40% of the

[95] *Elections 2007: A Comparison of Party Manifestos Against the Core Recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission*, 28th July 2007, from Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Programme available from http://www.slcmp.org/drwebsite/commentaries, accessed on 13/08/09.

population was engaged in economic activity of some sort; opportunities lay in farming, fishing or mining, mostly in the informal sector,[96] however, in certain areas of the country unemployment levels were estimated to be as high as 70-80%. Of those in work, large numbers of young men in the artisanal mining sector often engaged in food for work exchanges (EU, 2007). Figure 18 explains the employment landscape vis-à-vis paid and unpaid work with the expected contrasts between Freetown (West) and the provinces.

Figure 17 - Distribution of working population by employer [97]



[96] GovSL Analytical Report on Employment and Labour Force available from Sierra Leone Statistics at http://www.statistics.sl/2004%20Census%20Analytical%20Reports/2004%20Population%20and%20Housing%20Census%20Report%20on%20Employment%20and%20Labour.pdf, accessed on 13/11/08.

[97] Data retrieved from Core Welfare Indicator Survey (2007) GOVSL (2007) *Core welfare indicator questionnaire survey: (CWIQ 2007).* Freetown: Statistics Sierra Leone.

Figure 18 - Comparison between regular and salaried employees [98]



To counteract the dearth of job opportunities, projects through the Peacebuilding Fund reflected a very illiberal way of generating employment for the main target group. For example, under the Fund's 'Youth Enterprise Development' project it was hoped to generate 1200 jobs or training opportunities through a Food for Work agreement concluded with the World Food Programme (UNDP, 2008). This reflected the failure of marketisation to create jobs through the private sector; even those created through the re-opening of bauxite and rutile mines in 2006 were financed by a €25 million grant from the EU to the GovSL which funded loans to rutile mining, and support for regeneration of bauxite mining also came through the GovSL (IMF, 2007, Peters, 2002). Table 13 summarises 'artificial' job creation programming which is yet to be evaluated as to its efficacy or appropriateness (IMF/IDA, 2008).

[98] ibid

Table 13 – Summary of job creation activities

Scheme	Organisation	Potential Jobs	Actual Jobs
Micro-farms	Ministry of Youth and Sports/UNDP	48+	Unknown
Agricultural Business Units	Ministry of Agriculture/UNDP	120+	Unknown
Macro-farm (Newton)	USAID	1500	Unknown
Farms (young women)	UNDP	120	120
Girls off the Street	UNDP	Unknown	Unknown
Micro-credit	USAID	1200	1200
Palm kernel enterprise	UNDP	30	30
Pottery	UNDP/SLADEA	20	20
Road Works	SLRA	Unknown	3,618
Various	NaCSA	1950	1950
Unknown	KfW	1000	Unknown
Peer Educators	GTZ	160	160
Unknown	GTZ	2500/13500	Unknown
Rutile and Bauxite Mining	GovSL (Grant from EU)	Unknown	1400

Problems with private sector investment were widely recognised and new initiatives were launched to tackle the problem. A Diagnostic Trade Integration Study was commissioned and from that came an 'Integrated Framework' which evolved into an 'Activity Matrix' to help enable an environment conducive to private sector development (IMF, 2007). The Matrix involved many projects and activities including new legislation - The General Law Act (2007) and the Business Registration Act (2007), public/private dialogues and formulating policy for SMEs (small-medium sized enterprises). The problem remained that Sierra Leoneans had little know-how or capital to effectively participate in private sector development.

Again, various activities were implemented to try and correct this including the creation of a Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights and a study commissioned into the administrative barriers to trade and investment (ibid). It was acknowledged that there were many obstacles to job creation including adequate access to appropriate technology, a poor investment culture and the lack of youth awareness of business opportunities. Add to this limited access to finance, youth employability (various issues with relevant qualifications), poor inter-institutional programming and coordination, and the usual capacity and resource constraints, and the picture looked rather bleak (UNDG, 2006, IMF, 2007).

As late as October 2006 the government launched its Youth Employment Scheme (YES) whose objective was to provide around 135,000 jobs nationwide.[99] Projects approved under the YES are detailed in Table 14.

Table 14 - Projects approved under the YES initiative [100]

Area	Ministry	Job description	Location	No. of jobs created
Tourism	Tourism and Culture/National Tourist Board	Beach wardens, beach combers, life guards and parking attendants	Predominantly the beaches of the Western area	198
Health	Health and Sanitation/District health medical officers	Medical stock control clerks, community health registrars and promoters, medical and environmental waste management	All 13 medical districts	1271
Youth action in community environ-	Youth and Sports/District youth committees, chiefdom youth committees, local	Unknown	Western (600) Bo (200) Kenema (150) Makeni (200)	1300

[99] Awareness Times Newspaper, Freetown, *Youth employment scheme on course in Sierra Leone*, (2007) sourced from www.news.sl/drwebsite/publis/printer_20054975.shtml, on 10/11/08

[100] Report by YES. *Youth employment scheme on course in Sierra Leone*, 14 March 2007, Awareness Times Newspaper in Freetown, available from http://news.sl/drwebsite/publish/printer_20054975.shtml, accessed on 10/11/08

mental works	councils and youth serving agencies		Kono (150)	
Roads	Sierra Leone Roads Authority	Road rehabilitation, road cleaning etc.	All 12 districts	1657
Waste management	GTZ/Kline Salone[101]		Daylight workers and security officers	475

There were other projects on the go, for example the USAID Corad-Links project aimed at either improving livelihoods or increasing training opportunities but not directly creating jobs. These projects have therefore been omitted from this analysis.[102] Youth agricultural farms were set up, again with donor assistance, 51 micro-farms, 41 macro-farms and 700 agricultural business units were created for youth employment as well as initiatives for young women in the provinces. There have been some positive reports coming out of this venture. For example, youth groups were able to lease land from landowners to grow trees for profits (Unruh and Turray, 2006).

Summary

In sum, the stated goals of macro-economic reform bore little resemblance to empirical realities on the ground in Sierra Leone. Although there was evidence of development in some areas, the general picture was one of continuing deprivation and deep poverty. As noted by the NRS, the task for reconstruction was enormous and the wish list for reform extensive, but eight years on from Lomé there was little evidence of a peace dividend and growing concerns for the future as inflation started

[101] Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit – a private company owned by the German Federal Government working on a public benefit basis for sustainable development and part of a long term partnership with the GovSL, see Sierra Leone Encyclopaedia at http://www.daco-sl.org/encyclopedia/5_part/5_1german.htm, accessed on 16/11/08

[102] Report by YES. *Youth employment scheme on course in Sierra Leone*, 14 March 2007, Awareness Times Newspaper in Freetown, available from http://news.sl/drwebsite/publish/printer_20054975.shtml, accessed on 10/11/08

to bite allowing some people to slip back into poverty (IMF/IDA, 2008). The issue of sustainability in respect of the small advances made was central to concerns.

4.4 - ANALYSIS

> *Promoting equitable relations between community groups is incompatible with free market reform which often increases income gaps* (UNDG, 2006)

The GovSL adopted liberalising reforms in the economy but despite good economic growth and substantial aid flows it failed to deliver much in the way of improved living conditions or economic opportunities to the majority of the population, and disparities between the peninsular and the rural areas remained acute with marginalised groups experiencing deeper poverty. There were several possible explanations for this. They included continuing patrimonial practices at all levels of government, corruption and lack of political will; low human, technical and financial capacity; inadequate funding; bad policies; the inability of line ministries to absorb aid; external constraints; or a complex mix of all. The pressing demands of macro-economic stabilisation appeared to clash with the pressing demands for peace (Berdal, 2009: 129; de Soto, 1994); exporting the country's wealth at the expense of creating sustainable livelihoods.

The central issue for the peacebuilding model, however, was that liberalisation of the economy was only partially implemented. There were various factors which constrained liberalisation. Difficult post-war conditions were not attractive to private investors and traditional culture influenced the progress of reforms; for example, it was extremely challenging to liberalise an economy when traditional inalienable land tenure practices remained strong among powerful chiefs, and the local culture linked land security to food security. Because of low capacity and resources, and the

inhospitable ‘terrain’ of the post-war environment, the over-ambitious wish-list for reform had to prioritise some change over others and full liberalising reform did not prove to be essential as far as securing aid was concerned - although some deterioration in performance meant delayed flows from donors in 2006/07 (DfID, 2008). The reforms necessary to achieve the IFI’s PC were prioritised at the expense of improved economic management elsewhere; good progress on the PC was not the type of progress necessary to maximise the exploitation of natural mineral resources for local development or establish transparency and accountability in broader economic management which were key issues in the post-war political settlement.

Certain statements can be made about economic liberalisation in Sierra Leone. Export oriented growth policies did not reduce the incidence of poverty in most cases and did not create jobs. Formal economic opportunities remained elusive to most Sierra Leoneans. Although the informal sector remained robust, exclusion from the formal sector meant substantial amounts of human capital were disengaged from the national economy by way of income and taxation. As well as having the obvious effects on morale and durable peace, this waste of human capital helped to perpetuate the dependence of the state on external revenue flows, disconnecting government from any obligations to please the populace because the populace was not paying its way. It was the external constituency which remained the central benefactor of economic growth through debt servicing arrangements. This had implications for democracy.

Because there was only partial implementation of liberalising reforms, it is not possible to argue that this model of reform failed, it is only possible to argue that this model of reform was not conceivable within the post-conflict, cultural and political context of Sierra Leone. It is possible to conclude that, although full

liberalisation was illusive, the priority reforms that were made were not helpful with regard to addressing the challenges for peace. The so called 'liberal peace' appeared to be rather patchy; which parts of liberalisation were most important, and who decided what they were?

'Good governance' appears to be measured by human development indicators aligned to the MDGs. Del Castillo describes this reconstruction of post-conflict economies in terms of 'development as usual' which deepens aid dependency and fails to consolidate peace (Castillo, 2008: 26). Indeed, Sierra Leone peace priorities were a bit more nuanced than the MDGs and the empirical evidence from the country confirmed that 'reconstruction is fundamentally different from normal development' (Castillo, 2008: 304). Good governance as development was not necessarily relevant in terms of the pressing priorities for peace but in terms of local definitions, it was also an elusive goal. Promises were broken as diamondiferous communities did not get the funding or development they expected and although attempts were made at introducing new legislation and implementing new initiatives, the 'good governance' project gained little traction; corruption remained rife and this reduced confidence still further with regard to private investment. Donors also had a case to answer in respect of their outstanding inability to improve local capacity so that government could take on responsibility for its own recovery. Severe lack of capacity in all government ministries and the broader bureaucracy made the ambitious reforms of the liberal peacebuilding project delusory; this is well documented elsewhere but lack of capacity afforded the government a reasonable explanation for non-delivery and poor performance. Shortfalls in funding were also an issue. The cost of implementing the PRSP was estimated at $1,624 billion, but commitments amounted to only $929 billion creating

a shortfall in funding of $695,000 (IMF, 2008); this meant that over one third of the cost of the PRSP was not forthcoming. Delays in donor flows towards the end of 2006 impacted immediately on pro-poor spending (Table 15, below); this also had an effect on revenue collection from procurement activities and put the government further in arrears.[103] This deterioration was largely blamed on the 'political inertia' surrounding 'the elections' and the nervousness of private enterprise at the potential for instability the approaching elections may bring (GovSL, 2008), but whatever the excuse, there was a clear issue around the sustainability of even the smallest positive advances.

Table 15 – Poverty expenditures 2005-2007

2005		2006		2007	
Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual
154,000	151,724	208,058	186,017	240,600	153,553

Sourced from the PRSP Progress Report 2008, IMF country Report No. 08/250, available from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08250.pdf, accessed on 22/11/09

4.5 - CONCLUDING STATEMENT

The dire record of the GovSL for delivering on its economic promises for peace cannot be directly blamed on economic liberalisation because the picture was extremely complex, but what was clear was that the political and physical environments in post-war Sierra Leone were not at all conducive to the success of such reforms and that failures to fully implement liberalising policies were essentially overlooked by donors and funders. It is yet early to deduce whether this

[103] Personal interview by telephone with SLPP Minister of Finance Mr John Benjamin, 11th December 2008

is a deliberate tactic to allow time for the evolution of a fully fledged market economy, or whether some reforms were indeed irrelevant, but liberalising reforms exposed the fragile economy to external shocks such as rising food and oil prices, and the subsequent mitigating measures – the reduction of import tariffs - taken by the government meant a reduction in revenues to the treasury during 2008. In addition, the global financial crisis took its toll when, in 2009, there was a sharp drop in revenues from the mining sector and growth was forecast to fall to around 5.75%.[104] Environmental changes were also predicted to have an impact on the Sierra Leone economy as global warming was forecast to impact on the country's fish stocks.[105]

In terms of contributing to local priorities, economic liberalisation cannot be described as the optimum model for peacebuilding in Sierra Leone because it assumes commitment and capacity, exposes a fragile economic environment to global risk and uncertainties, and at the same time marginalises local people not only from economic benefits but also from the political process. There is a contradiction in the liberalisation of post-conflict economies because shrinking the state does not conflate well with the enormous challenge of building state capacity to fulfil its core functions, including much needed welfare provision (OECD, 2007). This remains a serious challenge for peace.

[104] Samura Kamara, Finance Minister, quoted by Reuters on 4th March 2009, at http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL4380362, accessed on 14/03/09

[105] Study by internationals scientists at the World Fish Centre explained by Alister Doyle, Reuters on 5th February 2009 and available from http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSTRE5144RR20090205, accessed on 14/08/09.

CHAPTER FIVE

PROMOTING POPULAR PARTICIPATION

> *The power of the state is invaluable when contained democratically. If not, it always carries the risk of catastrophe.* (Reychler and Paffenholz, 2001: 216)

The analysis of the political economy of peace presented in the previous chapters demonstrates the affect on participation and ownership of disconnected and externally imposed economic policy. In chapter five the argument is presented that liberal democracy, as espoused through a multi-party political system, has done a similar job of disempowering rather empowering the masses. This is because the central tenet of democracy - participation by civilians in decision making for their futures – is stymied and distorted by the presence of a powerful external constituency which controls the political economy of their peacebuilding plan. Yet democratic elections are the primary tool for legitimising government after conflict.

The central question this chapter aims to address is: how did political reform support the local priorities for peace? How did democratisation support the challenge of the nation building project by producing an egalitarian structure of representation and redistribution? How did the project for transparency and accountability empower the previously marginalised masses in their demands for better government, and how did democratic reform change the behaviour of political elites?

The country had many priorities for political reform. The TRC-R produced the most pertinent recommendations including demands for a leadership which the citizenry could trust. This would involve establishing an ethos of impartiality and accountability, eliminating corruption, and reforming the judiciary so that the rule of

law could act as a counter-balance for any executive excesses. It would also involve building up the capacity of civil society or the broader citizenry to monitor government and drive through the recommendations of the TRC (TRC, 2004). These promises for peace synergised well with the various commitments made by the GovSL in the iPRSP (GovSL, 2001: 111,112).

To investigate the political reforms, section 5.1 starts by analysing the post-conflict electoral process to determine how elections and decentralisation helped to connect the general populace to the previously impenetrable levers of power. In Sections 5.2 and 5.3 investigations are made into the efficacy of the democratic mechanisms which claimed to allow citizens to hold government to account; the rule of law, the anti-corruption commission and civil society. Finally, an analysis is made of the behaviour of political elites in the context of traditional ways of doing politics, conceptualised as the *culture politique.*

To facilitate the complex analysis, evidence is drawn from official and unofficial documentation as before, and also from primary data collected in the field during visits to Freetown in November 2006, and in March 2007 - during the period of voter registration prior to the elections in August 2007. The primary data consists mostly of semi-structured interviews conducted with civil society representatives, government ministers, political party members, and donors. The chapter opens with an explanation of why democracy was so revered in reconstruction efforts for Sierra Leone.

5.1 – THE LOGIC OF INCLUSIVITY

After war, multi-party elections were seen as the vehicle for delivering a stable political system by legitimising government (Wallensteen, 2002, Licklider, 2005).

This involved the transformation of warring factions into political parties and the creation of an independent and mutually approved NEC among other broader reforms to 'transform the conflict' (Lederach, 2003). The notion of democracy as a trust building mechanism was underpinned by its guiding principles of discussion, mutual respect and equal representation (Lederach, 1997). These concepts were not historically or culturally embedded in the political trajectory of Sierra Leone yet the damage caused by the war to the fabric of society needed to be repaired to prevent the 'logic of war' replacing the 'logic of peace' once again (Sisk, 2001). Democratisation – with its focus on the rule of law, justice and respect for human rights – was believed to be the panacea for healing Sierra Leone's broken society.

In the liberal peacebuilding project, democracy was one of the key components of the 'civilising mission' which set out to transplant western liberal values into post-conflict environs through the construction of democratic institutions (Paris, 2002). This reform was also part of globalisation because that process could only function through units of stable nation states. Post-Cold War, liberal democracy was projected as the optimum model for organising societies and for apportioning power within states (Fukuyama, 1989). The model of democracy was to be state-centred, through liberal representation.

As liberal democratic principles became the 'global referent' (Southall, 2006: 163), there was considerable paradigmatic investment by the international community for political reform which adopted this model. For example, US-AID are spending c.$1 billion a year on better governance promotion in the developing world and elsewhere (USAID, 2005). Thus, in the 1990s and 2000s, international democracy promotion actors proliferated and expanded their activities (Burnell, 2006).

The democratisation project was not straightforward, however. Making peace through building democracy had a mixed track record and the efficacy of this approach was yet to be determined with any degree of accuracy (Sisk, 2001: 786). External support in the form of aid for democracy assistance had been mostly ineffective in persuading national governments to 'do the right thing', for example (Easterly, 2006: 128). Britain, the biggest bilateral donor to Sierra Leone with long term commitments to the country's development and stability, directed 41% of its aid to governance reform projects over the period 2002 to 2007. This was compared to 11% in the social sector and 17% on the economy (DfID, 2008: 10, Table 4), yet despite this expensive focus on the 'good governance' project - a spend of at least £65 million - there was no tangible progress eight years on: 'the most significant failure… [being] in the area of corruption and integrity' (ibid:47).

Although there was a vibrant debate among scholars and other commentators as to the efficacy of democracy promotion by the international community, participation in the body politic had long been an aspiration of the local citizenry in Sierra Leone (Table 16, below) (Kandeh, 2003, Kpundeh, 1994, Wai, 2008).

Table 16 - Turnout for recent presidential elections in Sierra Leone

Year	% turnout	
1996 [106]	60%	
2002	83%	
2007	75% (1st round)	68% (2nd round)

Sourced from Africa Elections Database http://africanelections.tripod.com/sl.html on 12.12.08 and the CarterCentre (CarterCentre, 2002)

[106] This election was conducted at the height of the war when the country had no security in most of the provinces and conditions were very challenging for voters; the NEC voter register was severely constrained by large numbers of refugees and internally displaced people.

Compared to the outcomes of elections elsewhere in Africa (Kenya 2007 and Zimbabwe 2008), and given the political history of Sierra Leone, the 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections were of exceptional quality and a huge success for the country, its citizens and the community of external actors who had supported the process. This was particularly so as the aftermath of the elections involved the peaceful transfer of power from one incumbent to the next; almost unprecedented on the continent. In preparation for the elections, donors put efforts into strengthening institutional capacity through support to Electoral Management Bodies (EMB), the Political Parties Registration Commission (PPRC), the Election Offences Court (EOC) and of course the NEC. Civil society also played an important role in monitoring and sensitising people on their political rights and the importance of peaceful elections. The NEC accredited 35 civil society organisations (CSOs) to the monitoring task and 80 groups worked through membership of the local watchdog organisation - National Elections Watch (NEW) (EU, 2007b). The result was equality of access to the political space for competing parties, an informed electorate and a credible and transparent system of electoral management (Zack-Williams, 2008). This was a profound achievement for the country and its citizenry, and reflected the 'new sophistication' of the Sierra Leone voter and their commitment to abide by the rules of democracy in difficult post-war conditions (Zack-Williams, 2008). The 2007 elections were a significant improvement on those of 2002 when widespread malpractice was discovered, and the success of the 2007 elections suggested that the democratic project gained real traction in Sierra Leone. As democracy was closely linked to peace and better governance, this was good news for the country.

An investigation follows into the impact of democratic elections on the quest for meaningful participation and inclusivity, for representation and accountability, to establish the extent to which multi-party politics lived up to its claims.

Electoral process – participation and inclusivity

The first post conflict presidential and parliament elections took place in 2002, with substantial funding from international donors, followed in 2004 by local elections, the first for over thirty years. Paramount chieftaincy elections also took place in 2002 to replace the 63 chiefs who had died or been exiled during the war as part of the project to restore the chieftaincy system which would include grass roots communities in the political process. In 2007, the determination of donors and the GovSL to have free, fair and peaceful elections came at a projected cost of $28 million; $18 million was donated through the UNDP basket fund and $10 million was to be contributed by GovSL , although in the outcome this failed to materialise (Zack-Williams and Gbla, 2008, ICG, 2008). Around 8,980 election monitors from 53 domestic civil society organisations and 144 international election observers from 26 organizations took part and an unprecedented voter registration level of 91% was recorded by the NEC (Zack-Williams and Gbla, 2008). The eventual turnout of around 75% was partly influenced by the fact that voting took place at the height of the rainy season (August) compared to voter registration in the dry (March). Given the poor and often nonexistent infrastructure in more remote parts of the country, access to polling stations was considerably more difficult in the wet.

Political parties formed around the usual regional and ethnic groupings as well as interest groups such as youth (Young Peoples' Party, YPP) and women (Movement for Progress Party, MOP) (Cubitt, 2006). Eleven parties took part in 2002, five of which were 'obscure or fringe parties' with no hope of winning. It was

the case that people with no qualifications for the job believed that even a 'high school drop-out', was presidential material (Kandeh, 2003). When confronted with few alternatives in the way of viable money making opportunities such as the professions, industry, commerce or banking, politics seemed like a reasonable choice for all and sundry as access to state resources was considered to be the only sure means to secure wealth (Rose-Akerman, 2008). The proliferation of parties reflected what Kandeh described as the 'opportunism of the country's political class' rather than the 'flowering of democracy' (Kandeh, 2003), and yet it was also an indication of a more accessible political space and a much more tolerant government. The weakness in political parties was problematic for democratisation, however, and the post-war setting presented various challenges for the formation of effective parties (de Zeeuw, 2009). As expected, the RUF transformed itself into a political party for the elections of 2002. It gained virtually no support from the electorate managing only 1.73% of the vote in the presidential poll, and by 2007 the RUF had failed to sustain their rebel-to-party transition. Their leadership was either dead, behind bars or detained by the Special Court and there were no candidates submitted for the 2007 elections (Zack-Williams, 2008); due to lack of funding, the RUFP eventually merged with the APC and many of their number were hired as personal body guards for the party hierarchy.[107] This failure of the RUF to garner any tangible support from the general populace somewhat delegitimized its 'revolutionary' war project.

A second party to appear for the first time in 2002 was the Peace and Liberation Party (PLP) of Johnny Paul Koroma, the former head of the AFRC junta who had been excluded from the peace deal but who had gained some degree of

[107] Personal conversations with the Sierra Leone Diaspora, Bradford, September 2007

credibility as chair of the CCP, but his promise to 'make Sierra Leone ungovernable' if he lost the election demonstrated his clear misconception of the democratic ideal and did little to endear him to the general populace. He achieved only 3% of the presidential poll (Kandeh, 2003). In 2007, the PLP was still in contention but support had dwindled to less than 1%.[108] The stronger parties with most support contained much of the form but less of the substance of Western party based democracy. This was because their political culture at the higher levels contained all the characteristics of the old patrimony and a continuing focus on personalities and regionalism rather ideology (Salih, 2006, Cubitt, 2006).

The weakness of most political parties reflected the newness of multiparty politics in the country and the dearth of resources in post-conflict environs; never a good spawning ground for national political parties and an institution of democracy which generates little attention from donors (Zartman, 1995a, de Zeeuw, 2009, Reilly, 2006).[109] The parties for women and youth could not fund serious campaigns and donors were reluctant to support individual parties because of the partisan nature of such activities,[110] however by 2007 some support came in the form of generic training: 'for capacity building processes, campaign methods or preparing political messages'.[111] The Westminster Foundation, for example, arranged visits by British parliamentarians to mentor local MPs at the national parliament. The Political Parties Registration Commission (PPRC) was a programme supported through the UNDP basket fund. It was mandated by the Political Parties Act 2002 and the Constitution of 1991 to monitor and mediate all parties and their membership on

[108] African Elections - http://africanelections.tripod.com/sl.html, accessed on 06/02/09

[109] Personal interview with Roland Caeser of the PPRC, Freetown, 20/11/06

[110] Personal interviews with anonymous donor respondent, London, February 2007 and Ernest B Koroma, president of the APC, Freetown, March 2007

[111] Personal interview with president of the opposition APC, Ernest B Koroma, Freetown, March 2007

behalf of the electorate, the idea being to promote political pluralism and the spirit of constitutionalism amongst political parties. Although this initiative was strongly supported by the international community, during field work interviews the PPRC respondent demonstrated great frustration at logistical constraints on his activities. The organisation appeared to lack all essential equipment to conduct business; furniture, stationary, computer or vehicle, and there was a sense of 'unfinished business' with regard to donor interest in the project. Since the completion of field work, however, there were more positive developments; a new PPRC website with working links to the financial reports of all political parties was a good sign of more transparency in the system. The accuracy of the financial reports was unknown but accessibility to their content both via the web and the offices of the PPRC was a useful starting point for society to check out their party's financial activities.[112] There were also positive reports about the activities of the Code Monitoring Committees,[113] an adjunct of the PPRC, which were successful in reconciling clashes between political parties during 2007 campaigning (EU 2007b).

By 2007, there were three main party contenders in the elections, and voting patterns suggested that the country had settled back into habits of old where regional and ethnic ties dictated party allegiance - the northern aligned APC and the southern aligned SLPP (ICG, 2008), however, there were also some encouraging signs in respect of broadened participation. The split in the old political groupings of the APC and SLPP created a new party, the PMDC, headed by the old political protagonist Charles Margai but fielding many younger parliamentary candidates.

[112] The PPRC acknowledges 'generous funding' from US-AID on its website at http://www.pprcsl.info/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=29 accessed on 07/02/09

[113] See DACO at http://www.daco-sl.org/encyclopedia/1_gov/1_3/PPRC/operation_modalities.pdf, accessed on 06/02/09

Around 65% of the PMDC candidates were young which gave the youth a fresh opportunity to find its voice and which perhaps heralded the evolution of a new type of identity politics in Sierra Leone which was not centred on ethnicity (ICG, 2008, Wai, 2008, Gaima, 2009). Some observers suggested that this was a cynical attempt to attract the youth vote; a tactic also applied by the main opposition APC (Wai, 2008).

The results of the 2007 elections showed a much more balanced representation among parties in parliament compared to 2002 (Tables 17 and 18, below) and this was perhaps an indication of increased freedoms borne of greater security. Improved discipline and professionalism in the security sector, for example, allowed people to make more autonomous choices. Security and greater political tolerance were both very positive aspects of international intervention in Sierra Leone.

Table 17 – Results of 2007 parliamentary election by party

Party	Percentage of vote	Number of seats
All Peoples' Congress	52.68%	59
Sierra Leone Peoples' Party	38.39%	43
Peoples' Movement for Democratic Change	8.93%	10

African Elections - http://africanelections.tripod.com/sl.html, and LeoneNet - http://www.leonedirect.com/marketplace/sierraleone_parliamentary_election_resultstable.jsp, both accessed on 06/02/09

Table 18 – Results of 2002 parliamentary election by party

Party	Percentage of vote	Number of seats
Sierra Leone Peoples' Party	67.6%	83
All Peoples' Congress	21.4%	27
Peace and Liberation Party	3.6%	2

Data sourced from the CarterCentre (CarterCentre, 2002)

Further positive developments included additional political space through media outlets which gave voice to alternative expressions especially among the alienated youth who were bold in their condemnation of corruption among elites (Zack-Williams and Gbla, 2008). Some popular and politically charged music included songs with the titles *Fat Cats, Those responsible for destroying the country, Time to go SLPP government, Corruption; it's enough*. Music was a 'powerful tool in the campaign for social transformation' because it allowed citizens peaceful expressions of their anger (Wai, 2008:57). The lyrics of songs 'inaugurated a national conversation … [and] … demand for social citizenship' (Abdullah, 2007: cited by, Wai, 2008). Youth played an important role in the elections - mobilising voters, observing, being voters and candidates themselves, or acting as election agents and cadres (Zack-Williams and Gbla, 2008). The youth also represented an important voting block; 56% of the country's registered voters were under the age of 32 and were therefore very significant players in the country's democracy (Wai, 2008). This energetic response by the youth of Sierra Leone to get involved in the election process was perhaps an indication of their high expectations from the democratic process.

On the down side, reforms in the electoral system failed to increase the number of female candidates nominated in 2007. Only 64 women, 11% of candidates, were nominated despite the rhetoric on gender equality from all political parties (EU 2007b). Although active in national observer groups, few women made it to key positions; in the new cabinet of 2007, out of 26 ministerial positions 3 were filled by women, the same number as the previous SLPP cabinet. Further, there was evidence that some traditional leaders continued with the partisan practices of old, actively supporting the incumbent and influencing campaign agendas (EU 2007b). Opposition members claimed that money was distributed among chiefs and others to buy support, in many cases state officials were accused of using national resources to garner support for the ruling party (EU, 2007b).[114] In conversations, senior members of the opposition produced animated responses about the 'politicisation' of donor funds during the campaign period where presidential candidates would use monies to buy support; the point was made that the local populace didn't know the money came from international funds for poverty alleviation.[115] Democracy itself is an expensive process for local elites involving official campaigning and unofficial bribes (Branch and Cheeseman, 2009).

> *You cannot really talk about a level playing field when political parties don't have the same capacity … when there is an abundance of advantages to the incumbent. In our situation we have abuse of the incumbency which will make the playing field not level.*[116]

Despite these comments about an 'unlevel playing field' which was supported by EU observers (EU, 2007b), there was a peaceful transfer of power in 2007 indicating

[114] Various personal interviews in Freetown during the registration period, March 2007

[115] Personal interview with three senior members of the APC, Freetown, March 2007

[116] Personal interview with leader of the opposition APC, Ernest B Koroma, at his offices, Freetown, March 2007

that perhaps the populace had clear minds of their own, and freedom and security to express their views.[117] In the light of more recent African elections, the SLPP regime was to be commended on its peaceful acceptance of the results although local evidence suggested that the incumbent did not have support from the vast majority of police and armed services.[118]

The successful elections of 2007 showed how the combined effort of both local and global actors brought about great change as far as procedural democracy was concerned. The populace was able to peacefully choose the people they thought would best represent their interests in parliament. Parliament, however, was what Thomson described as the 'Cinderella' of reform, receiving little support from either government or donors and having minimal efficacy as an institution (Thomson, 2007, Southall, 2006). Critically weak, the national parliament was noted for its prevailing 'bad governance' culture, a problem acknowledged by local commentators who urged the international community to help build knowledge in the areas of 'integrity building, political stability, good governance, the theory of Separation of Powers and The Rule of Law'. Many MPs were not cognisant of their functions or their powers. In 1991, Sierra Leone adopted the Washington model but there was evidence that MPs were unaware of the change and the extent of their new powers (WB, 2004). This had serious implications for law making, approving budgets or making senior appointments and therefore, as an institution of representation, parliament had minimal capacity and was unable to perform its primary function - the monitoring of the executive.[119] [120] It lacked the necessary

[117] Research into the impact of aid or the absence of aid to support political parties has emerged more recently in the literature, see: Burnell, 2006; Salih, 2006; King, 2006; Carothers, 2006

[118] Personal interview with Charles Margai, leader of the PMDC, Freetown, March 2007 '85% of the police are not with the government and 75% of the military are not with the government'

[119] From an article in AllAfrica dated 03.12.07 by Pel Koroma in Freetown entitled *'Conduct Workshop for Parliamentarians'*

staffing, secretarial support and computerised technology; research facilities such as libraries, buildings or meeting rooms, and the relevant knowledge and expertise among staff and MPs.[121] This rather negated the purpose of elections because the primary mechanism to convert democratic choice into effective representation did not work; citizenship could only have meaning if local communities were integrated through their representatives into national institutions (Chopra and Hohe, 2004: 245-246). The commitment of MPs to represent their constituents was also questionable, most being 'too poor' to take a stand against the government.[122]

> *These are people who do not even understand the parliamentary procedure and secondly they are poor, they cannot exercise a will of their own, they do not have the capacity to tell the government what they believe is right.*[123]

There was also the issue of 'crossing the floor' as in the pre-war era, traditional politics prevailed (Kandeh, 2003: 197). Comments included:[124]

> *People are being bribed and given different incentives to act or not*
>
> *If the president says this, you are tied … over the past ten years MPs have not uttered* ***one word*** *[original emphasis]*
>
> *MPs cannot afford to meet their constituents*
>
> *In the first place, MPs are corrupt. They are part of the state infra structure. These are sycophants, they are hostile, these are people coming to parliament for themselves; they want … government contracts - nobody can actually depend on them. The people depend on civil society.*

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[120] Personal interview with leader of the opposition APC, Ernest B Koroma, at his offices, Freetown, March 2007

[121] Personal interviews Ernest B Koroma, Charles Margai, Freetown, March 2007

[122] It should be noted that the 2002 'block system' of voting, similar to proportional representation at province level, was changed in 2007 to the system of constituency based voting and there were hopes that this would make representatives more accountable

[123] Personal interview with Charles Margai, leader of the PMDC, Freetown, March 2007

[124] Various personal interviews requesting anonymity in Freetown, March 2007, A4, B5, B7, C18, D3

The most worrying dynamic of the 2007 elections was the prevalence of old practices by political elites in manipulating the youth (Christensen and Utas, 2008). Many ex-combatants remained in Freetown or other larger provincial towns after the war involving themselves in petty trading and prostitution, drug peddling and theft. Vulnerable, they were willing to be courted by politicians to act as their election thugs (Zack-Williams, 2008, Christensen and Utas, 2008, Wai, 2008). Liberal representative democracy meant 'shortened time horizons' for political elites to prosper from the benefits of office, and this had the effect of hastening the pilfering of state resources. Winner-takes-all scenarios were an unhelpful model of democracy in such a fractured and dysfunctional body politic.

A further issue was the emerging ethnicisation of politics. Cheru argued that it was the politicisation of ethnicity, not ethnicity itself, which accentuated conflict and destruction and this thesis was borne out in the political history of Sierra Leone (Cheru, 2002: 197). The single party state of the Stevens era had ironically dissipated tensions around ethnicity. The concern in the post-conflict democratisation was that ethnic relations were being brought into much sharper relief through multi-party politics which was compounded by the 'winner-takes-all' model of democracy. In 1996, ethnicity once again came to the fore as a tool of the upper strata political elite (Francis, 1999) and again, in 2007, the politics of ethnicity were the dominant determining factor in campaigning when citizens were mobilised around historic ties (Fakondo, 2009). In the 2008 local elections, partisanship and political polarisation around the north/western (APC) and southern (SLPP) divide became more acute, resulting in a contraction of support for the emerging PMDC in favour of old allegiances (Gaima, 2009: 143).

Decentralisation

If central parliament wasn't up to the task of representing citizens' interests, the decentralisation initiative had potential to correct this dilemma of *participation without representation*. Devolution of power from central government was an important component of the GovSL reform agenda 'to move away from the highly centralized system of administration … inherited from previous governments' (Kabbah, 2003).[125] It was strongly supported by the international community, particularly the EU and DfID through the World Bank,[126] as a mechanism to bring accountability and participation to the 'local' and improve the impact of aid resources (EU, 2007a, DfID, 2008, Jabbi and Kpaka, 2007). Restoration of the chieftaincy system was part of this bid to give ownership to local people. In short, decentralisation was the mechanism to bring government to the people; the major trend during the 1990s for promoting participatory governance and for legitimising government by giving regional authority for decision making (Olowu and Wunsch, 2003, Crawford, 2008, Brancati, 2008:9).

In theory, local administration meant public service delivery was more closely scrutinised and monitored by the people who benefited from it. 19 local government councils in four administrative regions of the country were created from the Local Government Act and elections were held in 2004, including a quota share for women representatives in ward committees. Functions and finances were devolved to the local councils and staff made available, although severe delays in resourcing had an impact on the new councils' functions (EU, 2007a). This was unfortunate because improvements in demand side pressures, the local elections,

[125] Statement delivered by his Excellency the President at Kenema, Bo, Makeni and Pork Loko from 26-30 January 2003 and available from Sierra Leone Web at http://www.sierra-leone.org/GOSL/kabbah-012603.html, accessed on 05/02/09

[126] The Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project (IRCBP)

were not harmonized with service delivery or high expectations with local capacity.[127] The Rapid Results Initiative (RRI), a joint GovSL and World Bank project, was designed to jump-start local council activities to produce 'quick wins' and promote a 'culture of performance, accountability and results' in local councils.[128] The first wave brought encouraging signs for the local populace, and local teams felt empowered which unleashed 'knowledge and capacity already available at the local level' (World Bank, 2006b). Each council was encouraged to set up a 'high visibility, high impact project' within 30 days of receiving a grant ($30,000). These projects were established in the areas of water, sanitation, feeder roads, traffic, rice production and for mitigating post- harvest loss. A team member in the Western Rural Area was quoted by the World Bank as saying: *'The RRI project is exciting, because we know we are no longer at the mercy of the donor; we own it and we will finish it'* (World Bank, 2006b). Examples of successful RRI projects are set out in Table 19 (below).

Table 19 – Selected Rapid Results Initiative Projects

District	Project Result
Sewafe and Kono	Travel time between Sewafe and Kono District was reduced from 1 hour to 15 minutes and transportation costs were reduced from Le 5,000 ($1.75) to Le 2,000 ($0.70).
Pujehun district	High-yield quick-harvest Inner Valley Swamp Rice seeds increased yields by 4,000 bushels within 90 days
Kenema	The total volume of garbage in two lorry parks and two markets in Kenema Township was reduced by 90% within 95 days.

Data sourced from World Bank, 2006b

[127] Encouraged by projects such as ENCISS (see section 4.3) which sensitised citizens and civil society on the decentralisation process

[128] See Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project (IRCBP) at - http://www.ircbp.sl/drwebsite/publish/rri.shtml, accessed on 09/02/09

There were mixed reports about the efficacy of the local councils but these must be considered in the light of their very short period of operation. Overall there were improvements in service delivery although there were disparities across the country. The transfer of the education sector to rural councils was delayed, not starting until March 2007 but both health and agriculture were transferred with some improvements recorded in delivery. The health sector was the most advanced (EU, 2007) with district medical officers (DMOs) 'embracing' the decentralisation project. Services through the primary medical units (PMUs) did not deteriorate after reform (Zhou, 2007), and there was some improvement in access to care and satisfaction levels; in 2007 over half of respondents (53%) in a IRCBP survey had access to a clinic within 60 minutes of their home compared to 48% in 2005 (Table 21, below).

Table 20 – Access to government health care providers, comparison 2005/2007

Time to government clinic or	% of households 2005	% of households 2007
Less than 15 minutes	18	18
15 to 30 minutes	12	16
31 to 60 minutes	19	19
60 to 120 minutes	18	24
Over 120 minutes	33	21
None nearby	1	2

Data sourced from (IRCBP, 2008)

These improvements were significantly assisted by the efforts of donors who were involved in the construction of new clinics independent of the local council and also the introduction of the Direct Service Delivery policy for essential drugs which bypassed central government (DfID, 2006). Due to the autonomy exercised by DMOs and their participation at all levels including managing the health grant

account, morale was greatly improved in the sector. Zhou recorded the following comments (WB, 2004):

> *Decentralization has stopped the tide of brain drain among medical professionals because we now have interesting work to do.*
>
> *Decentralization allows us to quickly respond to disease outbreaks. We don't have to wait for the ministry.*
>
> *Decentralization means if I have a problem I can knock on the doors of our council rather than sitting on a long bench in Youyi Building for a week and waiting for an audience with a ministry official.*[129]

The agricultural sector was also devolved to local councils but showed deterioration in some services over the 2005-2007 period; for example a decline from 23% to 18% of people made contact with an agricultural extension worker.[130] This was the only area of devolved activity, however, which actually deteriorated over the period. There were improvements in the sector in respect of increased drying and storage facilities but with large disparities across councils, some faring far better than others (IRCBP, 2008).[131] Generally there was confusion as to which activities were devolved and the actual role of local councils in service delivery (ref) which supports comments made earlier about the lack of a 'sound comprehensive agricultural policy' from the centre.

It should be noted that although there were great disparities between the various local councils this was not necessarily a reflection on individual performances because donor activities associated with particular councils made a great impact. For example, strong improvements were recorded in Kambia district

[129] Central administrative building in Freetown

[130] Agricultural extension workers provide advice and training on increasing production and income generating activities for rural farmers

[131] For example an overall increase from 12% to 20% of people who had access to drying floors, and an overall increase of 8% to 12% of people who had access to storage

due to intensive efforts of the Japanese International Cooperation Agency where access to extension workers improved from 20% to 29% of the population (IRCBP, 2008: 11).

Despite mixed reports on performance, by 2006, three out of nineteen local councils achieved at least five out seven minimum standards for government practice and the majority of the rest were achieving four;[132] only the Freetown urban and rural councils were achieving one or no minimum standards (Figure 19, below). As Zhou points out, many of the good governance practices adopted by the local councils were yet to be practiced by central ministries (Zhou, 2007). Given the short time frame of local council operations, these improvements were encouraging.

Figure 19 – Performance of local councils on government practice



Reproduced from Zhou, 2007: *www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/Youngmei.ppt*

In a poll, on average 54% of respondents knew the name of their local councillor but this varied dramatically from district to district (IRCBP, 2008). In one of the high

[132] The seven include: financial management, development planning, budgeting and accounting, procurement, transparency and accountability, project implementation and functional capacity (Youngmei, 2007?) *www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/Youngmei.ppt*

performing councils (Pujehun), 65% knew the name of their councillor, compared to an extraordinarily low 5% in Freetown (a low performing council), however almost twice as many respondents knew the name of their traditional leader compared to the name of their local councillor; 82% compared to 44% (IRCBP, ibid) (Table 21, below).

Table 21 – Percentage respondents with knowledge of political leaders by community type

	Paramount chief	Local councillor	Member of Parliament
Freetown		5%	3%
Large town	85%	30%	9%
Small town	85%	48%	32%
Village	82%	43%	18%

Data sourced from (Zhou, 2007)

There was a much better perception of local council's responsiveness to the needs of the community if the councillor had visited to meet with the locals; 69% positive response compared to 25% for those who had never met their councillor. Further, although there was some worsening of perceptions about local councils due to strong campaigning by central government around the 2007 elections, this deterioration was non-existent for those respondents who were involved and knew about local projects and the problems associated with local delivery (IRCBP, ibid). With regard to forthcoming local elections of 2008, in a survey among local community 'opinion leaders',[133] 17% said they thought the community would wish to re-elect their local

[133] Opinion leaders were people identified either by the survey team or the community as someone who was knowledgeable about politics and current events and influential in the

councillor compared to 35% who said they would not. Opinion was divided in a further 23%, and 24% didn't know. Perceptions about the commitment of local councils to community needs varied widely across the country with Freetown having a figure of only 17% confidence in local councils compared to Makeni in the northern province which had levels of 68% (ibid). This disparity was closely linked to kinship ties. It was found that the benefits of decentralisation accrued primarily in the home villages or towns of local councillors (Zhou and Zhang, 2009: 104). This suggested that the concept of the broader constituency was still a mystery to many representatives of local wards but the profiles of most newly elected councillors also showed a desperate lack of education as well as non-existent experience of local government. These shortcomings were shared by the majority of their support base (Gaima, 2009: 139). In the outcome, around 60% of local councillors were returned to office for a second term in 2008 with an increase in women councillors from 12.7% to 18.9% since the 2004 poll (Zhou and Zhang, 2009: 103, 105). In the IRCBP survey there was some correlation between communities knowing the name of their councillor, or having met their councillor, or being involved in local projects, and their perceptions about councillor's level of commitment for reform. What does appear to have emerged as a result of decentralisation is a greater tolerance of local councils performance if they are better understood by local populace; in addition, local councils may produce better standards of governance if their communities are working more closely with them. In a survey carried out by Search for Common Ground in 2007, it was found that generally more people had high levels of trust in local politicians than national politicians:

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community. 84% of the respondents were male, with an average age of 49. 20% represented the youth IRCBP (2008)

Figure 20 – Rating of trust placed in local and national politicians (SFCG, 2007)



Local political culture remained a challenge for democratisation. Emerging tensions were recorded between the local councils and central government, as a new political class was being established in competition with traditional authorities where roles and responsibilities were being contested (DfID, 2008, Jackson, 2005, Jackson, 2007, EU, 2007a). This raised concerns that corruption had been decentralised along with devolution (Jabbi and Kpaka, 2007); because decentralisation had brought about new opportunities for chiefs to co-opt the potentially very lucrative local councillors (Hanlon, 2005, Jackson, 2007). This situation was not helped by the fact that donors did not build close relationships with local councils; rather, they relied on relationships associated with the implementation of projects through intermediaries.

The strong legacy of colonial indirect rule and romantic reminiscences by the SLPP and others about local and chieftaincy rule created opportunities for the dysfunctional systems of the past to be reinstated with the restoration of the chieftaincy system alongside decentralisation (Fanthorpe, 2005; Jackson, 2005; Thomson, 2007). Corruption, inequities and mismanagement abounded as post-war

efforts to replace chiefs succeeded in reigniting old grievances in the countryside (ibid). The International Crisis Group described interference by Paramount Chiefs as the 'greatest threat' to the decentralisation project, and the situation wasn't helped by support given to Chiefs by parliamentarians who expected votes in return (ICG, 2007). Well into the twenty first century, and in the post-conflict, externally constructed new state, old colonial practices of indirect rule remained a key part of national politics. This meant that 'large groups of excluded citizens [had] no hope for advancement' as the 'closed feudal approach to governance' was once again exposing the rural youth to traditional forms of exploitation (Jackson, 2007).

Another problem with the decentralisation project was that it added extra burdens to the challenging agenda of public financial management, draining the already limited capacity of the bureaucracy (EU, 2007a). Decentralisation is a hugely costly process (Brancati, 2008: 228), but the World Bank reported that although local council transfers from central government increased from 3.4% to 6.1% of domestic revenue between 2005 and 2008, there were consistent shortfalls on these targets and even if they had been met, they were woefully inadequate to cover the costs of effective devolution (World Bank, 2009: para.4). Suffering from severe overstretch, the government had difficult choices to make about its allocation of resources.

5.2 – THE ACCOUNTABILITY NEXUS

The natural progression of the electoral process is to have government accountable for the representation of citizens' interests. Being able to choose your candidate, albeit from a very limited pool of mostly undemocratic contenders, is irrelevant if there are no other mechanisms than future elections (fair or otherwise) to hold them

accountable. Proponents of democracy would argue that elections in themselves are a powerful mechanism against corruption, exploitation and general bad governance because elites know they can be removed from office. There is little evidence to support this, however, in either the general African context or in the context of Sierra Leone. There was no 'good governance' in Sierra Leone for four decades despite multi-party elections, single-party elections, and recently two 'free and fair' elections (1996 and 2002) (Transparency International, 2004). Replacing 'bad for bad' was not an acceptable mechanism for accountability in a society which was recovering from civil war; in 2008 the country's CPI fell from an already low of 2.2 in 2003 to 1.9, despite the government's *Improved Governance and Accountability Pact* of 2006 and peaceful elections which resulted in an historic change of government .[134] [135] This raises questions about the country's political culture and 'suitability' for the liberal democratic model, a point which will be revisited later in this chapter.

Concluding that parliament was an ineffective institution in the chain of participation, representation and accountability, there now follows an investigation into the efficacy of two other mechanisms for reform. First, the justice sector is investigated to determine its credentials as a democratic institution for holding elites, and others, accountable for their actions; the rule of law being a central tenet of procedural and qualitative democracy (Diamond and Morlino, 2004, Huntington, 1968, Doig and Marquette, 2005, O'Donnell, 2001, IDEA, 1998). Law and order were specific political goods recognised by citizens as critical for their own sense of

[134] Corruption Perception Index where 10 represents highly clean and 0 highly corrupt - Transparency International http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008 accessed on 19/01/09

[135] Available from DfID at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/sierra-leone-igap.pdf accessed on 19/01/09

security and also for their own perceptions of the legitimacy of state officials (Bratton and Chang, 2006, IRCBP, 2008). In Sierra Leone the justice sector was a key area for reform recommended by the TRC-R.

The second investigation concerns the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) which was to play an important role in supporting the judiciary in controlling corruption 'in all its forms' and also to improve peoples' perceptions of the legitimacy of government (CGG, 2003). The following analysis therefore reveals the progress made in the implementation of peace promises 5 and 6 (GovSL, 2001: para. 73, GovSL, 2005: 5.2.2.a)

Reforming the national justice system: a missed opportunity?

> *With a judiciary operating under two jurisprudential philosophies and exercising power according to the whims of an overreaching executive, the backbone of a Sierra Leonean democracy appears too weak to succeed* (Bangura and Ganji, 2009)

Notions of justice in peacebuilding were closely linked to mechanisms of accountability whether they were for war crimes and impunity, political violence and answerability, or bad governance and responsibility. All were associated with restoration of the rule of law in Sierra Leone. Post-war, the country was in the 'historically unique' position of locally mandating a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and at the same time being the recipient of an internationally sanctioned tribunal to adjudicate those 'most responsible' for crimes against humanity, war crimes and violations of international law, the Special Court (Pham, 2004, Alie, 2008).[136] Transitional justice in peacebuilding is a highly contentious component of interventionist policies because of the implications of 'getting it

[136] The Special Court of Sierra Leone a joint venture between the GovSL and UNHDR - http://www.sc-sl.org/

wrong' in fragile societies which are rebuilding trust after conflict (Baker, 1996). Some of the mechanisms for transitional justice, however, are a useful starting point for building an effective and impartial justice system which can restrain the excesses of political elites.

The Special Court represented an 'unprecedented opportunity to contribute to the restoration of the rule of law' but analysts concluded that it missed the opportunity to drive forward much needed legal reform in the country.[137] This was partly due to the 'de-linking' of its functions from the local justice system so as to secure its impartial credentials. The Court operated as an instrument of justice only for a handful of accused and did little to reaffirm the faith of local people in their justice system because of the contentious nature of some of the trials (Kerr and Lincoln, 2008, Alie, 2008). [138] [139] In some areas of the country there was outright hostility towards it (Ginifer, 2004), exacerbated by the lack of relevance of the Special Court's proceedings to local cultural practices and beliefs (Kelsall, 2009). The building itself, an impressive and towering edifice built on a local community centre in a prominent position on a hillside in Freetown, caused resentment among some locals because of the perceived waste of many millions of dollars in its construction (Penfold, 2009).[140] Some of the Special Court indictments were also identified as a possible future security threat but long sentences for those convicted demonstrated that the culture of impunity for war crimes was at an end (ICG, 2008). The narrow mandate of the Court, however, meant that broader judicial reform was

[137] Third Annual Report of the President of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, January 2005-January 2006, p. 2, cited by Kerr and Lincoln (2008)

[138] See Cubitt (2006) for a discussion on the controversial nature of the activities of the SP-SL at the local level.

[139] Most notably that of Chief Hinga Norman of the CDF who died in custody in 2007 and Charles Taylor transferred to The Hague.

[140] Various discussions with locals in Freetown, March 2007, also see Kerr and Lincoln (2008) for a full discussion about local perceptions of the efficacy and role of the Court.

beyond its scope. In terms of improved capacity, the Court's legacy had huge potential to support local judicial reform:

> *These lawyers, investigators, court administrators, case managers, witness protection managers, personnel and financial specialists, as well as physical plant technicians will stay and begin rebuilding the capacity of the judiciary to once again administer the law throughout the country. They will undoubtedly begin to train a new generation of legal specialists and support personnel.* (Crane, 2005)

The TRC-R recommendations for the reform of the justice sector included its independence and autonomy, the accountability of judges and the efficacy of the prosecuting authority (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 3, Recommendations). Achieving this was no mean task for local peace-builders faced with razed or dilapidated courts and a dearth of legal professionals, but considering the vital role of the local judiciary in providing the accountability of elites to the citizenry, its reform represented the foundation stone for better governance and the cornerstone of a stable state (Pham, 2004, Transparency International, 2008: 148). Indeed, the UNHCR declared that 'no foundation for peace and stability can be laid in a country emerging from conflict if it is not grounded on respect for the rule of law.'[141]

Despite various programming coordinated by the World Bank in 2002/03 and proclamations from the government for reform of the judiciary, reform of the sector was an unmitigated failure (Gloppen, 2004). In 2007, the UN Peacebuilding Commission highlighted the justice sector as a key area for reform under the extended peacebuilding project because the government itself had not made this a priority (UN, 2007, ICG, 2008). In 2006, around 80% of the population still relied

[141] Office for the High Commission on Human Rights, ONHCR in Sierra Leone 2006-2007, accessed on 21/01/09, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/AfricaRegion/Pages/SLSummary.aspx

on the traditional chieftaincy-based system of justice, problematic because of its lack of capacity, transparency and accountability, and its bias against women and young people (UN, 2007, Alie, 2008).[142] The two-tiered system of justice in the country, the English Common Law and the local Customary Law, meant greater challenges for attempts at reform (Bangura and Ganji, 2009, Dale, 2007). The judicial branch of the sector was the main impediment for reform; its 'corruption and incompetence' a consequence of magistrates and judges being the most poorly remunerated on the continent (ibid).[143] The salaries of judges and magistrates were bankrolled by the international community but the quality of judicial delivery remained poor.[144] The Bench had low levels of training and there was a dearth of court personnel such as registrars and stenographers, and minimal technical equipment including computers (WB, 2004).

By 2007, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported 'particularly striking deficiencies in the judicial system and ongoing corruption' and expressed growing concerns about 'extortion and bribe-taking by court officials, insufficient judicial personnel, detention of hundreds of accused for extended periods without trial, and sub-standard prison conditions' (Human Rights Watch, 2007). This situation meant that the rights of both victims and accused were severely undermined (ibid). Extortion and bribe taking by court officials meant that justice was beyond the pocket of many ordinary citizens, and the lack of representation for those who had been accused meant that a fair trial remained elusive. Overcrowding was a serious issue in detention centres and pre-trial detainees were living in conditions described

[142] Personal interview with anonymous respondent, London, 07/02/07

[143] Personal interview with senior staff member, Sierra Leone UNDP, Freetown, November 2006 – justice sector employees had to 'leave their hands in the coffers of government or resort to other means to augment their pay'.

[144] Personal interview with Oliver Nylander, Chair, Sierra Leone Bar Association, Freetown, March 2007

in one report as constituting a de facto death sentence (ibid:2). The problem of inadequate prosecutorial and investigative staff was particularly acute in the provinces giving credence to the perception that the justice sector served only a small well-connected urban elite (WB, 2004).

This desperate situation rather belied the various activities for reform being spearheaded by the international community; for example DfID's Law Development Project, which involved work on the customary legal system and activities such as refurbishment of the Law Courts in Freetown and other court buildings in main towns around the country, the provision of technical equipment and vehicles, stocking Law Courts Libraries and training support staff (ibid). There were various additional initiatives by other externals including USAID, ICRC, UNDP and UNAMSIL (WB, 2004: annex IV). Governing elites at the time had a serious case to answer as their failure to separate the powers of the attorney general and justice minister compounded the lack of transparency. These failings had implications on morale in the police force as there was little point having 'Rolls Royce' institutions of security in the military and the police when justice reform lagged way behind (Stone, 2005; DfID, 2008: para.4.63, Albrecht and Jackson, 2009). A general culture of impunity remained and citizens found themselves at the mercy of public officials who opportunistically invented offences to extort funds (Rose-Akerman, 2008). There was ample evidence of this on the streets of Freetown where the police routinely stopped taxis to extort money.[145] Further, public officials demanded bribes in order to negotiate the best 'terms of trade' for international companies - such as reducing the minimum quota of locals to be employed in non-national enterprises.[146]

[145] Several incidences experienced by the author whilst travelling around Freetown, November 2006 and March 2007.

[146] Anonymous personal conversations, Freetown, March 2007

Unscrupulous actors, both local and non-national, wishing to engage in illegal activities such as arms or drugs smuggling, and money laundering could do so in an environment of impunity protected by the public authorities (Rose-Akerman, 2008, Transparency International, 2004).

How citizens fit in

Legal mechanisms for the ordinary public to challenge government were available. Complaints could be made through the Public Service Commission, the Establishment Secretary's Office, the President, the Courts, the Police, the Anti-Corruption commission and the Office of the Ombudsman and enabling legislation abounded in respect of Constitutional provisions for citizens to sue government officials (Transparency International, 2004). Despite the complex architecture and procedures involved in bringing about complaints, the public remained active although perversion of justice against the poor, and connivance to protect the rich and influential, gave the ordinary citizen little confidence in the system (Doig and McIvor, 2004, Transparency International, 2004). Lack of confidence was exacerbated by other severe restraints such as mass illiteracy and ignorance about citizens' rights, the dearth of financial resources, transport issues or fear of victimisation. A major issue was that the Office of the Ombudsman had no disciplinary or enforcement powers (Transparency International, 2004).

In 2007 a survey conducted by the Search for Common Ground established that, across the country, less than 30% of the population had high levels of trust in their government to respond to protests about unjust laws; less women than men trusted their government - (SFCG, 2007: Figs. 47, 48). There were substantial differences across the country; with lows of 14% and 10% in Western Urban and Port Loko areas respectively, and highs of 39% and 46% in Bombali and Pujehun

respectively (ibid: Fig.47). An average of 36% of people had high levels of trust in the legal system itself but there were huge disparities across the country with very low levels of trust being recorded in the Western Urban and Kailahun districts (both 19%), but 63% in Bombali (ibid: Fig.50). The knock on effect of a justice system which could not be trusted or relied upon also brought little confidence to a fledgling business community which legitimately expected legal protection for its various transactions. This predicament made businesses vulnerable to political predation i.e. demands for payment in exchange for the trouble free licensing of businesses.[147]

> *There is virtual unanimity among Sierra Leoneans that building confidence in the justice sector is an essential requirement of economic investment and growth, and hence for reviving opportunities for economic progress for Sierra Leoneans generally.* (WB, 2004: 6).

In the 2007 election manifestos no party had plans for judicial reform despite widespread local frustration at the overloaded and inefficient system and the fact that, with the exception of one,[148] none of the TRC recommendation on judicial reform had been carried out.[149] This was a major concern because lack of accountability in the reconstruction set an example for the future; especially cogent because the evolution of post-conflict accountability structures, was so strongly demanded by the TRC.

Corruption: breaking the mould?

The National Anti-Corruption strategy was first published in 2005, but a revision in 2008 noted the following types of endemic and ongoing corruption (ICG 2008):

[147] Personal interview with senior members of the APC, Freetown, March 2007

[148] This was the drafting of a Code of Conduct for members of the Bench.

[149] See *The Monitor*, official Newsletter of the Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Programme, Vol.25, July 2007 available from www.slcmp.org, accessed on 21/01/09

i. bribery of public officials to obtain benefits, obtaining services (eg, prompt delivery) associated with a benefit, preventing others from sharing in a benefit and avoiding sanctions or punitive actions;

ii. use of bureaucratic power for illegal seizure of public and private assets;

iii. embezzlement of public funds by false accounting; and

iv. preferential treatment of members of family and social networks in legal cases, the issuance of government licenses and permits, and the award of government contracts to private firms

This revision following the withdrawal of support by the main donors in 2007 on account of the exceptional failures of the Commission to:

- make any progress in reducing corruption – real or perceived, and
- the deterioration of the Commission's institutional capacity despite good levels of funding and technical support, and
- no progress on high-level prosecutions (DfID, 2007).

This dramatic failure of the Commission warranted a closer investigation which revealed that general lack of reform in the justice sector had an impact on the Commission's activities (EU, 2007a, UN, 2007). For example, 'the judicial system is in such a dilapidated state that a change of direction is urgently needed', 'corruption is rife' and 'effective oversight mechanisms do not yet exist' (Transparency International, 2008, EU, 2007a: II.1.1). The chronic failures of the Commission were an indictment of the state of law enforcement and the justice system as a whole in particular, problems with the auditor general's office and the prosecution service (ICG, 2008, Cubitt, 2006, Thomson, 2007, DfID, 2007). The failure of the ACC was particularly damning as it represented the 'flagship' programming of the main bilateral donor DfID and was the 'political barometer' of

the government's pledge to greater probity in public life. So what went wrong when so much attention and resources were spent getting it right?

The project of the Anti-Corruption Commission and National Anti-Corruption Strategy were priorities of President Kabbah, dating back to 1998/99.[150] There were problems from the start; after only one year the head of the ACC complained about interference from government and the attorney general's reluctance to act on its recommendations.[151] 57 cases had been submitted to the attorney general's office but three-quarters had not been acted upon including the case of former minister of transport and communications Momoh Pujeh, who was arrested in November 2001 for illicit mining and the possession of conflict diamonds, but who did not face corruption charges until August 2002.[152] By 2003 and in response to 'strong disappointment' over 'slow progress', the Commission's head expressed frustration over 'the rather lukewarm attitude of the judiciary, which after two years has yet to take a single matter of adjudication to a final conclusion'. He also expressed frustration at 'a level of disinterestedness' by Parliament.[153] By October 2003 Momoh Pujeh was eventually convicted and sentenced to twelve months imprisonment, but won his appeal in the High Court, was acquitted and discharged.[154]

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[150] See *Address to the nation by H. E. President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah on the restoration of democracy in Sierra Leone, 13th February 1998*, available at Sierra Leone Web http://www.sierra-leone.org/GOSL/kabbah-021398.html, accessed on 25/01/09

[151] Sierra Leone Web, 26/10/02, http://www.sierra-leone.org/Archives/slnews1002.html, accessed on 22/01/09

[152] Transparency International, 22/01/03, http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2003/2003_01_22_gcr2003_regional_highlights, accessed on 18/01/09

[153] Sierra Leone Web, 18/08/03, http://www.sierra-leone.org/Archives/slnews0803.html, accessed on 22/01/09

[154] Sierra Leone Anti-Corruption Commission, http://www.anticorruption.sl/currentcourtcases.htm, accessed on 22/01/09

Non-nationals were appointed to the ACC in the roles of deputy commissioner, senior and principal investigating officers, but there was a very high turnover of staff mostly due to low morale and a sense of not 'getting anywhere'.[155] Despite various protestations and pledges by the president, the ACC was not independent but accountable to the attorney general who made the decisions on prosecutions. This favoured those who were part of the 'status quo'; often the well connected who got their convictions overturned on appeal (ICG 2008). This 'fuelled suspicion that the governing elite were primarily interested in protecting its own' (ibid) but the problem for the ACC was that it had been set up with no independent prosecuting powers and was therefore reliant on a higher authority. The British government brought in two expatriate judges with the power to outvote the attorney general but this produced no improvement in high level convictions. By 2005, the conscientious and frustrated head of the ACC was removed from office. His replacement immediately dispensed with the 'task and coordinating group' and other working systems set up by external staff. Over a five year period, the Commission was only effective for around six to nine months.[156]

There was great confusion within the Commission as to exactly *what* to investigate. Rather than acting as a Commission for high level investigations it operated more like a 'quasi police unit', being strongly influenced by British models of policing with many investigators but with no clear template for investigation; for example, 'what was the actual criteria, what offences were you going to investigate, which people, over what duration of time'.[157] In short; there was no real understanding of investigative doctrine. In addition to this fundamental shortcoming,

[155] Personal interview with principal investigating officer, Anti-Corruption Commission, Freetown, March 2007.
[156] ibid
[157] ibid

the Commission failed to embrace capacity building efforts. This was reflected in the dearth of recording procedures witnessed by new external staff arriving in 2006 amid local unwillingness to create computer records. Although there were indicators that lower level staff were happy to work with donors who provided support, development, mentoring, training, and generally exchanging ideas, senior level staff 'don't want your views or they don't want to be transparent and don't want proper engagement on how investigations should be run or how their organisations should be managed'. Consequently, no 'footprint' was left of capacity building efforts by the donor community.[158] Indeed, the famous 'under-spend' of the ACC was primarily due to the commission simply not undertaking the necessary investigations and 'sitting around doing *nothing'* – this view from a non-national senior staff member of the ACC. The view of ACC external staff was that local working ethics and culture were not compatible with European norms and that change was not wanted. Requests to interview local staff at the Anti-corruption Commission were met with outright hostility.

The year of 2006 was something of a watershed for the ACC as far as funding was concerned. With the help of the WB, EC, ADB and DfID, the GovSL published an Improved Governance and Accountability Pact (IGAP) which included a commitment to increase the number of significant 'public interest' prosecutions by the ACC (GovSL, 2006b) but the subsequent under-spend of over three quarters of a million pounds suggested no hope of progress for 2007 (DfID, 2007). Despite the promises of the IGAP, small but positive achievements during 2005 were negated or reversed including strategic planning, tasking and co-ordinating (ibid). Notions of 'accountability and transparency' threatened vested interests in government

[158] ibid

ministries, departments and institutions and were therefore ignored (Soloman, 2007). Despite repeated promises by the President for a renewed anti-corruption drive,[159] it was not until 2005 that the government launched its Anti-Corruption strategy. The new problem post-war was that although corruption had become very much part of the public awareness, convictions at high level remained elusive (TIRI, 2007).

Democratisation appeared to have only cleared the first hurdle because by 2007 the promise of accountable government and a leadership with integrity remained unfulfilled aspirations. This made mass participation in the elections rather a shallow exercise. In the post-war era of reconstruction, the opportunities for corruption without such safeguards were enormous (AAPPG, 2006: 16, Branch and Cheeseman, 2009). Indeed, the combined impact of increased aid flows and dearth of oversight mechanisms meant that bad practice was solidified rather than reformed and far from acting as a counter-balance for government excesses, the judiciary appeared to have enhanced their proliferation (Jabbi and Kpaka, 2007). This was extraordinary given the many warnings and threats on flows of aid if the government didn't sharpen up its act (ICG, 2008). Corruption remained a serious problem for stability, as did lack of respect for and manipulation of the rule of law (Soloman, 2007, Jabbi and Kpaka, 2007, ICG, 2007, DfID, 2007).

There are several explanatory variables for the failures in accountability mechanisms:

- lack of capacity and integrity in key democratic institutions – parliament and the justice sector
- low priority for reform by both donors and national government

[159] See Brian Thomson (2004) for a useful account of the evolution of the Anti-Corruption project in Sierra Leone

- continuing patronage practices and lack of commitment to the 'good governance' project on the part of political elites (not necessarily at lower management levels)
- minimal social capital to push for change from inside

5.3 - TRANSFORMING THE CULTURE POLITIQUE – THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

> *The expanding talk of civil society is not immune to muddle and delirium. There are even signs that the meaning of the term 'civil society' are multiplying to the point where, like a catchy advertising slogan, it risks imploding from overuse.* (Keane, 1998: 36)

Civil society was a key institution of democratic polities and a central tenet of democracy promotion efforts because it was believed that it could act as a counter balance to government; an additional institution of accountability to compliment national elections and an independent judiciary. Peacebuilding research concluded that positive outcomes would be more likely and consolidation of peace more effective if multiple local actors at multiple levels were involved in the process (Reychler and Paffenholz, 2001, Crocker et al., 2001, Lederach, 1997, Paffenholz, 2009). A vibrant civil society therefore became associated with *liberal peace* theorising and peacebuilding missions evolved to include civil society peacebuilding initiatives. These involved the training and capacity building of a wide range of local actors including NGOs, associations, religious entities, and business or grass roots organisations (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006, Richmond and Carey, 2005).

The Lomé Accord thus mandated local civil society to participate in the consulting and implementing bodies connected with both the peacebuilding mission and longer term development (GovSL, 1999: Articles VI, VII and XXV), the aim

being to improve the links between government and society through the promotion of 'low politics against high politics' and by educating the populace to scrutinise the state (Pouligny, 2006: 168, Paris, 2004). Underlying this belief was the assumption that there existed a natural community known as civil society, a community which had a 'passionate attachment' to the notion of nationhood (Young, 1994: 32). This assumption is contested here.

The belief that a natural and united society existed in post-conflict environs helped define the *liberal peace* as practiced in state reconstruction, and the consequential search for an innate civic community gave donors a 'direct engagement in social reconstruction' which had previously been outside their sphere of influence (Mac Ginty, 2008, Hearn and Robinson, 2000, Clapham, 1996).

Peace missions trying to identify what post-war 'civil society' was found this task rather difficult (Paffenholz, 2009). The tendency was to look for structures similar to those in modern western societies and to promote an urban, English speaking, westernised construct at the expense of traditional sources of power and counsel (Mamdani, 1996, Hearn and Robinson, 2000, Mac Ginty, 2008: 52). This missed the variety of different forms of natural representations in societies such as Sierra Leone (Pouligny, 2006, Kasfir, 1998), and the danger was that a new exclusive platform was being created which could marginalise wider participation (Belloni, 2008, Hearn and Robinson, 2000). This was because the involvement of NGOs in conflict transformation went 'hand in hand' with the professionalization and commercialisation of peace work – described as the 'NGO-isation' of social protest (Orjuela, 2004), or the 'taming of social movements' (Kaldor, 2003). Support to civil society peacebuilding initiatives was therefore deeply problematic. It led to the 'colonisation of space' by international actors which in turn led to the

disempowerment of local communities and the empowerment of local elites who were often linked to the political establishment through their kinship networks (Paffenholz, 2009:70). There is cause for concern when insensitive distributions of post-conflict support may reinforce social antagonisms (Anderson, 1999)

Further problems associated with using civil society for the peacebuilding project included the 'skewing' of local priorities in the direction of interventionist agendas; the temporal and therefore unsustainable nature of donor support; the increased opportunities for profiteering both for local politicians and the bourgeoisie; and the 'blurring' of government and societal realms through 'special privileges' given to CSOs which agreed to toe the line (Belloni, 2008). From the evidential base, there are indications that all these concerns, and more, were substantiated in Sierra Leone.

Although there was a wide literature on the contested nature of civil society, its complexity and cultural specificity (Carothers, 1999, ICG, 2004, Belloni, 2008:186, Keane, 1998, Whaites, 2000), interventions prevailed which focused on this concept as an institution for democratisation and the consolidation of peace.

The purpose of the following analysis is to examine the character and consequences of civil society support in Sierra Leone, and the nature of the emerging 'civil society' vis-à-vis its ability to represent the interests of the broader citizenry (Gramsci, 1971; Fatton, 1992; Keane, 1998). The aim is to indentify interpretations of the concept which had resonance with grass roots communities and which contested the language of civil society in Freetown whose interlocution was Westernised. The question is posed: what form of civil society would be successful in changing the *culture politique* in Sierra Leone?

Building a strong society

> *Local participation and ownership encouraged, financed and sponsored by outside donors is limited in its capacity to create domestic social capital and ownership of the peace process* (Belloni, 2008:202)

Official documents were littered with references to the role of civil society in the good governance project, often linked to the vocabulary of human rights, poverty and public oversight, and the importance of having civil society at the table in peace and development negotiations (DfID, 2008, EU, 2007a, GovSL, 2002, GovSL, 2001, TRC, 2004, World Bank, 2006). Despite this, support to civil society was one of the 'Cinderellas' of governance reform (Thomson, 2007), receiving minimal funding from the main bilateral and multilateral donors, and usually through INGOS and accountable grants (DfID, 2008).[160] In the 1990s, democracy assistance to non-state actors was mainly focused on urban based NGOs, predominantly English speaking and elite led who prescribed to and promoted democratic values (Hearn and Robinson, 2000, Thomson, 2007).

In post-conflict Sierra Leone, the number of CSOs reached epidemic proportions – over 500 by 2007 (TIRI, 2007), and some were created to serve as local implementing partners for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction activities in the immediate post-war era (Europa, 2007). On Main Motor Road into Freetown many individuals and groups had taken advantage of the new opportunities for employment or enterprise the civil society 'ticket' offered; a multitude of organisations in buildings large and small representing various interest groups including youth, women, and peace, lined the route into the capital. This

[160] Thirteen out of twenty service delivery projects from DfID were implemented as accountable grants by INGOs (DfID, 2008).

mushrooming of CSOs was helped by both the government's new tolerance of a civic voice and also donor support which made resources available for pet projects including democratisation, peacebuilding and gender. The government's gesture towards democracy also involved encouraging 'the setting up of NGOs to compete against each other'.[161] This created a civil society too fragmented and weak to be effective. In many cases, organisations had overlapping interests. For example:

- the Association of War Affected Youths for Social Awareness and Community Development,
- the Youth Movement for Peace and Non-Violence and
- Youths for Sustainable Peace and Development in Sierra Leone

Among the CSO's there were larger and influential networks or 'umbrella' groups such as the Coalition of Civil Society and Human Rights Activists (representing 150 organisations), the Network Movement for Justice and Development (NMJD),[162] the Women's Forum, and the Civil Society Movement (CSM), some with a long history of activity in the country. The CSM, a high profile organisation based in Freetown, was famous for its interventions to negotiate peace with armed groups in the bush through its various member groups.[163] Despite this multitude of CSOs, civil society

[161] Personal interview with Charles Mambu, Coalition of Civil and Human Rights Activists, Freetown, 15/11/06

[162] Established in the late 1980s to build 'social networks for more effective civil society participation' - see Network Movement for Justice and Development: http://www.nmjd.org/main.html?src=%2Findex2.html, accessed on 04/02/09

[163] Initially the CSM included over 150 CSOs which united to take over the vacuum between the state and the people, to 'proactively articulate the concerns of the common man' and has countrywide membership at all levels from national to chiefdom. In 2007 its chairman, Mr Festus Minah, said that because civil society had accepted the 'sacred responsibility to give hope to the citizenry' it must never again allow bad governance to neglect the people, chairman's press release, Awareness Times, dated 20/09/07 sourced from http://news.sl/drwebsite/publish/article_20056547.shtml on 03/10/07. Although civil society

was mostly ineffective in holding government to account and the new flagship project of the British Government established in 2005 aimed to address this 'malfunction'.

Enhancing the interface between civil society and the state to improve poor peoples' lives (ENCISS) was a project set up by DfID in 2005 with a mandate quite similar to the already well established (in 1988) local organisation NMJD.[164] Launched with a budget of £5 million and a life of between three to five years, ENCISS was modelled on similar projects in 'other countries' but garnered little support locally. Locals argued that the initiative was 'never evaluated by civil society as a need' nor the conceptual framework shared with them; that 'people were not allowed to buy into the agenda' which some felt was 'imposed' upon them, and that this created strong resistance to it.[165] 'ENCISS is nothing but a white elephant'.[166] The animosity may have been influenced by the government's successful manipulation of the project which was originally designed to strengthen the demand side of governance not the supply side (ICG, 2008).[167] This hostility was problematic because without a public 'buy in' the project's participatory credentials were essentially nullified.[168] Local respondents felt that, because they were not consulted, the project misunderstood local needs, and some felt that it had

played a pivotal role in the peace negotiations they were slow to act as the war took hold, possibly because of their concentration in the Freetown area which was virtually untouched by the war until the mid 1990s, report by Conciliation Resources, Sandi, R. and Fortune, F. (2005) Building links and sustaining momentum: reflections on track two roles in Sierra Leone accessed on 03/10/07 from http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/engaging-groups/sierra-leone.php

[164] Website available at http://www.nmjd.org/index.htm

[165] Personal interview with anonymous respondent, Freetown, March 2007

[166] Personal interviews in Freetown, November 2006 and March 2007.

[167] A similar project – UNDP National Communications Plan – was also 'hijacked' by the Kabbah government (ICG, 2008)

[168] Personal interview with Jeannette Ebo, programme director, ENCISS, Freetown, March 2007

'closed windows' for other avenues of funding.[169] Three years on, the project was making little progress in Freetown although things were better in the provinces. The project failed to develop an effective strategy for state-society engagement and donors admitted that 'greater attention at an earlier stage might have improved efforts to support the demand side of governance' (DfID, 2008, ICG, 2008). The analysis which follows involved consultations with various local CSOs to gain a deeper insight into their capacity to challenge or influence government, their relationship with donors, and the externally driven social engineering which was taking place in their country.

The evidential base

> *'Civil society remains Freetown-centric, with limited ability to hold those in power to account.* (EU, 2007a:10)

> *'There is little organised civil society that is not donor driven' anonymous staff member at ENCISS cited by* ICG (2008)

Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with representatives from a total of fifteen separate CSOs. The CSOs were chosen partly because of their credentials as organisations whose activities were linked to democracy, for example the Campaign for Good Governance, but also because of logistics during fieldwork i.e. their accessibility, availability and willingness to take part in the research, results of 'snowballing' activities and also, in one instance, pure chance. Most organisations contacted were willing to talk, there were some which didn't respond to messages but this could have been due to workload - the LAWCLA for example. The only respondent which refused access was the gatekeeper of the ACC who was very hostile to the research and requests for interview. The respondents represented an

[169] Personal interview with anonymous respondent, Freetown, March 2007 (C18)

eclectic group of local organisations and were not the subject of random sampling. They included two unions, two professional associations, one religious group and ten local organisations with democracy, HR or gender mandates. Several issues emerged as a result of this interview process, the most prominent being the practice of 'skewing'.

Working the donors – skewing

All organisations receiving adequate[170] funding and/or technical assistance for their projects from external donors, had either activities directly of interest to externals (e.g. 50/50 Group),[171] or had learnt how to 'work' the donors by writing professional proposals in line with donors' agendas.[172] There was a general consensus around the necessary 'bureaucracy' and 'politics' of bidding for funds; 'you have to have some rapport between you and the people there'.[173] This had an impact on the type of activities local organisations could get involved in 'some organisations just follow the trend ... they have priority issues but have to leave them out because they know what the donors are interested in',[174] – democracy, human rights, youth, women, for example – and this criticism was also directed at the PRSPs themselves. 'The country has to formulate strategies in a particular way which actually doesn't make sense to ordinary folks because they [the policies] are outside their sphere of existence'.[175] Liberal democracy itself was in a 'parallel cosmos' for many locals

[170] 'Adequate' is taken to mean enough funding to undertake some of the activities of concern to the organisations themselves.

[171] A well established NGO set up to ensure 50/50 representation of men and women in government; gender equality is a key priority among the donor community and is also of great concern to locals, particular women.

[172] 6/6 respondents noted that they had learnt how to write the 'right' proposals to secure funding.

[173] Personal interview with anonymous CSO respondent, Freetown, 15/01/07 (C9)

[174] Personal interview with Valnora Edwin, Campaign for Good Governance, Freetown, 17/11/06

[175] Personal interview with Janet Ebo, project director ENCISS, Freetown, March 2007

whose lives continued as before, mostly dictated by the constraints of their poverty and traditional elites. 'Civil society work that is going on right now is mostly donor driven because the funds determine the issues' and intermediary INGOs had their favourites because 'they secure funding for themselves through it. Once there is money around the process people will [engage with the programming] but that doesn't mean it will have any value in the outcome'.[176]

Of those organisations who had not learnt how to work the donors, did not wish to work them or did not have the capacity to do so, very little support was coming their way other than 'remnants' from other projects. For example, the Sierra Leone Market Women's Association (SLMWA) had no capacity to bid for funding (despite its activities being directly relevant to the peace promises of Lomé and global agendas for peacebuilding and development, and its historic role in successful peacebuilding) but was assisted by CGG which redirected some of its own resources; for example, a small amount of office space.[177] SLMWA had influence with large numbers of women across the country and the technical communication strategy used for mobilising this impressive group was 'word of mouth passed around the markets'. The respondent said that she could not access funds direct from donors because she was not good at writing proposals and because the donors 'don't know our face'.[178] Local people certainly knew her face and her organisation advocated on women's issues across the country. Their main project involved educating women up and down the country in basic literacy and numeracy so that they could open bank accounts, access loans and understand basic account management in respect of income and expenditure. High illiteracy rates were

[176] Anonymous interview with CSO in Freetown, 27/11/06 (C8)
[177] Personal interview with Marie Bangura of the SLMWA in Freetown, March 2007
[178] ibid

preventing women maximising their income earning potential and were making them vulnerable to exploitation. Some small amounts of funding had been allocated from the Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP)[179] which had enabled SLMWA to put together a handbook to train 25 market women in the Western area, but additional funds to expand the project up country were not secured. The impression gained from the activities of SLMWA was that the organisation was getting a lot done despite a dearth of resources and 'without support from donors with agendas' which would compromise its work.[180]

There were some incidences of 'no strings' funding which came from international bodies to specific CSOs. The Council of Churches, for example, accepted support from donors whose conditions were aligned with the local project but the organisation also garnered unconditional support from global Christian organisations.[181]

There were CSOs working independently such as the Civil Society Alternative Process (CSAP-SL) which was 'not actually an organisation but a platform on which we get the voiceless to stand up and speak', but it appeared that the government did not like what the voiceless had to say and to some extent, neither did the donors.[182] Independence was highly prized by the director of this small organisation.

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[179] Justice Sector Development Programme '*1.2 The **Goal** of the JSDP is the improved safety, security and access to justice for the people of Sierra Leone. The **purpose** is to support the development of an effective and accountable Justice Sector that is capable of meeting the needs and interests of the people of Sierra Leone, particularly the poor, the vulnerable and the marginalised.'* Available from http://www.britishcouncil.org/jsdp-project-memorandum.pdf, accessed on 18/08/09

[180] Notes from fieldwork journal, March 2007

[181] Personal interview with Kenmoore Salia, Council of Churches Sierra Leone, Freetown, November 2006

[182] Personal interview Freetown, March 2007

An interesting example of 'remnant' support involved the very well established and respected Women's Forum of Sierra Leone. An interview with its director revealed that by the time funding got to her (in this incidence to monitor the implementation of the PRSPs) it had been filtered through DfID, CARE, and ENCISS – a long (and costly) accountability chain. Denis Bright, Minister for Youth and Sports commented that there was even more filtering through additional 'committees' within the donor system and that he had 'made a critique of this overwhelming bureaucratic structure ... I still don't understand the necessity for it'.[183] Despite being an effective organisation, the Women's Forum got little support because it did not have full time staff. This was due to women, with their extra burdens, being unable to commit time to the project, especially when it was unpaid. But because of the lack of staff donors would argue 'we cannot entrust you with the money, you are not used to playing with… money like that. Who is going to do your accounts?' The irony was that money was not available for institutional capacity building.

> *The people don't want to know what the donors want or don't want; all the people are interested in is a fair share of whatever they are entitled to* (Rosalyn McCarthy, Women's Forum)

Temporal – sustainability

Another issue raised by some respondents was the sustainability of funding for their activities; the ENCISS project which had wasted a lot of time, money and resources simply in its set up, had an initial life span of three years when 'this project should run for thirty',[184] for example. Other CSOs operated 'hand to mouth' with small

[183] Personal interview with Minister for Youth and Sport, Mr Denis Bright, Freetown, March 2007

[184] Personal interview with Jeannette Ebo, ENCISS, Freetown, March 2007

tranches of money or resources coming through sometimes on only six monthly time frames.[185] Donor fatigue meant that eventually many CSOs could disappear, especially if they did not have flows of funding from their constituents to secure their local legitimacy (Pham, 2004).

Social capital

Strengthening civil society presupposed some degree of inherent *social capital* (Diamond, 1999), and interviews revealed that donors expected a certain amount of infrastructure and human capital within an organisation so that accountability could be secured and projects could have 'integrity' before funding and other resources could flow. This necessarily excluded a lot of groups, such as the SLMWA, which had scarce resources and capacity, but which was representing grass roots interests and using local markets as communication channels rather than the internet. In this sense, 'cherry picking' the CSOs meant that the accountability nexus was aligned with donors rather than the communities that the CSOs served (Belloni, 2008), and 'professionalising' civil society involved redirecting crucial but scarce social capital from grass roots entrepreneurial activity.[186]

Accountability nexus

The skewed accountability nexus of externally driven CSOs did not help to consolidate democracy because civil society itself could not engage effectively with the government on accountability and policy deficits because they themselves were accountable to donors. Further, the government was accountable to the IFIs. This meant that the whole state/society relationship was systematically distorted in favour of external actors, and that neither was accountable to citizens. Attempts at

[185] Personal interview with Charlie Hughes, Forum for Democratic Initiatives, Freetown, March 2007

[186] Ibid

state/society debates delivered through national radio were called to a halt as heated exchanges between knowledgeable civil society members and rather ignorant public officials resulted in acute embarrassment for the government. Many ministers and MPs held office out of patronage and therefore had 'no particular value' to the populace and were no match for educated and committed civic society members.[187] Yet the failure of this excellent platform for debate illustrated the impotence of civil society to really engage with their government.

A further fracture in the accountability chain was the civil society/broader society relationship. CSOs were 'professionalised' as a result of increased and externally accountable resources which isolated them from the constituencies from which they had 'derived both their legitimacy and dynamism' (Pham, 2004). Many became 'top-down, Freetown-centred institutions dominated by the competing agendas of their leaders [and donors] rather than representing concerns on the street' (ibid).

The new generation of CSO democrats could not be criticised for their enthusiastic response to donor agendas especially when there was some degree of confluence with local needs, but they were not the people to bring about radical reform of government and economic planning and did not represent the 'new opposition' in the absence of any parliamentary oversight. Indeed, government ministers were somewhat dismissive of civil society as a democratic institution, failing to turn up at well organised national consultations with CSOs on issues such as African Union and NEPAD initiatives.[188]

[187] Personal interview with Charlie Hughes, Forum for Democratic Initiatives, Freetown, March 2007

[188] See Press Release from Civil Society Alternative Process Sierra Leone (CSAP-SL) (2005) and available from http://www.nmjd.org/press%20releases/Press%20Statement%20(CSAP-SL)%202005.pdf, accessed on 18/08/09

Profiteering/privileges

International donor agencies consider civil society to be a benign realm separate from the state but there was evidence to show that this was not the case. 'Some people in civil society used their position to garner favours from government'; this is 'an utter violation' of the role of civil society.[189] 'Civil society is sycophantic because they have to survive'. 'People have spiders in their cupboard and cannot be outspoken for fear of the anti-corruption commission… which hangs like a sword of Damocles' over certain civil society activists'.[190] In some cases the same personnel worked for different CSOs.[191] Far from being watchdogs, there were concerns that CSOs themselves had become part of the state apparatus and uncritical of the government (Pham, 2004). Under the patronage of the incumbent's vice-president, some 'NGO elite', made up of local professionals, rose to prominence as managers of post-war reconstruction despite their dearth of relevant experience (ICG, 2008). Despite the undoubted success of indigenous civil society in the political history of Sierra Leone, the modern 'civil society' had little impact as a mechanism to hold government to account or improve its performance.[192] Because of this, the 'illiberal' culture of political elites was allowed to prevail and flourish through the perversion of civil society.

The evidential base indicates that CSOs in Sierra Leone spent too much time pleasing the donors on issues which were not grass roots driven and therefore with little local legitimacy, rather than rebuilding and mobilising their fractured

[189] Personal interview with anonymous respondent, Freetown, March 2007 (C9)

[190] Personal interview with Charles Margai, PMDC, Freetown, March 2007

[191] Personal interview with anonymous respondent, Freetown March 2007 (C9)

[192] It must be noted here that civil society played a very important role in democratic elections in the country; educating and sensitising voters on their political and civil rights, and working hard for peaceful, free and fair elections through monitoring and observation activities. The NEC accredited 35 local organisations for this project – National Elections Watch (NEW) and the Council of Churches notable among them, see EUROPA (2007)

communities. At the same time the 'professionalization' of civil society absorbed much of the country's social capital and channelled it towards the demands of the external constituency instead. Whilst funds were directed towards competent proposal and report writing exercises by professionalised CSOs, grass roots initiatives for peace and development were sidelined. The donors themselves held several assumptions: that such organisations were representative of the broader citizenry and could effectively challenge government on their behalf; that they were capable of mobilising ordinary citizens to demand better government; that they themselves were committed to democratic principles in their own internal organisation; and that they represented the needs and priorities of society's politically and economically marginalised (Hearn and Robinson, 2000:244).

If civil society had failed in its tasks, was there a possibility that the broader citizenry could do the job instead? Civilian resistance was part of the political history of Sierra Leone and there remained a strong culture of group membership in the country, particularly the rural areas. In a survey, around 75% of respondents said they were members of one or more groups especially in the rural villages (IRCBP, 2008b). These groups were not recognisable as the standard westernised version of NGOs because they were mostly informal in nature. The most well supported groups were religious groups with around 44% of respondents saying they were members; the average was lowest in Freetown (36%). Twenty nine per cent of respondents belonged to traditional society groups, 27% to women's groups and 23% to youth groups. There were also good levels of membership of farming and fishing groups, and school groups, with credit/savings groups being mostly patronised by women (ibid). These important grassroots groups should not be ignored as potential peace constituencies (Lederach, 1997). Mobilised, they could form a useful counterbalance

for political excess, especially at the local level where representation and accountability were brought into sharp relief by horizontal collective interests within and across wards.

The motor-bike renters' association was an example of a grass roots group capable of effective 'horizontal collective action' against heavy handed policing. Supported by women traders (their main customers) riders used strikes and court actions to push for a fairer system and more inclusive society (Richards et al., 2004: 36). Student unions remained a strong group for change in the post-war era pushing through a change of policy during registration for the elections of 2007 to allow members from up country to return home to register.[193] Grass roots women's groups, as already explained, were also successful in lobbying government for legislative change.

A more useful definition of civil society as far as democratisation was concerned was therefore the horizontal, often interest based, grass roots associations who were a more legitimate representation of the broader citizenry, not dependent upon outside funding and the conditionalities attached to that, but formalised in an organic way. This definition of civil society gives the notion of participation and inclusivity some logic. There was already a functioning and strong civil society in Sierra Leone but not the type recognised by the liberal peacebuilding project which was artificially constructed to build the peace.

> *in the final analysis, our interest in civil society and its potential will only be of use if it brings meaningful long-term change for the poor* (Whaites, 2000)

[193] Telephone interview with Hassan Yarjah, President Student Union, University of Sierra Leone 18/04/07

5.4 - MAKING ELITES DO THE RIGHT THING – IS THERE A CULTURE POLITIQUE?

> *West African states failed to 'establish institutions that are capable of constraining and outlasting the individuals who occupy their offices'* (Jackson, 1990: 22 and cited in Kandeh 2004b)

> *The Commission holds the political elite of successive regimes in the post-independence period responsible for creating the conditions for conflict* (TRC, 2004: para 18)

> *There is no option but to address bad governance and corruption head on. It would not be an overstatement to say that the survival of the nation depends on the success of society in confronting these issues* (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 3, Recommendations: 207).

A democratic political culture was clearly essential for consolidating post-war democracy (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982, Lumumba-Kasongo, 2005, Ottaway, 2003, Taylor, 2007). Without consolidation, the rise of an 'illiberal democracy' was possible which would challenge the appropriateness or relevance of the liberal model in Sierra Leone, and also the wisdom of cross-culture normative transfer of western ideas on social power relations (Zakaria, 1997, Ake, 1993). Yet, despite all the programming, legislation (Table 22, below) and concerted efforts by locals, the Sierra Leonean political elite remained wedded to their culture of patrimony and corruption.

> *'Traditional patterns of patronage and gift giving persist and… political power remains the surest route to wealth in the post-conflict period with its influx of aid'* (Rose-Akerman, 2008).

'Good governance', according to any definition, remained elusive, yet patronage was not the exclusive domain of political elites and their CSO compatriots. There

was a similar culture among interventionists themselves who directed funds through a variety of different intermediaries in the long chain of aid delivery. This could also be described as a form of patrimony, albeit more transparent and 'official'. The issue still remained, was there a local political culture which could not be changed?

Table 22 – 'Good Governance' legislation

New legislation concerning the agenda for Good Governance
The Audit Services Act 1997
The Anti-Corruption Act 2000
The Bank of Sierra Leone Act 2000
The Income Tax Act 2000
The National Commission for Social Action Act 2001
The National Social Security and Insurance Trust Act 2001
The Independent Media Act 2002
The National Revenue Authority Act 2002
The National Commission for Privatisation Act 2002
The New Revised Civil Service Code 2004
The Local Government Act 2004
The Government Budgeting and Accountability Act 2004
The Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone Act 2004

The debate about corruption, political will and bad practice taps into the wider argument that Africa was unsuitable for democratisation. It was the case that neo-patrimonialism remained the only institutionalised model on the continent not weakened by external interventions (de Walle, 2005, Fatton, 1992, Barongo, 1983, Zakaria, 1997). Because colonial legacies of indirect rule and divisive ethnic practices prevailed, multi-partysm became an institutional façade to attract foreign aid (Diamond, 1989). Certainly, it is true that reciprocal practices were central to

politics in Sierra Leone and that economic decisions were often likely to be 'embedded in the relations of affection' (Hyden, 1990: 254). Traditional politics such as these rather stymied the democratic process but Sierra Leoneans themselves are ambivalent towards corruption:

> *Battling corruption is not as simple as monitoring projects and improving documentation. It is a deep cultural phenomenon that will entail revolutionizing approaches and social norms.* (Brima Karl Samura) [194]

> *It is a societal problem. It is the mentality of the people. They need to understand what corruption really is. This information should be ritual in the schools, in the universities – so that children should be able to tell policeman that they see taking a bribe 'don't do that'; and they will have to justify what they are doing. [original emphasis]* (Denis Bright, SLPP Minister for Youth and Sport)

A survey of attitudes confirmed that corruption was viewed as a general feature of life often necessary to access basis services, and carry out normal business when holding public office.[195] In a survey conducted in 2000, the majority of respondents (around 94%) indicated that corruption was rampant in most government departments and government agencies.[196] 43% of respondents from a group of public officials admitted that members of the public had to pay bribes to access services from their institutions and over 60% of public service users confirmed that they had paid bribes (Konteh et al., 2002). This culture was not confined to domestic activities, foreign investors were commonly asked for bribes to secure licences, permits or public services (ibid: 2). After decentralisation, 48% of respondents said

[194] See *The Monitor*, official Newsletter of the Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Programme, Vol.31, October 2008 available from www.slcmp.org, accessed on 21/01/09

[195] GovSL *National Anti-Corruption Strategy* (2005) cited by Thomson (2007:21)

[196] Source - Anti-corruption Survey (Sierra Leone) 2000. National Reform Secretariat, Freetown cited in Governance and Corruption Survey at http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/206579/sl_gacreport.pdf

they expected local officials to take all or most of the project money, 26% said they expected them to take a little money but do a good job and only 9% had complete confidence in the integrity of their officials (IRCBP, 2008).

Western ideals of transparency and democracy in the exercise of political agency is absent in the day to day normal functioning of Sierra Leonean society. Openness and honesty are generally considered to be undesirable qualities, bordering on idiocy, in a society where 'ambivalence' is highly prized as a political tool (Ferme, 2001). The 'verbal artistry' evident in elite rhetoric in contemporary Sierra Leone represents the cultural and historic value put on ambiguity. Ferme describes this as a 'cultural idiom of indirectness' where 'the effective use of ambiguity has been - and continues to be - more productive that the pursuit of social ideals of transparency' (Ferme, 2001: 2). This notion of 'neo-patrimonialism' condones 'natural abuse' of the system (Therkildsen, 2005).

This ambivalence extended beyond the reach of the state because the large amounts of reconstruction funding fed into the patronage system attracted limited admonishment by the international community. Despite substantial evidence of continued and blatant bad practice, donors did not withdraw funding or hold elites to account. Flows were 'delayed' but not suspended. The EC delayed, but did not withhold, flows over concerns about procurement practices and stability of the macro-economic framework. Instead, the government was offered and received a 25% bonus incentive for renewed commitments to good governance.[197] In the modern age where elites engage on an international stage with global actors and depend upon the international system to support national recovery, democratic

[197] Personal communication with Markus Handke, Delegation of the EC to Sierra Leone, 18/02/09

principles are widely understood and commitments are made to them. Neo-patrimonialism is as much a bad habit as a *culture politique*.

5.5 - CONCLUDING STATEMENT

At first glance, post-war democratisation appeared to have gained real traction but, in the outcome it was a shallow exercise on several counts. In the absence of any effective mechanisms of accountability, the ambition to bring meaningful democracy to Sierra Leone was futile even though free, fair and peaceful multi-party elections were remarkably efficient in changing government and a great success for the country and its partners. Although space for participation grew considerably, the result of concerted efforts by the international community and locals to embed political tolerance and security into the body politic, participation was stifled by the weakness of political parties, a dysfunctional judiciary and inutile parliament, and 'bad attitude' among governing elites. A 'co-opted' civil society represented the new entrepreneurs in the reconstruction project, somewhat detached from their grass roots base and the needs of the local community. The positive advances were therefore overshadowed by the delusory nature of democracy being constructed in the country. Without a responsive government and a truly collaborative relationship between citizen and state, the democratisation project was in danger of losing legitimacy. Participation without representation, or accountability, was not dissimilar to the political process of old.

What was different in the post-war era, however, was the decentralisation of government. Although this development was still in its infancy, there was some evidence to suggest that bringing government closer to the people gave them an improved sense of ownership and increased their levels of tolerance for poor

performance. This was because the demand side of government was stimulated, and localised elites brought meaning to accountability. Decentralisation also brought more opportunities for women to engage in politics, and locals greatly welcomed the opportunity to use their own skills and knowledge in community initiatives for development under the RRI. Prevailing patrimonial practices, however, meant that devolution of authority and resources opened up further opportunities for corruption, and co-option of the restored chieftaincy system resurrected tensions of old and created new friction among local elites vying for supremacy in the provinces. Continuing bad practice both centrally and locally was a blatant perversion of the peacebuilding project, but the *culture politique* was not likely to change because there was little political will to change it. The process appeared to have produced politicians and officials who generally continued to serve themselves, not the general populace, and this was illustrated by the re-emergence of the kind of political violence reminiscent of the past (White, 2000: 84, Kandeh, 2002, Christensen and Utas, 2008). What exactly was it about Sierra Leone that suggested multi-party liberal democracy could work well?

The politicisation of ethnicity through multiparty politics – which had failed dramatically in the past – added to the multiple fractures already of concern for the nation building project. Multi-party politics necessarily involved 'elite fragmentation' and winner-takes-all scenarios, rather than collaborative relationships across ethnicities to secure a durable peace. Efforts to reign in executive excess through the ACC and through new legislation were outstandingly unsuccessful. This was because the system of patrimonialism required weakened accountability mechanisms, not strong ones, and an informalised state to accommodate bad practice (Branch and Cheeseman, 2009).

Liberal democracy in the context of post-war Sierra Leone did not conflate well with local conditions, local culture or local need and serious issues about accountability were present at every level, both domestic and international. The behaviour of elites, historic structures and weak institutions contrived to strangle and subvert the progress of democracy, whilst democratisation made little impact on the ideals of ownership and participation by the masses.

Chapter five has challenged the rationale of conflating democracy with interventionist politics because of the potential distortions an external constituency has on national responses to local citizenry. This issue does not help the central challenge of accountability in government. Chapter six now presents an analysis of the impact of post-conflict reforms on the social dimensions of recovery to determine how the new state faired in reinventing its relationship with the populace and constructing a new social contract.

CHAPTER SIX

THE NEW STATE AND ITS CITIZENS

> *Between the ambitions of the elite and the survival strategies of the masses, the state often appears to survive essentially as a show, a political drama with an audience more or less willing to suspend its disbelief.* (Holsti, 1996:145)

Chapters three, four and five have challenged the wisdom of imposing externally constructed solutions for building peace and a new state because of their inflexibility to address the central challenges for peace locally, and because they impose an unmanageable burden on a weak state with few resources.

If the newly constructed state was not working well in terms of local objectives for peace – failing to redistribute resources, create jobs, or consolidate democracy, for example – what did this mean for the general populace who were expecting some form of peace dividend from the reconstruction project? What did the reforms do for the new relationship between the state and its citizens, particularly the most vulnerable and marginalised groups? We now know that the country's political and war history prescribed a radical change post-conflict in both leadership behaviour and governance performance to secure the best chance of durable peace, so how did the reforms play out in terms of peoples' expectations and experiences after the war? What happened to the local priorities for peace?

The purpose of chapter six is to tackle these questions and throw some light on the possible longer term impact of Sierra Leone's programme of structural reforms, and explore alternative systems which might be better suited to local conditions and the local challenges for peace. The first section explains the nature of the new political process and how it affected the previously problematic relationship

between the state and its populace. In particular, the focus is on participation, representation and human rights to explain how marginalised groups were brought into the political process and how their interests were served. Section 6.2 analyses the nature of the new state to determine the impact of new structures on governance objectives as far as people were concerned, and there follows an analysis of what alternative governing structures would perhaps do a better job. Finally, there is a discussion about the possible consequences of structural reform on longer term peace in the country and the chapter then returns to the notion of the so called 'liberal peace' to analyse its usefulness as a template for recovery after war.

The concluding statement brings the work together to summarise the arguments and the central issues. Here is a reminder of the local priorities for peace:

Figure 21 – The 'framework for peace'



6.1 THE NATURE OF THE POST-WAR POLITICAL PROCESS

Repairing state/citizen relations

This work has thus far evidenced that what Sierra Leone needed for post-war recovery and the consolidation of peace was *good government*, not a disconnected notion of 'good governance' constructed from outside. This supports one of the central arguments in this thesis that solutions for a peaceful nation cannot be predetermined external to the locale. The preoccupation of the international

community in the reconstruction was to associate free and fair elections and the accompanying accoutrements of democracy with 'good governance' - but this did not equate to effective, efficient, or accountable *government* in the outcome. This remained a challenge for longer term peace.

Representation

The return to multi-party democracy was a welcome development for local citizens and a great advantage for the international community because elections legitimised the government it was doing business with. Elections did not legitimise the political process, however, because of the absence of any effective mechanisms for representation or accountability, mechanisms taken as a given in a functioning democratic polity. This failure was particularly pertinent given the inherent behaviour of the political elite, who could not be trusted. What use was representative democracy or changes of government when there were no mechanisms to control the conduct of the political elite, whoever got into power? The country's ineffective institutions - parliament, political parties, civil society and the judiciary – made notions of representation rather delusory. Failures to address the archaic and dysfunctional justice system in particular consolidated the common sense of prolonged injustice and persistent detachment of the general populace from politics. Nation building was to be about 'the rule of law rather than the rule of men' (Ignatieff, 2003: 113), but what people got was the continued rule of men who could not be trusted.

Representation was an issue in the presence of a very powerful external constituency which tended to smother the local voice. Exporting the country's wealth did not help ensure that poor and marginalised mining communities received their fair share of revenues from diamond extraction, for example (although it is

acknowledged that capacity issues and the decisions of local elites were also significant factors in this). Local citizens were somewhat squeezed out of the political sphere by more powerful representations. Local and global elites, and local and global structures, determined that ordinary citizens were once again left without a state which was responsive to their needs.

Justice

This sense of helplessness and injustice compounded the negative experiences of ordinary people which they had experienced during the difficult years of the previous APC regime. Where were the new mechanisms to heal the historic cleavage between state and society, and to conjoin the political domain with the social? How could the relationship between state and citizens be reconciled when justice was elusive to the majority, when elites were not accountable and there was no real chance of changing the *culture politique* any time soon? Securing durable peace with no access to justice, the central human right, was deeply problematic (Abraham, 2004b, Cheru, 2002: 218). It cannot be stressed strongly enough the importance of justice for longer term peace and stability in Sierra Leone. For a population which had experienced mass abuse of human rights throughout the war and indeed throughout independence history – by fellow citizens and its own government – this was the most fundamental of rights for citizens who had accepted a peace deal which included blanket amnesties for the perpetrators of mass crimes committed against them. Without a functioning justice system, what was to stop further abuse by criminals who knew they could get away with it because impunity was their reward (TRC, 2004)?

Civil society

Not only had citizens little control over their elected representatives once in office, their part in the decision making process appeared to be somewhat distorted by the agenda for reconstruction being imposed from outside. There was some evidence of this in the activities of the 'revived' civil society whose representations reflected some degree of co-option into donors' agendas - not necessarily their own, or not necessarily those of the broader citizenry. This was a predetermined definition of what the public good should be that was brought in from outside and worked around in discussions with the local stakeholders.

The advances in political rights and civil liberties (Table 23) were stymied by the character of the government in office and the realities of ordinary life.

Table 23 – Progress on political rights and civil liberties in Sierra Leone (selected years)

	2002	2005	2009
Political Rights	4	4	3
Civil Liberties	5	3	3

Freedom House scores political rights and civil liberties on a scale of 1-7 where 1 equals most free and 7 equals least free: data sourced from Freedom House, http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=166&year=2002, accessed on 28/08/09

Multi-party democracy

To add to this distortion, empirical evidence suggests that the model of democracy which was advanced in the post-war period might even have been an impediment to sustainable peace. This was because multi-party politics constituted a contest between competing elites whose *modus operandi* was to marshal block votes through regional or ethnic ties and other patrimonial systems – in the style of old -

the purpose being to capture the benefits of state office for the advantage of themselves and their supporters. It is the case that political ethnicity, or patrimonialism, 'softens the state' - not strengthens it. This is because the state becomes 'malleable' when governing elites make compromises to look after their clients (Kandeh, 1992: 83). After the elections of 2007, for example, 80% of the bureaucracy was changed in order to put in place civil servants sympathetic to the APC with all the negative consequences of lost skills, lost knowledge and expertise, some of which had been built up through external support in the post-war re-build as part of 'capacity building' (World Bank, 2009). 'Speaking the same language' was an important pre-requisite for holding office at all levels; when the new administration took over President Koroma appointed his first cousin Edmund Koroma to head the Finance Ministry and his elder sister Admire Koroma as a major government contractor.[198]

This was a throwback to colonial practices; an elitist, higher strata, winner takes all conceptualisation of democracy which had little respect for egalitarian principles. In the outcome, multipartyism was not the mechanism for inclusivity as multiple fractures remained, and some deepened. Previously marginalised groups such as intellectuals, labourers, rural communities and grass roots workers, students, women, and the youth continued to struggle for a voice and yet the most salient new fracture emerging from the democratic process was that of ethnicity. This was a sop to disguise the real method of doing politics – patronage. 'Crossing the floor' remained a common practice – not usually the norm in ethnically divided societies.

[198] See *A family business* in Africa Confidential, Vol.50, No.20, 8th October 2009, from www.africaconfidential.com

The multiplicity of discontent was submerged beneath phantom ethnic politics but tangible class alliances.

This scenario had not changed from the situation in the immediate independence period when political parties aligned around regional or class ties, not the issues associated with effective multi-party democracy more commonly found in the industrialised nations where groups associate around other interests. Not only were the cultural and historic conditions in the country somewhat inhospitable to the formation of western type party politics, but the post-war conditions and dearth of all resources meant that the construction of a true multi-party polity was unlikely anyway. Weak institutions, elitism in politics, a fragile economy and lack of accountability mechanisms, corrupt politicians and low levels of development meant that party politics was perhaps most likely to result in winner takes all privatisation of the state (Makinda, 1996).

Local people were not going to get good government this way because they remained disconnected from the levers of powers instead of being the nation's political powerhouse themselves. The issue for peace was that multipartyism was emerging as a catalyst for ethnic tensions as new fractures were accommodated in the model for reconstruction as well as the old, and political elites remained wedded to their traditional networks of support and cronyism. After the change of government in 2007, the cabinet, bureaucracy and security sector were systematically realigned with the governing party in similar ways of the Margai, Stevens and Momoh regimes (Alie, 2006: 24).

Healing Society

The issue of reparations illustrated the attitude of political elites to the citizens who elected them to govern. The Lomé Accord promised a Special Fund for War Victims

(Article XXIX) and this was recommended by the TRC-R, but by 2009 this had still not materialised. The National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA) started up as a government ministry in 1996, and in 2006 was appointed as the implementing agency for reparations (Alie, 2008). By December 2008 the government's reparations program was yet to start and, by 2009, war victims were still complaining and deeply resentful that the perpetrators of the mass atrocities were better off than they were (Sesay and Suma, 2009).[199] In February 2009 war victims signed up to receive their reparations from a new tranche of money allocated to the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, a sum of $3 million, which had been granted by the international community in the absence of commitment by the national government to set up the Special Fund. This involved indignity and trauma for the victims who had photographs taken of their wounds and had to recount the terrifying incidents which they had experienced.[200] Women who had been gang raped or worked as bush wives or sex slaves or had been subjected to other sexual violence would have particular difficulties going through this process yet women were acknowledged as the group that suffered the most as a result of the conflict and their welfare was to be a priority in the peacebuilding project (Lomé, Article XXXIII (2)). In the outcome, the interests of this group were generally ignored.[201]

The political economy of peace came at a high price for some local citizens because the issue of reparations was 'no longer of prime concern for economic

[199] Anne Jung from Medico International quoted in AllAfrica on 25th November 2008 - *Sierra Leone: Reparations for War Victims A Must*, available from http://allafrica.com/stories/200811250604.html, accessed on 28/08/09

[200] VOA News.com, *Sierra Leone War Victims Sign Up for Reparations*, 19th February 2009, available from http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2009-02/2009-02-19-voa30.cfm?CFID=275819841&CFTOKEN=65436186&jsessionid=84303ec6f095ddd974004f13b53787a4f838, accessed on 28/08/09

[201] Amnesty International: *Sierra Leone, the implementation of key TRC recommendations: priorities in 2008 and beyond*, 6th March 2008. Available from http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR51/001/2008/en/AFR510012008en.html, accessed on 01/09/09

reconstruction' (Castillo, 2008: 25). Despite claims by government that they were addressing the issues, amputees were ostracised and stigmatised by their communities and this made the long wait for reparations even more distressing and humiliating (Ovadiya, 2009).[202] The process was not designed to support the very people who bore the brunt of the violent excesses perpetrated during the war (King, 2006, Amnesty International, 2009, Sesay and Suma, 2009), and there were reports of victims being antagonised by their attackers who considered themselves to be immune from justice because they had benefited from the crimes they had committed, in many cases receiving access to education, cash, tools, or training.[203] Ex-combatants were assisted by the national government and international community through DDR programming which started less than six months after the signing of the Lomé Accord, yet their victims remained ignored nine years on.

National reconciliation involves the equal redistribution of resources and effective mechanisms for grievances and reparations for violence (Castillo, 2008: 270), yet there were virtually no mechanisms for transitional justice despite strong recommendations by the TRC. Given the weaknesses of the TRC as a mechanism for reconciliation and forgiveness, its longer term recommendations for justice and reparations were of paramount importance for sustainable peace (Sesay, 2007).

> *the 'primary cancer' in our case may be and was and will always be grave social injustice and the desperate desire to deprive the less fortunate in society…whilst the 'secondary infection' is the …savage conflict which has eroded and deprived victims' knowledge of good and evil. Learning to uphold*

[202] INFOSUD, Human Rights Tribunal, *Sierra Leone's War Amputees Angrily Await Reparations*, available from http://www.humanrights-geneva.info/Sierra-Leone-s-War-Amputees,3956, accessed on 28/08/09

[203] VOA News.com, *Sierra Leone's War Amputees Angrily Await Reparations,* 22nd December 2008, available from http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008-12/voa-22dec08-2.cfm?CFID=275653145&CFTOKEN=14301349&jsessionid=00306e0fbb342c899c2147b7117f1b2365a2, accessed on 28/08/09

> *and administer justice fairly and fearlessly is the major therapy to that trauma* (Momoh, 2002: 25)

In the post-war, abuse against women continued with around 67% being the victims of domestic violence in 2008. There were even fears that the incidence of rape was higher in peacetime than during the war and often involved ex-combatants (IRIN, 2009, IRIN, 2008). Rape is stigmatised in Sierra Leone, usually blamed on women and girls themselves for 'provoking' the men, but often rape is committed by 'father' figures; teachers, uncles, or community leaders.[204] Very high levels of teenage pregnancies contribute to the low levels of girls in secondary education and although sexual violence against women and girls prevailed on a very serious scale in the post-war, this group experienced persistent barriers to justice (Dale, 2007). This was not helped by the fact that rape is not generally considered a serious crime in Sierra Leonean culture; there is no such thing as rape in marriage for example, and most perpetrators get away with their crimes. Just 13 out of 896 alleged attackers received a conviction in 2007 (IRIN, 2008). These cultural attitudes towards women were somewhat influential in by-passing the needs of women and girls involved in the conflict in the DDR programming, and their stigmatisation, and also the difficulties they faced being reintegrated to their communities or making a living (Coulter, 2009).

Despite the rhetoric on gender equality and the Gender Laws passed in 2007:

> *women face extensive legal and de facto discrimination, as well as limited access to education and formal employment. Women's status under customary law is equal to that of minors… Sierra Leone's maternal mortality rate is the*

[204] Personal interview with Rosalyn McCarthy, Women's Forum, Freetown, March 2007

> *highest in the world and a recent UN study found that there were just six obstetricians in the entire country.* [205]

Women's representation in government remained weak and there was little evidence to suggest that the legal position of females in political and social life would be improved given the government's history on implementing reform (EU, 2007). Reforms to the electoral system had not improved the number of female candidates nominated in the elections of 2007, for example, when only 11% of political party candidates were women (EU, ibid). Despite the promises made by government to support women, in the outcome, there was little evidence to show that this was the case.

> *It is doubtful whether the PRSP projects have really contributed to addressing women's longer-term poverty needs. This is because of inadequate provision of funds to serve the majority of poor women. With regard to micro-credit, interest rates are high and many women do not access the funds.*
>
> *Even though gender issues were included in the planning process of the PRSP, they were approached in a fragmented manner in the body of the PRSP which deals with priorities and budgetary commitments.* [206]

New legislation to protect children was enacted in the post-war period including the Anti-Human Trafficking Act (2005) and the Child Rights Act (2007) but in 2008 the International Committee on the Rights of the Child urged the government to act upon and implement this legislation (CRC, 2008).[207] Reports on child labour in the mining industry suggested that the government was not taking child protection

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[205] Freedom House Report for Sierra Leone 2009 available from http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&country=7699&year=2009, accessed on 31/08/09

[206] Report by the Sierra Leone Women's Forum into the Poverty Reduction Strategy Projects, Annexed to the PRSP Progress Report 2008 EU (2007b) *EU election observation mission: Republic of Sierra Leone presidential and parliamentary elections 2007.* Freetown: European Union.

[207] Available at http://www.crin.org/docs/SLeone.pdf, accessed on 31/08/09

seriously despite the terrible consequences of a 'lost generation' of children and the country's historic legacy of mass child abuse (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 3, Recommendations: 377-379). Child labourers in alluvial diamond mining were a persistent feature in the post-war, living and working in difficult and often dangerous conditions, exploited for their labour with little reward for themselves or their families (Boas and Hatloy, 2006). Yet little action was taken by government against the individuals who employed children to work in the mines.[208] This was described as 'a major post-conflict problem and a threat to social stability' by the NMJD which monitored mining activities.[209]

The rehabilitation and reintegration of former child soldiers was not a great success story either. Mostly marginalised from the DDR because of the stigma attached to child combatants and the 'mismanagement' and 'false promises' of the process itself, many children missed out on any benefits this may have brought them and the situation was particularly acute for girls. This meant that children often reverted to a life of crime or prostitution (Denov, 2005). Former child combatants in Sierra Leone are now the youth of the nation.

Post-war programmes did not succeed in adequately addressing the challenges and concerns of the country's youth, and this group was still to be given a meaningful voice ten years on from the Lomé Accord. The rural youth, for example, remained exposed to archaic traditional practices and would possibly never have a meaningful voice as long as they remained poor and unemployed. Given the ease of recruitment by rebel forces and government forces of disenfranchised youth in the

[208] A gang of child workers, some as young as seven, were witnessed by the author excavating gravel in the diamondiferous eastern area of the country during fieldwork in May 2009. Gang bosses confirmed that government monitors turned a blind eye when offered bribes.

[209] See report by CRIN: *Child miners: legacy of conflict*, 8th May 2009, available at http://www.crin.org/resources/infodetail.asp?id=20214, accessed on 01/09/09.

city and the countryside, this was a serious failing by both government and their external supporters, and remains a challenge for sustainable peace. A ministry for Youth and Sports was set up but there were no consultations between the government and the youth to find out what the priority areas in youth rehabilitation programmes should be; although skills training schemes were made available such as carpentry and tailoring, etc. they were not necessarily the preferred areas for youth empowerment or employment (Sesay, 2007: 51/52). The impact of unemployment on youth is often hunger, disease, and a return to anti-social behaviour (Machel, 1996) and, in the outcome, youth initiatives failed to capture or convince hard-core ex-combatants who preferred to be recruited by unscrupulous elites for election 'campaigning' (Christensen and Utas, 2008). Ex-combatants were also recruited as bodyguards and security advisers in the new government (ICG, 2007). There remains the question of whether or not economic liberalisation can prevent a net financial loss for ex-combatants in peace time (Keen, 2008). Certainly there were problems reintegrating certain members of the armed factions back into their communities and, again, little support was offered to women and girl ex-combatants (Sesay and Suma, 2009; Peters, 2006; Coulter, 2009). The problem wasn't helped by the dire economic situation and the failures in job creation, and there were concerns that lack of employment opportunities could result in a renewed 'zero-sum' mentality among ex-combatants who failed to recognise any benefits of peace such as improved livelihoods, education, housing, health or food security (Cheru, 2002: 207, Steenkamp, 2009)

There remained great injustices after the war; large disparities between rural and urban populations, marginalised groups such as women, youth and the disabled, and an emerging threat of the politicisation of ethnicity. In sum, the new political

process had failed to contribute to the nation building project by helping to heal the wounds of its troubled society, by securing the interests of marginalised groups, and by building a relationship of trust between the new state and its citizens.

> *Peace and reconstruction are best achieved by addressing social injustices 'it encompasses the entrenching of respect for human rights and political pluralism and the elimination of economic injustice'* (Cheru, 2002)

Given the evidence presented above, the post-war priority to protect and respect Human Rights seems to have largely been ignored. The setting up of a Human Rights Commission was promised in the Lomé Accord for no later than 90 days after the signing of the Agreement but eventually materialised in 2006 and was operationalised in 2007.[210] The experiences of many citizens strongly support the findings that the area of Human Rights was a 'Cinderella' of reform even though this was a crucial priority for peace. Despite increased political tolerance, peoples' experiences living day to day lives in Sierra Leone were hardly different from those of the pre-war; for women, things had deteriorated. Structural violence - extreme economic inequality, discrimination and denial of basic rights (including jobs) remained the norm (Galtung, 1969). So far, the *framework for peace* seemed to be as remote an aspiration as it was at the onset of war as the challenges for peace remained.

6.2 THE NATURE OF THE POST-WAR STATE

This work has evidenced that what Sierra Leone needed for post-conflict recovery and consolidation of peace was contextually specific *different governance*, not a notion of 'good governance' based on existing structures and western ideals which

[210] See UNDP http://www.sl.undp.org/4_media/Newsroom/humanright_commission.htm

had not worked in the past. Rebuilding existing structures, albeit with a new focus on decentralisation, meant that the characteristics which defined the new state were quite similar to those of the old, in this case weak, dominated by predatory elites, disconnected from the populace, under-developed and unevenly developed, over-centralised with an economy based on extractive industries and weak agricultural policies, and decision making constrained by global actors and global structures.

In sum, the shape and nature of the post-war state was unnervingly similar to that of the pre-war. Power remained too centralised, with marginalised rural areas and disenfranchised groups. Politics remained elite led and the economy remained centred on primary resource extraction - the profits from which were mostly exported. The impact of modern politics and liberalising economics on the new relationship between state and most citizens was hardly noticeable. It must be remembered that the successes of the liberalising reforms - new and open political space, and greatly enhanced civil and political freedoms - raised expectations among the populace that the relationship would indeed noticeably change.

The problem with promoting and imposing a set of liberalising reforms within existing structures of governance is that it produces a narrow and myopic conceptualisation of a peaceful state with little room for creative thinking about alternative governing structures or political processes. Too many assumptions are made. For example, the notion of 'good governance' is premised on a unified state, with adequate capacity, with functioning institutions, an hospitable political culture, and an economy which could integrate into the global system. Sierra Leone was therefore not an obvious candidate for this package for reconstruction. To many citizens living in Sierra Leone, especially in the rural areas, the state is quite irrelevant in their day to day lives because they generally have to fend for

themselves in very basic ways instead of relying on state support; the most simple of tasks like getting to market, for example, or accessing potable water.

In the absence of important pre-requisites for liberal democracy, would a different model be more appropriate when constructing the new state? A model which could perhaps support local priorities and address the challenges for building peace?

A new, new state

Chopra and Hohe argue that citizenship can only have meaning if local communities and their power holders are integrated into central government structures but this is a lengthy process, more challenging in post-conflict environs (Chopra and Hohe, 2004: 245-246). In the meantime, during transitions, elections take place allowing patrons and their cronies to get into power (ibid). 'Sequencers' might argue that national elections and central institution building should be delayed whilst mechanisms for genuine popular participation are built at the local level. Strengthening the grass roots first might foster a degree of downward accountability and legitimacy so essential for the peace. This type of participation would be meaningful for Sierra Leoneans because it would cultivate a participatory form of governance more relevant to their histories and local power structures although fresh thinking would be required in terms of how to absorb traditional leadership into the new structures rather than them being part of the constellations of entrenched patrimonial power (Jackson, 2007, Fanthorpe, 2005, Meyer, 2007).

The divide between central institutions and citizens in Sierra Leone remains enormous, so what systems could more effectively target and absorb marginalised groups into the political process in a form of *holistic integration* (Chopra and Hohe, 2004). How could the social contract be reconstructed and solidified to prevent

uneven shares of resources and the marginalisation of certain groups, and help to ensure a sustainable peace (Addison and Murshed, 2001); a social contract which would treat 'all individuals equally and give [opportunities] to develop their capacities securely' (Held, 1996: 57 citing, Rousseau, 1968: 60)? It is possible that the average citizen in Sierra Leone is not 'as interested in all the decisions made at national level as [s]he would be in those made nearer home' (Pateman, 1970: 110), so could more localised governance do better in generating confidence among marginalised groups and the general electorate, even when things weren't going so well in terms of service delivery or development?

Some evidence from the data suggests that this may be so. Maintaining peace at the community level would impact on national security because involving the whole community, including traditionally excluded groups such as women and youth, is key to sustaining the peace (Hanson-Alp, 2007), especially when they are backed up with targeted resources. Bringing a participatory and genuinely inclusive form of governance into the locale would give people a sense of 'something happening', even if progress was slow and the challenges great. This form of governance, prioritised from the beginning, could function alongside re-emerging state institutions but would be more relevant for local people.

Greater participation in decision making at the local level might also have the benefit of radically changing the context of national politics; for example, greater accountability of local councillors to their communities may have the effect of increasing confidence among the electorate and the participation of grass roots community groups would bring horizontal accountability to governance (Richards et al., 2004). This could transfer to the national level. When governance is close to the populace and more accessible to them, political skills tend to improve among grass

roots organisations and local power holders. Citizens become better placed to judge the performance of their representatives on both local issues and national issues and this has a positive effect on politics emerging at the national level (Held, 1996: 269 citing, Pateman, 1970). It would also assist in breaking down the urban/rural disparities and inequalities by weakening politics at the centre and empowering local representatives. Perhaps this would help the reconstruction of the social contract to prevent uneven shares of resources, the urban elite bias, and the marginalisation of certain groups, and this would help support the local priorities for peace (Addison and Murshed, 2001). This egalitarian redistribution could enhance the nation building project because there would be greater potential to reallocate resources and prevent the sense of injustice among rural communities and marginalised groups. Infrastructure into the provinces may also improve because power holders would be based there and links to rural areas would become more important to legitimise government and support new governance structures.

This work has argued that statebuilding is not peacebuilding unless something radical changes in the structure of the state. Real commitment to local governance and a move away from the centre is one possible change; a switch to non-partisan democracy is another. There are bad memories of single party governance in Sierra Leone after the model of politics as imposed by the previous APC regime. Yet, considering the façade of multi-party politics in the country and the potential it had to ignite tensions, perhaps a different one party system, or no-party system, would help more in the short to medium term by encouraging a sense of common purpose among all citizens, and their representatives.

Giving citizens a stake in governance

Earlier evidence indicated the realities of life in post-war Sierra Leone for ordinary citizens and the attitude of many political elites towards the average voter. The economic situation in the country was a major contributing factor to this unsatisfactory interpretation of democracy because mass unemployment in the formal sector meant that the majority of the citizenry did not actually have any monetary investment in the state through their taxation. Why should government respect their wishes when they were not contributing to national coffers like the donors were? 'No representation, no taxation' worked in reverse here when looked at from the government's point of view. This was a serious consequence of unemployment and the structure of the national economy, and a worrying dynamic for democracy because the lack of citizen 'buy in' meant reduced legitimacy of their claims on government.

Liberalising the economy brought growth but no jobs. This was a major challenge for the post-conflict reconstruction. Not only was the wealth of the country being exported in debt repayments but taxation opportunities were stymied by high unemployment and low private investment. Peace was compromised by such large numbers of people with nothing in particular to do but brood over their predicament. Among this group were previous child soldiers, skilled in warfare and terrorising tactics, psychologically disturbed and traumatised, and living with diminished expectations (Denov, 2005).

Post-war job creation seemed to be a challenge too huge to overcome and theorising about positive correlations between growth and economic opportunities was acutely inaccurate, and the dearth of employment opportunities took its toll on

the process of reintegration of ex-combatants where it mostly failed to provide sustainable livelihoods (Klem and Douma, 2008, Denov, 2005).

Although liberalisation was in its infancy and capacity was low, there was no evidence from the data that this method of economic restructuring would bring about jobs any time sooner or later because the environment for private investment so was unattractive and IFI demands to contract the state constrained any public initiatives to create employment. This was so when the new APC regime of 2007 reclaimed agricultural land for extensive new rice fields to try and reduce expensive imports and reduce the costs for local people when the global economy contracted. The labour used for this important public initiative was free of charge from Pademba Road prison. This gives some indication of the extent to which government was not free to plan and fund its public initiatives. The choices of political elites were severely constrained by the inflexible model for reconstruction.

Credit must go to international efforts to restructure the national instrument for collecting taxes. Reform of the National Revenue Authority and other bodies was successful in stabilising the national economy and getting good revenue flows through to the treasury. As noted earlier, these revenue flows could have been greatly enhanced with more employment in the formal sector and increased private investment but still the point of this success was to export the country's wealth not reinvest it for job creation. Something was working well in the statebuilding enterprise, but it was not to the benefit of local people.

The question is, even if national wealth was kept within the state rather than redirected for debt servicing, could political elites be trusted to redistribute and invest it properly? After all political elites liked repaying debt: 'the more we pay

back, the more we get in loans and grants'.[211] The evidence suggests that international actors could do more in holding corrupt elites to account. Political elites were desperate for help in recovery and in no position to challenge strong efforts to secure their good behaviour. Where was the close monitoring of aid? Was it alright to pay vast loans straight into national coffers when reports of corruption had never been more widespread? Was it helpful to believe 'good intentions' for 'good government' when track records clearly showed that funds and other resources went missing? Some initiatives to correct this lack of oversight such as PETS resulted in substantial improvements in resource delivery to DMCs (DfID, 2006).

The international community made a profound impact in stabilising the country and got a lot right in the immediate post-war securitisation and this shows there can be coherence and commitment as well as conflict and contradiction in post-conflict programming (Luckham, 2004).

6.3 THE MODEL OF RECONSTRUCTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR PEACE

The model for reconstruction did not support the local priorities for the longer term peacebuilding project because it was inflexible and centred on international benchmarks for 'good governance' and development. According to Ghali, peacebuilding should be 'action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict' (Ghali, 1992:II); yet the way forward for Sierra Leone did not appear to be the structures of

[211] Personal telephone interview with SLPP finance minister Mr John Benjamin on 11th December 2008

free markets and liberal democracy and all the accoutrements thereof because the challenges for peace remained largely unaddressed.

Post-liberal peace?

Economy

The claim of the so called 'liberal peace' - that peace, democracy and free markets are a viable combination - is discredited in this work because peace in Sierra Leone involved more than the absence of war and the presence of security, it involved a positive peace which did not come about through the programme of reforms undertaken (Galtung, 1969). Even though liberalising reforms in the country were relatively in their infancy, they would not work for positive peace because initial observations indicate that already vast swathes of the population were excluded from the process and many of its benefits. The political economy of peace had come at a high price for many citizens whose own priorities were somewhat sidelined (Castillo, 2008:25): 'Trickle down' simply had not happened nor was it likely to happen any time soon. This was because the success of the national economy in the global marketplace rested on 'coherent long-term strategic action... and the construction and maintenance of a dense web of 'intermediate' institutions… and sufficient social protection for the poor that the market… does not itself provide' (Castillo, 2008). This web of institutions – banks, financial services, technical services, training and infrastructure – was in short supply in Sierra Leone and combined with the inhospitable environment for investment, full liberalisation of the economy was not a viable ambition.

Democracy

Liberalisation of the body politic also failed to produce a meaningful participatory process and, conflated with interventionist politics, gave the demands

of the external constituency preference over the needs of local citizens. Most states in the global system are subject to influence by external forces, this is a necessary component of globalisation, yet such interference by powerful global actors in fragile and emerging democracies can do nothing to legitimise the actions of government in the eyes of the electorate. The 'liberal peace' as promoted by its supporters is something of an oxymoron. Liberalising activities in Sierra Leone did not support priorities for peace and may have contributed to renewed tensions in terms of frustrated democracy, increased vulnerability to poverty and increased shadow activity that market liberalisation often brings (Pugh, 2005) .

Capacity

The wish list attached to the liberalising agenda was unrealistic in the extreme, and the reconstruction strategy should have taken into account realistic prospects for international aid by focussing on the local need. Faced with such low capacity the Sierra Leone state had no chance in achieving the promises it made for post-conflict assistance. Precious resources, in particular human resources, were requisitioned for activities directed from outside. Capacity remained critically low despite a plethora of 'capacity building' activities by external agents. This wasn't helped by the fact that donors tended to use their own contractors and experts for reconstruction activities thereby missing good opportunities to build sustainable capacity among locals. It was imperative for the success of the statebuilding enterprise to build the capacity of governance by transferring skills and knowledge to local people at all levels.

There are several important points to make about the so called 'liberal peace' orthodoxy for peacebuilding and reconstruction in Sierra Leone.

1. *Mythical peace*

The evidence from Sierra Leone suggests that the 'liberal peace' was a rhetorical construct whose key components – market liberalisation, democratisation, civil society transformation – were promoted and implemented in a patchy manner which advantaged international institutions and agendas over the local community. It was an incomplete peace which prioritised certain policies and the sequencing of others to protect outside interests and not the interests of the people who had lived through the war. A more accurate conceptualisation would be *liberal peace lite* (Mac Ginty, 2008b:158, Ignatieff, 2003). The model's credentials for peacebuilding are strongly contested here. Some restructuring worked very well: securitising the country's territory, stabilisation and growth in the national economy, and along with free, fair and peaceful elections, these developments were very positive for short term stability and this advantage must be emphasised. Progress seemed to stop there, however, as the consolidation of democracy and the redistribution of resources remained as elusive as they had been before the war.[212] Equity and justice, representation and accountability, HR, the rule of law and equal opportunities, were the aspirations of the masses but were not prioritised in the statebuilding enterprise and the longer term peacebuilding project failed to gain much traction because the underlying structural problems were still in place. The challenges for peace therefore remained. Those who benefited most from the peacebuilding were those who had benefited from state resources and the privileges of office in the past. Once again the masses were marginalised and the continuance of structural violence was not a good prospect for future stability (Steenkamp, 2009; Galtung, 1969). The 'liberal peace'

[212] See UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, *More must be done to consolidate peace in Sierra Leone*, Un News Centre, 3rd September 2009, available from http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=31934&Cr=sierra+leone&Cr1=, accessed on 04/09/09

as a rhetorical construct appeared to be for someone or some purpose but not that of the local community and its peacebuilding plan (Cox, 1981; Chesterman, 2004; Paris, 2002).

2. *Ownership*

The model for reconstruction claimed local ownership because it was more about inclusive processes than about policies yet deals were done between local and global elites following a set template for poverty reduction which was really about debt servicing; even poverty reduction was subsumed within the central goal of servicing debt (Cheru, 2007).

This was problematic because external 'political pedagogy' could warp the traditional sense of legitimate politics and this had the effect of reducing 'local ownership' credentials still further (Zaum, 2007). Stakeholder meetings were constrained by templates for peace (or rather development) that had already been agreed. Local 'consultations' took place on a design which could not feasibly be delivered. Somewhere along the line the local priorities for peace - a simple and focused local strategy for recovery - morphed into an enormous and inappropriate reconstruction challenge which was focussed on economic growth for poverty reduction. This was a hugely ambitious project which could never have been fully and successfully implemented given the capacity of the state and the half hearted commitment of both local and global actors. It is argued elsewhere that the origin of 'off the shelf' policy is not usually a detriment to its successful implementation. More important is the political will and intellectual conviction of key domestic policy-makers or ministries to institutionalise external policy measures with broad community support (Morrissey, 2001, Killick et al., 1998), and yet poor capacity for implementation in itself meant that the GovSL could not truly own their pro-poor

strategies whether they were relevant for peacebuilding or not (Booth, 2003: 48). The unrealistic wish lists for reform meant that the 'liberal peace' was not doable in Sierra Leone even if it was desirable.

3. *Statebuilding was not peacebuilding*

This work has argued that peacebuilding became statebuilding in the reforming post-war project. This involved the reconstruction of institutions to replicate those which were previously dysfunctional and which had collapsed; the reinstatement of global and local power relations which had nurtured discontent in the past, and the engineering of society in the image of developed western states. In Sierra Leone, statebuilding could not be peacebuilding unless something radical changed in the structures of governance and their relationships which each other. The model for reconstruction was not viable because it was premised on crucial misconceptions about the nature of the Sierra Leonean state and its ability to change and adapt to a western model of statecraft which had historically been so disastrous.

This narrow view of how post-conflict states should be rebuilt assumes that the debate is closed on peacebuilding paradigms; that it involves statebuilding for 'good governance' and development, through growth. This is not the case; the jury is still out on appropriate models of peacebuilding because the 'scientific perfection' of known strategies just does not seem to be working (Richmond, 2006). Interventions sometimes 'reinvent the causes of war' or ignore them; bad government and ineffective governing structures were the causes of war in Sierra Leone but this point seems to have been overlooked in the reconstruction enterprise, if not the rhetoric (Keen, 2008: 188). To know what peace might look like is to know what must be achieved and also what must be avoided in the reconstruction (Richmond, 2006). The Fukuyaman certainties of the post-CW era, however, profoundly affected the

search for alternative solutions in unique states like Sierra Leone with unique challenges for peace. A more open and creative debate on what peaceful societies really look like will take as a starting point the cultural, historical and social conditions unique to each situation.

4. Mythical democracy

A further line of argument is that the political process in Sierra Leone looks like liberal democracy but in reality is not. Elections do not democracy make and yet post-conflict domestic politics in the country are lauded as a fine example of liberal democracy at work in Africa. How can this be so when the electorate cannot control their government? Representative democracy also cannot operate when controlled by an external constituency whose influence penetrates every aspect of day to day governance and society. Globalisation has meant that all states are enmeshed in this somewhat asymmetrical relationship with the international system but for fledgling democracies emerging from violent conflict, outside influence does little to repair the deeply problematic relationship between citizens and their state.

This is because the irony of peacebuilding is that often coercion and sometimes even force is used to apply it; it looks like an expression of external interest rather than of external concern and responsibility. Further, it gives national governments very little room to act independently to serve their constituents by determining the pace or priorities of the 'construction project' in a way that would ensure long-term peace, security and stability (Richmond, 2006, Sesay, 2007: 28). Exporting the country's wealth and exposing it to unpredictably external forces and a time of severe stress is also a bad idea and the policies for economic reconstruction have not worked for local people (Castillo, 2008:26). The effect of this when conflated with democratic elections is that people wonder what elites did with all the

money and why the new government cannot bring down the price of rice. Democracy brings with it high expectations, and perceptions of corruption can be distorted when people don't know that their government is paying high interests rates for their peace.

What guarantee is there, however, that if the wealth stayed in the country it would reach its proper target? What sort of economic restructuring policies and strategies would work better than those that have failed? Some suggestions have already been made above, but it remains the case that given the country's track record on economic management certain assurances had to be made that governing elites would put their accounts in order and deliver on their commitments to the financial institutions. Is it necessary, however, for the IFIs to keep those repayments considering the severe lack of capacity at all levels of governance and the desperate need of the country for development? Would it be possible to redirect debt repayments away from central government and back into communities through the new and strong local governance structures, where their representatives are more accountable to the populace and can make autonomous decisions on priorities?

6.4 - ANALYSIS

In the outcome the post-conflict reconstruction was generally lacking in its scope to support the local challenges for peace witnessed by the experiences of the local people outlined above. Important groups: women, the youth, the disabled and children remained on the margins despite 'gender mainstreaming' and other similar initiatives to bring about more pluralism and more egalitarianism in Sierra Leone's modern politics. Human rights were sidelined as an issue and the majority of the populace remained in deep poverty with no formal employment and no prospects for

change. Rural areas were, on the whole, neglected by the centre and ill-served by 'competitive elitism' at the local level. The day to day realities for ordinary Sierra Leoneans remained much as they had before.

The argument has been made here that different governance structures were required to secure good government in post-conflict Sierra Leone. What this would involve was fresh, creative thinking about models for reconstruction based on a sound knowledge of the country's history and its post-war needs. What **would** help address the challenges for peace? Rather than a loose and intangible notion of 'good governance', Sierra Leone required good government (people) and different governance (structures).

The success of government and the post-conflict reconstruction was measured on indicators of development which were then matched up with outsourced 'good governance' objectives (House of Commons, 2006). These had little to do with local priorities for peace and rather beg the question, who was the peacebuilding for?

This enquiry has evidenced that, although creditable aims in themselves, the goals and objectives of the MDGs and the 'good governance' ambitions were somewhat disconnected with the major imperative for sustainable peace in Sierra Leone, namely the construction of a cohesive, united and single nation state, with common goals, with equal participation, with effective representation, with accountable government and with an egalitarian share of the country's wealth. These were the promises made at Lomé and the recommendations of the TRC Report.

This research has allowed some light to be thrown on the location of the departure between local goals for peacebuilding and generic global ambitions for poverty reduction. The disconnect was revealed at the point of commitment by the

GovSL to the IFIs in the PRSPs. Therein lay a serious dichotomy in the conceptualisation of peace resulting in inappropriate policy formation and implementation. This was because the PRSPs contained lengthy lists of promises and commitments for broad reaching reform in line with liberal democratic models of governance found in the developed world. These were overambitious commitments which placed an unacceptable burden on the recovering state which was suffering from low capacity at all levels and operating in a very challenging post-conflict environment. Many of the commitments were only loosely connected to the pressing concerns of local people in respect of consolidating the peace, and securing reconstruction support involved a Poverty Reduction Strategy which re-focussed government's attention and resources on external priorities for recovery. The political economy of peace therefore nullified the claim that the new local/global partnership had any genuine credentials for local ownership despite the new and acclaimed process of inclusivity and consultation associated with PRSPs.

The preoccupation with indicators of development, such as MDGs, missed the point that peacebuilding was a *development plus* challenge in Sierra Leone (Castillo, 2008). It involved the consolidation of peace which must be prioritised over everything else. For example, policies had to account for the reconstruction of destroyed economic assets: infrastructure, agricultural land, industries, ports, and the wealth of human capital which left the country during the war or which did not survive it. All these challenges placed extra burdens on the recovering economy. Peace-related programmes added further strains: DDR, the return of refugees and IDPs, army and police reform, land rehabilitation, civil service reconstruction, extra burdens on the health service from the increased incidence of disability and psychological trauma. Add to this confusing and costly melee the task of attracting

foreign investment, loans and grants through a complex system involving PRSPs. The preoccupation of the PRSPs on shopping lists for development drastically constrained fresh thinking on pressing domestic issues.

One intervention which appeared to gain some initial traction was decentralisation. The reaction of the citizenry to new local government and the opportunities decentralisation provided for local individuals and groups to make use of their own expertise in reconstruction was a clue to the type of restructuring which was positive and relevant. Initial attempts to decentralise governance indicated that it might help in the quest to build sustainable peace. There was evidence to suggest that this restructuring provided Sierra Leoneans with what they needed because being close to government, its challenges, constraints and failures, gave ownership to citizens who were more inclined to accept any failures as their own and show tolerance of slow progress. But this initiative was constrained by half-hearted implementation and lack of resources. It was also at the mercy of devolved corruption which threatened to undermine progress; decentralisation may have been used as a tool to consolidate power and maintain control on resources in the provinces. Given the history of politics in Sierra Leone, political elites were unlikely to give up power to the provinces voluntary and continuing centralised power and patrimonial practices endangered these reforms. Strong political will (both local and global) was required to rid local politics of this endemic scourge and to ensure that necessary resources were targeted and delivered for this important part of the peacebuilding project (Smoke, 2003; Vedeld, 2003; Crawford, 2008). This is where the international community, if committed, could make real inroads into holding political elites accountable by redirecting resources direct to local government, to local representatives who were more accountable to the citizens themselves.

In broader terms, a consensus on what to prioritise involving all stakeholders working from their own agenda would produce a more pragmatic approach to resource allocation when resources were in such high demand. This is not the same as 'broad consultations' on the PRSPs. In peacebuilding, the yardstick for success in economic planning is different to normal development and not based on MDGs and resources need to be targeted to the specific challenges for peace. In post-conflict environs, the success of economic reforms is measured by the extent to which they contribute 'to national reconciliation and the consolidation of peace thereby allowing the country to eventually enter the normal development path' (Castillo, 2008:44). Post-conflict reconstruction is not normal development because it involves such an intrusive array of external interventions, what Duffield describes as the 'technology of counter-insurgency', and there is a need to break out of the enclosure of these scripted conversations in order to create a dialogue which is meaningful for peace (Duffield, 2007:215).

6. 5 - CONCLUDING STATEMENT

The international community had a unique opportunity to exert far reaching influence in the reconstruction of the Sierra Leonean state but a transformation did not occur as a result of grand scale social engineering from outside. The character of the state remained similar to that of the past as political elites continued to exploit their office for personal gain, and governance structures encouraged the perpetual marginalisation of certain groups. The failure to transform was due to ill informed conceptualisations of peace, of policy construction and of policy implementation which overlooked the unique context of the Sierra Leone tragedy. The role of local elites, local conditions, and local challenges added to the struggle to find solutions.

The country was an example of what could be achieved when support was coordinated towards a common purpose because stabilisation, demobilisation and disarmament, security sector reform and economic recovery had been successful. Yet these successes were not converted into a longer term and relevant peacebuilding plan. This was because liberal statebuilding emerged as the modus operandi for consolidating the fragile peace and the local project was subsumed, indeed sidelined, in favour of externally constructed, pre-determined targets associated with poverty reduction and development, codified in the MDGs.

> *the institutional fabric to keep armed conflict within bounds over the longer term sometimes emerges from below as well as from above' 'the interests of [war affected peoples] might be better served by reform of local government and justice than a reconstruction of the state* (Richards, 2005 : 19 ; cited by Berdal, 2009}

CONCLUSION

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The central task in this research was to determine what Sierra Leone needed from its reconstruction project by investigating the war history and local priorities, and by analysing the model for reconstruction in terms of its ability to address the local challenges for peace. This work has achieved its objectives by deepening our understandings of the many challenges facing Sierra Leone in its quest to secure a durable peace, and also the challenges of its partners in their endeavours to build a stable state. The research has examined the many programmes of reforms which were set up in the reconstruction, their consequences for local people and their own peacebuilding plans, and has enabled a few proposals to be made about possible alternative models for governance which might be more helpful.

What the country needed

The research found that what the country needed was good leadership and relevant governing structures which would give confidence to the local populace that the promises of democracy would not be compromised and that their interests would be served through genuine representations. These interests included improved and sustainable economic opportunities, especially for the largest group of unemployed – the youth of the country. They also included meaningful participation in the political process of former marginalised groups - and new interest groups – participation which would give them an effective voice and access to the levers of power. The sort of participation which would allow for a truly accountable government to the grass roots of society. The priorities included the respect for and the protection of human rights; in particular, access to justice and confidence in the

wider justice system, and provision for the victims of war. They also included a more egalitarian distribution of the country's wealth, in particular reallocation of resources to the most underdeveloped and marginalised rural areas of the country, and the most vulnerable in society. The historically problematic relationship between the government and the governed needed serious reform so as to secure a more responsive state and a more engaged citizenry.

What was delivered

Chapter 3 evidenced that Sierra Leone benefited from successful securitisation of the country - an imperative pre-requisite for all of the challenges noted above - a government which was legitimised through democratic elections and an economic structure which allowed healthy growth and successful servicing of the nation's debt. Trade liberalisation and macro-economic restructuring guaranteed the mechanism for debt servicing and the flow of aid; the reformed National Revenue Authority successfully converting inward tax and revenue flows into debt repayments.

Security sector reform removed one of the most serious threats to human security - a problem since colonial times. In particular, the mass abuse of civilians by government troops during the war had left communities deeply fearful of the security services. The removal of this threat in the post-war years cannot be underestimated as a profound contribution to the wellbeing of Sierra Leoneans and their ability to exercise their political freedoms.

In the outcome, healthy economic growth did not create greater job opportunities and former economically marginalised groups remained in deep poverty and at the periphery of society, as evidenced in chapter four. Promises for reduced poverty and food security failed dramatically with a high prevalence of

hunger and malnutrition remaining by 2009 (ActionAid, 2009). Re-emerging tensions among the disenfranchised youth meant new security threats including increased criminality and political violence as the country remained high risk on the state fragility index (Marshall and Cole, 2009).

In chapter five it was argued that democracy turned out to be a rather hollow version of the form of governance so badly needed because accountability mechanisms were virtually non-existent. The GovSL had a central role to play in the longer term peacebuilding project but bad government continued and poor decisions, inefficient management and corruption abounded. The model for reconstruction, putting the state central in the poverty reduction enterprise, meant that governing elites benefitted most from the reforms. The international community therefore had an essential role to play vis-à-vis interventions to ensure better government. External actors were in the strongest position to demand better efforts by the government of the day but outward accountability – of government to external actors - appeared to be focussed more on efficiencies in the economy than fair play in the game of politics. In terms of human rights and access to justice these were areas neglected in the reconstruction and issues which remain challenging for the longer term peacebuilding project.

The scope of reconstruction programming put huge strain on a weakened government with minimal capacity at all levels. Because of this, and the special circumstances and vulnerabilities of post-conflict Sierra Leone, liberalising reform was patchy and was unlikely to gain any real traction in terms of the stated aims of the 'liberal peace' or indeed the priority concerns of the local populace.

This work has argued that the model for post-conflict reconstruction in Sierra Leone lacked relevance and efficacy and that solutions to the local challenges could

not be successfully constructed from outside; the project was not owned by the local populace who remained marginalised from their political economy of peace and this was because the focus was on statebuilding for delivery of the MDGs whose objectives – most creditable in their aims – were not necessarily the most pressing concern for longer term peacebuilding locally.

Questions raised from this research

There are many questions which arise as a result of these findings which centre on the kind of state being constructed in Sierra Leone and the purpose it serves for the local challenges.

If the model for international interventions was not best suited to support the local priorities for peace, who was the reconstruction for? If the purpose of the project went beyond the need for debt servicing towards an effective technology of security through development, why chose a model with a poor track record on delivering development? What, indeed, were the expectations of the reconstruction effort, and if the model for development and poverty reduction failed to deliver, what does this mean for the global project of liberalisation after conflict?

If attempts at rebuilding the state went wrong, what are the implications for the next reconstruction effort or reconstruction efforts elsewhere? If the model is failing to address the local challenges, is it possible to reconstruct the reconstruction, and is there a will to do so? Is it too late to change the new state model and, if so, what fresh strategies might work better within the existing structures?

How long will the absence of war be enough to legitimise bad government, or ‘good enough’ governance, and how long will local people allow military security

to trump their human security?[213] If not through another civil war, how will growing tensions next manifest themselves - through increased criminal activity, trafficking, exploitation or internecine violence, perhaps?

DISCUSSION ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS

The reason the solutions for post-war recovery matched rather badly with local priorities for peace was that the idea behind statebuilding was to reconstruct Sierra Leone in line with the wider global objectives of merging failed states into the global economy and promoting democratic regimes. This would allow the state to fulfil international obligations - the implementation of international treaties on issues such as Human Rights, for example – and also local obligations such as democratic governance. Sierra Leone, like all post-colonial, post-Cold War states in Africa, had a new relationship with the global system which involved its state apparatus being legitimised through the adoption of tried and tested western norms of societal and economic organisation. The focus on poverty reduction, growth and development provided the framework for cooperation between the emerging democratic state and the global financial institutions through the PRSPs. This was not a blue print owned by the local populace constructed to address their many challenges for peace.

In terms of international objectives, however, the reconstruction plan was successful. Stabilisation of the national economy, export growth and improved revenue flows were stated objectives which were achieved. These successes were potentially hugely beneficial for the people of Sierra Leone but the proclaimed benefits of such reform – job creation, community development and a reduction in

[213] See Richmond and Franks (2009) for a fuller discussion about the security advantages of neo-liberal models of reconstruction RICHMOND, O. P. and FRANKS, J. (2009) *Liberal peace transitions: between statebuilding and peacebuilding.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

poverty – failed to materialise in any significant way. This meant that a functioning economic sector had been constructed from outside but not necessarily for the benefit of local citizens. The reforms were successful enough, however, to persuade the IFIs to release essential resource flows because debt repayments were assured. In the outcome, there was little evidence to show that flows from the IFIs compensated ordinary citizens for the little direct benefit they were enjoying from their country's economic recovery.

> *[the government] got 30 million and all of that 30 million is for the people of this district or for this project, but the 30 million is not spent in its entirety on the people of Sierra Leone because contractors are also paid and yet, in the final analysis we have to pay all the interest as if it is spent on us* [214]

The emphasis in the reconstruction appeared to be on the ability of the state to fulfil its key international responsibilities first and its responsibilities to the local citizenry second. It is conceivable that this was the primary expectation of the reconstruction reforms and, if so, they proved to be successful. Democratic elections and institutional reform were also key objectives as was integration of the Sierra Leone economy into the international system. These ambitions were indeed realised.

Ownership of the project was an issue. Interventionist politics played into the hands of local elites because having to be accountable to an external constituency rather let them off the hook locally. Sierra Leone citizens did not feature in the global politics going on external to the domestic domain and political elites seemed to benefit most whether or not they were committed to genuine liberalisation or 'good governance'. It was imperative to give local people meaningful representation because failing to do so would perpetuate the tendency of governing elites to corrupt

[214] Interview with Rosalyn McCarthy, Women's Forum, Freetown, March 2007

the system – practices so despised by the populace in the run up to war. This lack of ownership is a new challenge facing the peaceful recovery of the country.

Why would external elites wish to challenge a government, however, which had put its economic 'house in order' and was servicing its debt? Why should the priorities for peace influence the new structures of governance when key objectives were being met? After all, any redirecting of precious state resources may just threaten the capacity of the government to sustain its debt repayments.

The answer to these questions may be in one of the key objectives of statebuilding – restructuring the state for the effective delivery of development because the general failure of this objective in Sierra Leone might persuade international actors to re-engage with the debate on models for reconstruction. Achieving the MDGs and reducing poverty is important because, in the theory behind policy making, development remains closely linked to the security of not only local communities but also western ways of life, and the international order itself (Duffield, 2007, DAC, 1997, DfID, 2005, Solana, 2003). The widening of security threats to include those of human development is viewed as unproblematic in the policy literature and indeed quite progressive in that it reflects important international advances in humanitarianism after the Cold War. Development has thus become a 'technology of security' (King and Murray, 2001, Mack, 2002, CHS, 2003, HSC, 2005, Duffield, 2007:viii). Underdevelopment is believed to be a key threat which requires global interventions on the back of peacebuilding to improve peoples' lives and reflects a post-interventionist era of 'development trusteeship', relevant for Sierra Leone because the risk of future armed conflict remains a

possibility and the risk needs to be contained.[215] The focus on development in Sierra Leone is to counter the unintended consequences of market liberalisation where 'trickle down' does not benefit the local citizenry, but in the outcome citizens have not significantly benefitted from development either. Neither project appears to be working because development as a counter-insurgency mechanism is still elusive and growth has not brought jobs.

It is at this point that we see the scope for re-conceptualising reconstruction for peace and development to address the local challenges in Sierra Leone. The evidence which has emerged from this enquiry suggests that the global preoccupation with development as a central component of counter-insurgency is somewhat delusory and misses the point of peace in Sierra Leone. The notion that security and development are natural partners is therefore challenged in this context because it is not development per se that Sierra Leone needs for continued stability, it is a sense of a unified nation, shared entitlement and good government. Given that these priorities were somewhat sidelined in international efforts to reconstruct but the need for development as a technology of security was not, why impose such an ineffective model in the reconstruction? There is little evidence to show that the reconstructed state in Sierra Leone will be any more effective at delivering development in the longer term as it has been in the short term. The focus is on development at the expense of peacebuilding yet it is conceivable that a different model for reconstruction may have the potential to address both. This is because a different model which re-shapes the state and which is intended to produce better development outcomes may also have a positive impact on the historic fractures and

[215] See Duffield (2007:163) for a discussion about reconciling the demands of progress with the need for order and stability

inequalities being perpetuated by the existing status quo and which remain the central challenges for peace in the country.

To do this, the discourse on reconstructing states for peace must take a leap of faith. The country, a prime example by all accounts of the 'liberal peace' in action, is not quite a model of peacebuilding grounded in liberalising norms. Certainly, there is much superficial evidence to suggest that it is; democratisation, trade liberalisation, security sector reform, for example, but liberalisation in Sierra Leone is 'patchy' and has been evidenced here as a deeply problematic working paradigm for peace. The PRSPs committed the Sierra Leone government to reconstruct the nation in a generic form identified as the 'optimum model' by non-local actors and it was at this point that the site of departure in the rhetoric was located - when peacebuilding became statebuilding for poverty reduction in the PRSPs and when the imperatives for peace became submerged in the vocabulary of development. The structures of governance had been predefined and elites had to work within them. Even if the emerging political elite had been committed to the project of nation building and serious about building a cohesive community with a common identity for peace, they would have been expected to do so within the confines of liberalising and pre-defined structures not necessarily best suited to the local challenges. The lack of debate in conceptual and policy circles denies the realities that the discourse on optimum reconstruction models is still on-going and that local actors are best placed to decide the priorities (Castillo, 2008).

It is at this point that the originality of this work emerges as an important contribution because it has dug deep to retrieve historically and culturally relevant detail which can inform new conceptualisations of peace and suggest a better informed model for reconstruction which is relevant for Sierra Leone.

Accountability is a major challenge for stability in the country. It is essential that some mechanism or model is found to bring the broader citizenry into politics; to secure meaningful participation and representation and unequivocal accountability at grass roots level. Given the political history of Sierra Leone where the citizen has never had any meaningful role to play in governing themselves in an independent state, this is a major challenge for the country and its partners.

External intervention had a major impact on the post-war political process and yet local politics remained deeply problematic. This was because a legitimate body politic required more than the coercive power of external benefactors; it required proper mechanisms to address the demands of the society it served (Chandler, 2006). Even though political fractures were widely understood to have been an influencing factor in state failure and conflict, these were yet to be addressed. Democratisation was not consolidated yet expectations from democracy within the local populace were enormous.

The problem of 'democracy denied' is that crushed expectations lead to more tensions. Being able to vote freely and being promised mechanisms to hold representatives accountable was a most welcome departure from the politics of the past where citizens were mere pawns in elite contests for state resources. But in the outcome, citizens remained pawns.

Once state structures are in place, however, changes are costly and complex and risk destabilising the security environment. A faulty model is difficult to correct even if there is a will to do so. This reality emphasises the point of getting the structures right from the start.

Addressing the challenges for peace

Given this predicament, what is needed is fresh thinking on new strategies which might work within the existing framework so as to produce effective ways to bring the populace in. This is not the same as consulting on PRSPs, which evidence shows is not useful or effective. This means a re-conceptualisation of the nation state in Sierra Leone based on sound local knowledge and sound understandings of local need. This re-conceptualisation might involve, for example, moving resources to the provinces through committed and well informed decentralisation programming, and deliberating on possible alternative and nuanced models of local governance which could work better with traditional authority. Targeted investment in infrastructure, in public and private enterprise across the country, and using national wealth for national projects in a committed and unambiguous way. This may result in strides forward in terms of employment opportunities. It cannot be stressed strongly enough how employment is a central key for successful peacebuilding in Sierra Leone. Not only will it improve human development, give people something to do and a sense of self-worth, but it will also give them a genuine *stake in their government*. The informal sector is a lifeline for the majority of Sierra Leoneans yet paying taxes through formal sector employment means that governing elites are more pressured to look inwards for their accountability (Boyce and O'Donnell, 2007). There is a mutual interdependence between post-conflict economic policies and peacebuilding strategies because the state is expected to provide economic opportunities and other peace dividends, whether through state sponsored enterprises or support to the private sector, and the primary objective of post-war economic policy is to create meaningful and sustainable peace dividends (Wennmann, 2007, Collier, 2005).

Reflections on methodology

Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone was a huge and complex enterprise and this study focused on only a small, but very significant, part of that enterprise. The conclusions drawn from this limited focus are, however, justifiable because of the extraordinary degree of dependency of the Sierra Leone state on external intervention for recovery. The politics of peacebuilding – the macro-economic reforms and centrality of multiparty democracy – had clear implications and consequences for the trajectory of the peacebuilding mission and the shape of the new state.

The elite urban bias of the primary data limited the scope of the study to identify more nuanced understandings of peace and the impact of interventionist approaches. What would have enhanced the work would have been primary data collected in rural areas from amongst grass roots communities. It must be noted, however, that local communities are quite used to being surveyed on all manner of issues relating to the post-conflict recovery of their country – from government questionnaires, to individual researchers – and 'survey fatigue' is not uncommon. More beneficial would be an ethnographic study but the constraints of the research precluded this.

The design of the study proved to be appropriate as large amounts of primary and secondary documentary evidence was available for analysis, but the flexibility of the design to include interview and observation added richness and nuance to the analysis of the documentation. In particular, the evidential base emerging from interviews with civil society was very enlightening and supported the central thesis unequivocally. Again, data from the provinces would have been very beneficial to give a complementary account of perceptions away from the capital and also to seek out grass roots interpretations of 'civil society' within the broader citizenry.

Implications for theory

The 'liberal peace' as a useful or tangible framework for building peace was problematised from the beginning and the research findings support the proposal that this paradigm for reconstruction was somewhat illusory. The failures of the 'liberal peace' orthodoxy, so clearly disclosed in this study, raises profound questions about the 'universal translatability' of the liberal state and the feasibility of external interventions to construct peaceful liberal entities from the cataclysm of war, at least as far as local citizens are concerned. The purpose of the 'liberal peace' – to construct internationally recognised sovereign states – resulted in a negative peace for Sierra Leone; important in its own right, but not sufficient for longer term stability.

Some of these themes feature in the evolving literature on peacebuilding where authors have identified the struggle to define what 'local ownership' actually means. Where to start in the search for indigenous definitions of 'political order' or how to identify the rightful 'owners' of peacebuilding in complex societies, are deeply problematic challenges (Boege et al, 2009, Donais, 2009, Liden, 2009). These struggles, and others, appear so overwhelming that the absence of any theorising or viable alternatives leaves the 'liberal peace' orthodoxy void of any serious and pragmatic challenge to its hegemony. Nevertheless, new themes are emerging. Hauge, for example, argues that Latin America has developed an alternative model of peacebuilding by de-linking certain components of the 'liberal peace'; democratisation has been deepened where economic liberalism has been rejected in favour of regional collaboration to support trade. This demonstrates 'new ideas and hope… where the peacebuilding discourse [has] reached a point of fatigue and stagnation' (Hauge, 2009: 696). Chopra's research in the arid lands of Kenya

provides evidence of specific indigenous forms of justice for peacebuilding working as an effective substitute for the failures of security at state level, yet this empirical reality directly undermines the purpose of statebuilding as a proxy for peacebuilding as undertaken in international peace operations (Chopra, 2009). Here we see what might be identified as a legitimate local process for justice, culturally specific, but in direct contradiction to the stated aims of international statebuilding endeavours which include the rule of law as defined by international norms. This is a further dilemma for peace operations. Indigenous processes such as these weaken the central state, they do not strengthen it; a point taken up in detail by Boege et al in their engagement with the 'fragile states' discourse and commentary on potential spoilers (in terms of building strong states) among traditional authority structures (Beoge et al, 2009). Local ownership of peacebuilding may indeed be desirable for the sustainability of security and longer term peace in war-torn environs - but how much ownership, and with whom? This has prompted a call for 'politically hybridised' versions of peacebuilding involving perhaps an 'international social contract' to protect the welfare and human security of local citizens (Liden et al, 2009), or a 'post-liberal' peace which engages at the level of the 'every day' (Richmond, 2009c). In any event, there is a clear need to develop new ontologies and epistemologies of peace which could work better for local populations (Liden et al, 2009).

The challenge is enormous in its complexity. Therefore improved understandings of what peace means in culturally specific environs is an important starting point and this work has therefore made a useful contribution. Its implications for on-going peacebuilding research and policy design in this area are many. They include; how to align PRSPs with peacebuilding; how to bring people

into the political debate; how to identify legitimate local ownership – if not political elites and reconstituted 'civil society'; how to understand the real challenges for peacebuilding and include locals as potential arbiters of successful solutions, and a wider debate about the structural challenges and constraints for delivering a positive peace.

Implications for policy and future research

The issue of peacebuilding as statebuilding has been raised in policy circles. It has been recognised that this paradigm is problematic and, in some cases, it is inappropriate to make results and outcomes oriented poverty reduction programming the central framework for post-conflict engagement. To compensate for the tensions that emerged from this process, ten 'principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations' were constructed by policy-makers (OECD, 2007). These reflected, among other things, the new focus on state-society relations in statebuilding projects and the need to align priorities with those of local actors (OECD, 2008: 8). An emerging policy paper from DfID signalled their intention to merge peacebuilding and statebuilding – both 'highly complex political processes' – and target support to 'integrated' programming. This was because there was 'growing evidence' that poverty reduction and the MDGs were not going to be achieved in post-conflict or fragile states without addressing the underlying causes of conflict (DfID, 2009, Barnes, 2009). Elsewhere, recognition was given to the possibility that international objectives in the short term should focus on peacebuilding to lay good foundations for making progress against the MDGs in the longer term (DfID, 2009). At the time of writing the multi-stakeholder 'consultation' process, which claimed to monitor the implementation of the ten principles, was underway in Sierra Leone with a report due to be published in late 2009.

It was clear from the documentation that the new principles for international engagement in fragile states were to support existing dialogues, not to create new ones. The liberal peace orthodoxy remains strong despite its contradictions and its critics (Pugh, 2005), and despite the empirical evidence from Sierra Leone which shows that the paradigm was not very helpful vis-à-vis local challenges for peace.

There is scope for further research into effective long term peacebuilding mechanisms and the optimum shape of the state for continued stability in Sierra Leone, and elsewhere. In particular, research is required into the effects of the political economy of peacebuilding on the creation of new livelihood opportunities for local people. Investigations into decentralisation models and nuanced alternative programming would be a useful addition to the literature as would enquiries into the relative merits of traditional and modern judicial mechanisms in terms of holding government officials, at all levels, to account and strengthening the grass roots voice. A new interpretation of civil society, which complements the local realities and engages with the wider citizenry – market women, young farmers, mineworkers, transport workers – would help identify alternative sites of state/society dialogue, and a full investigation into the most optimum role for traditional chiefs in the modern political process is an imperative. Finally, the regional dynamic cannot be ignored when considering stability in Sierra Leone; a wider regional study of transitions in Liberia and Guinea would help to determine the threat of external forces on the fragile peace in Sierra Leone.

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APPENDIX 1

LIST OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS – ALL BASED IN FREETOWN

50/50 Group

Campaign for Good Governance

Church Council of Sierra Leone

Civil Society Alternative Process of Sierra Leone

Civil Society Movement

Drivers' and General Workers' Union

ENCISS

Forum for Democratic Initiatives

IPAM Student's Union

Search for Common Ground

Sierra Leone Association of Journalists

Sierra Leone Bar Association

Sierra Leone Market Women's Association

Talking Drum Studio

Women's Forum

APPENDIX 2

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS

Semi-structured interviews based around the following questions:

1. What does your organisation do to support local people?
2. Have you had funding or other assistance from external donors with regard to your activities?
3. (If so) Do you feel your objectives have been achieved with the help of donor funding?
4. Are donor objectives similar to yours?
5. How do you attract funding and are any of your proposals rejected?
6. Do donors consult with you when planning programming in your area of work?
7. How does donor support affect your relationship with other civil society organisations?
8. What do you achieve without funding?
9. What would you change with regard to democracy assistance programming and the relationship you have with donors to achieve your objectives?
10. How does donor aid alter the relationship between civil society and the state?

APPENDIX 3

THE LOMÉ PEACE ACCORD

The Lomé Agreement

PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF SIERRA LEONE AND THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE and THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE (RUF)

Having met in Lomé, Togo, from the 25 May 1999, to 7 July 1999 under the auspices of the Current Chairman of ECOWAS, President Gnassingbe Eyadéma;

Recalling earlier initiatives undertaken by the countries of the sub-region and the International Community, aimed at bringing about a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Sierra Leone, and culminating in the Abidjan Peace Agreement of 30 November, 1996 and the ECOWAS Peace Plan of 23 October, 1997;

Moved by the imperative need to meet the desire of the people of Sierra Leone for a definitive settlement of the fratricidal war in their country and for genuine national unity and reconciliation;

Committed to promoting full respect for human rights and humanitarian law;

Committed to promoting popular participation in the governance of the country and the advancement of democracy in a socio-political framework free of inequality, nepotism and corruption;

Concerned with the socio-economic well being of all the people of Sierra Leone;

Determined to foster mutual trust and confidence between themselves;

Determined to establish sustainable peace and security; to pledge forthwith, to settle all past, present and future differences and grievances by peaceful means; and to refrain from the threat and use of armed force to bring about any change in Sierra Leone;

Reaffirming the conviction that sovereignty belongs to the people, and that Government derives all its powers, authority and legitimacy from the people;

recognizing the imperative that the children of Sierra Leone, especially those affected by armed conflict, in view of their vulnerability, are entitled to special care and the protection of their inherent right to life, survival and development, in accordance with the provisions of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child;

Guided by the Declaration in the Final Communique of the Meeting in Lomé of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of ECOWAS of 25 May 1999, in which they stressed the importance of democracy as a factor of regional peace and security, and as essential to the socio-economic development of ECOWAS Member States; and in which they pledged their commitment to the consolidation of democracy and respect of human rights while reaffirming the need for all Member States to consolidate their democratic base, observe the principles of good governance and good economic management in order to ensure the emergence and development of a democratic culture which takes into account the interests of the peoples of West Africa;

Recommitting themselves to the total observance and compliance with the Ceasefire Agreement signed in Lomé on 18 May 1999, and appended as Annex 1 until the signing of the present Peace Agreement;

HEREBY AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

PART ONE

CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

ARTICLE 1

CEASEFIRE

The armed conflict between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF is hereby ended with immediate effect. Accordingly, the two sides shall ensure that a total and permanent cessation of hostilities is observed forthwith.

ARTICLE II

CEASEFIRE MONITORING

1. A Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (hereinafter termed the CMC) to be chaired by the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (hereinafter termed UNOMSIL) with representatives of the Government of Sierra Leone, RUF, the Civil Defence Forces (hereinafter termed the CDF) and ECOMOG shall be established at provincial and district levels with immediate effect to monitor, verify and report all violations of the ceasefire.

2. A Joint Monitoring Commission (hereinafter termed the JMC) shall be established at the national level to be chaired by UNOMSIL with representatives of the Government of Sierra Leone, RUF, CDF, and ECOMOG. The JMC shall receive, investigate and take appropriate action on reports of violations of the ceasefire from the CMC. The parties agree to the definition of ceasefire violations as contained in Annex 2 which constitutes an integral part of the present Agreement.

3. The parties shall seek the assistance of the International Community in providing funds and other logistics to enable the JMC to carry out its mandate.

PART TWO

GOVERNANCE

The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF, recognizing the right of the people of Sierra Leone to live in peace, and desirous of finding a transitional mechanism to incorporate the RUF into governance within the spirit and letter of the Constitution, agree to the following formulas for structuring the government for the duration of the period before the next elections, as prescribed by the Constitution, managing scarce public resources for the benefit of the development of the people of Sierra Leone and sharing the responsibility of implementing the peace. Each of these formulas (not in priority order) is contained in a separate Article of this Part of the present Agreement; and may be further detailed in protocols annexed to it.

Article III Transformation of the RUF into a Political Party

Article IV Enabling Members of the RUF to Hold Public Office

Article V Enabling the RUF to Join a Broad-Based Government of National Unity Through Cabinet Appointment

Article VI Commission for the Consolidation of Peace

Article VII Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development

Article VIII Council of Elders and Religious Leaders.

ARTICLE III

TRANSFORMATION OF THE RUF INTO A POLITICAL PARTY

1. The Government of Sierra Leone shall accord every facility to the RUF to transform itself into a political party and enter the mainstream of the democratic process. To that end:

2. Immediately upon the signing of the present Agreement, the RUF shall commence to organize itself to function as a political movement, with the rights, privileges and duties accorded to all political parties in Sierra Leone. These include the freedom to publish, unhindered access to the media, freedom of association, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and the right to mobilize and associate freely.

3. Within a period of thirty days, following the signing of the present Agreement, the necessary legal steps shall be taken by the Government of Sierra Leone to enable the RUF to register as a political party.

4. The Parties shall approach the International Community with a view to mobilizing resources for the purposes of enabling the RUF to function as a political party. These resources may include but shall not be limited to:

(i) Setting up a trust fund;

(ii) Training for RUF membership in party organization and functions; and

(iii) Providing any other assistance necessary for achieving the goals of this section.

ARTICLE IV

ENABLING MEMBERS OF THE RUF TO HOLD PUBLIC OFFICE

1. The Government of Sierra Leone shall take the necessary steps to enable those RUF members nominated by the RUF to hold public office, within the time-frames agreed and contained in the present Agreement for the integration of the various bodies named herein.

2. Accordingly, necessary legal steps shall be taken by the Government of Sierra Leone, within a period of fourteen days following the signing of the present Agreement, to amend relevant laws and regulations that may constitute an impediment or bar to RUF and AFRC personnel holding public office.

3. Within seven days of the removal of any such legal impediments, both parties shall meet to discuss and agree on the appointment of RUF members to positions in parastatals, diplomacy and any other public sector.

ARTICLE V

ENABLING THE RUF TO JOIN A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY THROUGH CABINET APPOINTMENTS

1. The Government of Sierra Leone shall accord every opportunity to the RUF to join a broad-based government of national unity through cabinet appointments. To that end:

2. The Chairmanship of the Board of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD) as provided for in Article VII of the present Agreement shall be offered to the leader of the RUF, Corporal Foday Sankoh. For this purpose he shall enjoy the status of Vice President and shall therefore be answerable only to the President of Sierra Leone.

3. The Government of Sierra Leone shall give ministerial positions to the RUF in a moderately expanded cabinet of 18, bearing in mind that the interests of other political parties and civil society organizations should also be taken into account, as follows:

(i) One of the senior cabinet appointments such as finance, foreign affairs and justice;

(ii) Three other cabinet positions.

4. In addition, the Government of Sierra Leone shall, in the same spirit, make available to the RUF the following senior government positions: Four posts of Deputy Minister.

5. Within a period of fourteen days following the signing of the present Agreement, the necessary steps shall be taken by the Government of Sierra Leone to remove any legal impediments that may prevent RUF members from holding cabinet and other positions.

ARTICLE VI

COMMISSION FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE

1. A Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (hereinafter termed the CCP), shall be established within two weeks of the signing of the present Agreement to implement a post-conflict programme that ensures reconciliation and the welfare of all parties to the conflict, especially the victims of war. The CCP shall have the overall goal and responsibility for supervising and monitoring the implementation of and compliance with the provisions of the present Agreement relative to the promotion of national reconciliation and the consolidation of peace.

2. The CCP shall ensure that all structures for national reconciliation and the consolidation of peace already in existence and those provided for in the present Agreement are operational and given the necessary resources for realizing their respective mandates. These structures shall comprise:

(i) the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development;

(ii) the Joint Monitoring Commission;

(iii) the Provincial and District Ceasefire Monitoring Committees;

(iv) the Committee for the Release of Prisoners of War and Non-Combatants;

(v) the Committee for Humanitarian Assistance;

(vi) the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration;

(vii) the National Commission for Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction;

(viii) the Human Rights Commission; and

(ix) the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

3. The CCP shall have the right to inspect any activity or site connected with the implementation of the present Agreement.

4. The CCP shall have full powers to organize its work in any manner it deems appropriate and to appoint any group or sub-committee which it deems necessary in the discharge of its functions.

5. The Commission shall be composed of the following members:

(i) Two representatives of the civil society;

(ii) One representative each named by the Government, the RUF and the Parliament.

6. The CCP shall have its own offices, adequate communication facilities and secretarial support staff.

7. Recommendations for improvements or modifications shall be made to the President of sierra Leone for appropriate action. Likewise, failures of the structures to perform their assigned duties shall also be brought to the attention of the President.

8. Disputes arising out of the preceding paragraph shall be brought to the Council of Elders and Religious Leaders for resolution, as specified in Article VIII of the present Agreement.

9. Should Protocols be needed in furtherance of any provision in the present Agreement, the CCP shall have the responsibility for their preparation.

10. The mandate of the CCP shall terminate at the end of the next general elections.

ARTICLE VII

COMMISSION FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF STRATEGIC RESOURCES, NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

1. Given the emergency situation facing the country, the parties agree that the Government shall exercise full control over the exploitation of gold, diamonds and other resources, for the benefit of the people of Sierra Leone. Accordingly, a Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (hereinafter termed the CMRRD) shall be established and charged with the responsibility of securing and monitoring the legitimate exploitation of Sierra Leones gold and diamonds, and other resources that are determined to be of strategic importance for national security and welfare as well as cater for post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction, as provided for under Article XXVIII of the present Agreement.

2. The Government shall take the necessary legal action within a period not exceeding two weeks from the signing of the present Agreement to the effect that all exploitation, sale, export, or any other transaction of gold and diamonds shall be forbidden except those sanctioned by the CMRRD. All previous concessions shall be null and void.

3. The CMRRD shall authorize licensing of artisanal production of diamonds and gold, in accordance with prevailing laws and regulations. All gold and diamonds extracted or otherwise sources from any Sierra Leonean territory shall be sold to the Government.

4. The CMRRD shall ensure, through the appropriate authorities, the security of the areas covered under this Article, and shall take all necessary measures against unauthorized exploitation.

5. For the export or local resale of gold and diamonds by the Government, the CMRRD shall authorize a buying and selling agreement with one or more reputable international and specialized mineral companies. All exports of Sierra Leonean gold and diamonds shall be transacted by the Government, under these agreements.

6. The proceeds from the transactions of gold and diamonds shall be public monies which shall enter a special Treasury account to be spent exclusively on the development of the people of Sierra Leone, with appropriations for public education, public health, infrastructural development, and compensation for incapacitated war victims as well as post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction. Priority spending shall go to rural areas.

7. The Government shall, if necessary, seek the assistance and cooperation of other governments and their instruments of law enforcement to detect and facilitate the prosecution of violations of this Article.

8. The management of other natural resources shall be reviewed by the CMRRD to determine if their regulation is a matter of national security and welfare, and recommend appropriate policy to the Government.

9. The functions of the Ministry of Mines shall continued to be carried out by the current authorized ministry. However, in respect of strategic mineral resources, the CMRRD shall be an autonomous body in carrying out its duties concerning the regulation of Sierra Leones strategic natural resources.

10. All agreements and transactions referred to in this Article shall be subject to full public disclosure and records of all correspondence, negotiations, business transactions and any other matters related to exploitation, management, local or international marketing, and any other matter shall be public documents.

11. The Commission shall issue monthly reports, including the details of all the transactions related to gold and diamonds, and other licenses or concessions of natural resources, and its own administrative costs.

12. The Commission shall be governed by a Board whose Chairmanship shall be offered to the Leader of the RUF, Corporal Foday Sankoh. The Board shall also comprise:

(i) Two representatives of the Government appointed by the President;

(ii) Two representatives of the political party to be formed by the RUF;

(iii) Three representatives of the civil society; and

(iv) Two representatives of other political parties appointed by Parliament.

13. The Government shall take the required administrative actions to implement the commitments made in the present Agreement; and in the case of enabling legislation, it shall draft and submit to

Parliament within thirty days of the signature of the present Agreement, the relevant bills for their enactment into law.

14. The Government commits itself to propose and support an amendment to the Constitution to make the exploitation of gold and diamonds the legitimate domain of the people of Sierra Leone, and to determine that the proceeds be used for the development of Sierra Leone, particularly public education, public health, infrastructure development, and compensation of incapacitated war victims as well as post-war reconstruction and development.

ARTICLE VIII

COUNCIL OF ELDERS AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS

1. The signatories agree to refer any conflicting differences of interpretation of this Article or any other Article of the present Agreement or its protocols, to a Council of Elders and Religious Leaders comprised as follows:

(i) Two members appointed by the Inter-Religious Council;

(ii) One member each appointed by the Government and the RUF; and

(iii) One member appointed by ECOWAS.

2. The Council shall designate its own chairperson from among its members. All of its decision shall be taken by the concurrence of at least four members, and shall be binding and public, provided that an aggrieved party may appeal to the Supreme Court.

PART THREE

OTHER POLITICAL ISSUES

The Part of the present Agreement Consists of the following Articles

Article IX Pardon and Amnesty

Article X Review of the Present Constitution

Article XI Elections

Article XII National Electoral Commission

ARTICLE IX

PARDON AND AMNESTY

1. In order to bring lasting peace to Sierra Leone, the Government of Sierra Leone shall take appropriate legal steps to grant Corporal Foday Sankoh absolute and free pardon.

2. After the signing of the present Agreement, the Government of Sierra Leone shall also grant absolute and free pardon and reprieve to all combatants and collaborators in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives, up to the time of the signing of the present Agreement.

3. To consolidate the peace and promote the cause of national reconciliation, the Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure that no official or judicial action is taken against any member of the RUF, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA or CDF in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of those organizations, since March 1991, up to the time of the signing of the present Agreement. In addition, legislative and other measures necessary to guarantee immunity to former combatants, exiles and other persons, currently outside the country for reasons related to the armed conflict shall be adopted ensuring the full exercise of their civil and political rights, with a view to their reintegration within a framework of full legality.

ARTICLE X

REVIEW OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION

In order to ensure that the Constitution of Sierra Leone represents the needs and aspirations of the people of Sierra Leone and that no constitutional or any other legal provision prevents the implementation of the present Agreement, the Government of Sierra Leone shall take the necessary steps to establish a Constitutional Review Committee to review the provisions of the present Constitution, and where deemed appropriate, recommend revisions and amendments, in accordance with Part V, Section 108 of the Constitution of 1991.

ARTICLE XI

DATE OF NEXT ELECTIONS

The next national elections in Sierra Leone shall beheld in accordance with the present Constitution of Sierra Leone.

ARTICLE XII

NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION

1. A new independent National Electoral Commission (hereinafter termed the NEC) shall be set up by the Government, not later than three months after the signing of the present Agreement.

2. In setting up the new NEC the President shall consult all political parties, including the RUF, to determine the membership and terms of reference of the Commission, paying particular attention to the need for a level playing field in the nations elections.

3. No member of the NEC shall be eligible for appointment to political office by any government formed as a result of an election he or she was mandated to conduct.

4. The NEC shall request the assistance of the International Community, including the UN, the OAU, ECOWAS and the Commonwealth of Nations, in monitoring the next presidential and parliamentary elections in Sierra Leone.

PART FOUR

POST-CONFLICT MILITARY AND SECURITY ISSUES

1. The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF, recognizing that the maintenance of peace and security is of paramount importance for the achievement of lasting peace in Sierra Leone and for the welfare of its people, have agreed to the following formulas for dealing with post-conflict military and security matters. Each of these formulas (not in priority order) is contained in separate Articles of this Part of the present Agreement and may be further detailed in protocols annexed to the Agreement.

Article XIII Transformation and New Mandate of ECOMOG

Article XIV New Mandate of UNOMSIL

Article XV Security Guarantees for Peace Monitors

Article XVI Encampment, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

Article XVII Restructuring and Training of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces

Article XVIII Withdrawal of Mercenaries

Article XIX Notification to Joint Monitoring Commission

Article Notification to Military Commands.

ARTICLE XIII

TRANSFORMATION AND NEW MANDATE OF ECOMOG

1. Immediately upon the signing of the present Agreement, the parties shall request ECOWAS to revise the mandate of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone as follows:

(i) Peacekeeping;

(ii) Security of the State of Sierra Leone;

i. Protection of UNOMSIL.

i. Protection of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration personnel.

2. The Government shall, immediately upon the signing of the present Agreement, request ECOWAS for troop contributions from at least two additional countries. The additional contingents shall be

deployed not later than 30 days from the date of signature of the present Agreement. The Security Council shall be requested to provide assistance in support of ECOMOG.

3. The Parties agree to develop a timetable for the phased withdrawal of ECOMOG, including measures for securing all of the territory of Sierra Leone by the restructured armed forces. The phased withdrawal of ECOMOG will be linked to the phased creation and deployment of the restructured armed forces.

ARTICLE XIV

NEW MANDATE OF UNOMSIL

1. The UN Security Council is requested to amend the mandate of UNOMSIL to enable it to undertake the various provisions outlined in the present Agreement.

ARTICLE XV

SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR PEACE MONITORS

1. The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF agree to guarantee the safety, security and freedom of movement of UNOMSIL Military Observers throughout Sierra Leone. This guarantee shall be monitored by the Joint Monitoring Commission.

2. The freedom of movement includes complete and unhindered access for UNOMSIL Military Observers in the conduct of their duties throughout Sierra Leone. Before and during the process of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, officers and escorts to be provided by both Parties shall be required to facilitate this access.

3. Such freedom of movement and security shall also be accorded to non-military UNOMSIL personnel such as Human Rights Officers in the conduct of their duties. These personnel shall, in most cases, be accompanied by UNOMSIL Military Observers.

4. The provision of security to be extended shall include United Nations aircraft, vehicles and other property.

ARTICLE XVI

ENCAMPMENT, DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION

1. A neutral peacekeeping force comprising UNOMSIL and ECOMOG shall disarm all combatants of the RUF, CDF, SLA and paramilitary groups. The encampment, disarmament and demobilization process shall commence within six weeks of the signing of the present Agreement in line with the deployment of the neutral peacekeeping force.

2. The present SLA shall be restricted to the barracks and their arms in the armoury and their ammunitions in the magazines and placed under constant surveillance by the neutral peacekeeping force during the process of disarmament and demobilization.

3. UNOMSIL shall be present in all disarmament and demobilization locations to monitor the process and provide security guarantees to all ex-combatants.

4. Upon the signing of the present Agreement, the Government of Sierra Leone shall immediately request the International Community to assist with the provision of the necessary financial and technical resources needed for the adaptation and extension of the existing Encampment, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme in Sierra Leone, including payment of retirement benefits and other emoluments due to former members of the SLA.

ARTICLE XVII

RESTRUCTURING AND TRAINING OF THE SIERRA LEONE ARMED FORCES

1. The restructuring, composition and training of the new Sierra Leone armed forces will be carried out by the Government with a view to creating truly national armed forces, bearing loyalty solely to the State of Sierra Leone, and able and willing to perform their constitutional role.

2. Those ex-combatants of the RUF, CDF and SLA who wish to be integrated into the new restructured national armed forces may do so provided they meet established criteria.

3. Recruitment into the armed forces shall reflect the geo-political structure of Sierra Leone within the established strength.

ARTICLE XVIII

WITHDRAWAL OF MERCENARIES

All mercenaries, in any guise, shall be withdrawn from Sierra Leone immediately upon the signing of the present Agreement. Their withdrawal shall be supervised by the Joint Monitoring Commission.

ARTICLE XIX

NOTIFICATION TO JOINT MONITORING COMMISSION

Immediately upon the establishment of the JMC provided for in Article II of the present Agreement, each party shall furnish to the JMC information regarding the strength and locations of all combatants as well as the positions and descriptions of all known unexploded bombs (UXBs), explosive ordnance devices (EODs), minefields, booby traps, wire entanglements, and all other physical or military hazards. The JMC shall seek all necessary technical assistance in mine clearance and the disposal or destruction of similar devices and weapons under the operational control of the neutral peacekeeping force. The parties shall keep the JMC updated on changes in this information so that it can notify the public as needed, to prevent injuries.

ARTICLE XX

NOTIFICATION TO MILITARY COMMANDS

Each party shall ensure that the terms of the present Agreement, and written orders requiring compliance, are immediately communicated to all of its forces.

PART FIVE

HUMANITARIAN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC ISSUES

1. The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF\SL recognizing the importance of upholding, promoting and protecting the human rights of every Sierra Leonean as well as the enforcement of humanitarian law, agree to the following formulas for the achievement of these laudable objectives. Each of these formulas (not in priority order) is contained in separate Articles of this Part of the present Agreement

Article XXI Release of Prisoners and Abductees

Article XXII Refugees and Displaced Persons

Article XXIII Guarantee of the Security of Displaced Persons and Refugees

Article XXIV Guarantee and Promotion of Human Rights

Article XXV Human Rights Commission

Article XXVI Human Rights Violations

Article XXVII Humanitarian Relief

Article XXVIII Post War Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

Article XXIX Special Fund for War Victims

Article XXX Child Combatants

Article XXXI Education and Health

ARTICLE XXI

RELEASE OF PRISONERS AND ABDUCTEES

All political prisoners of war as well as all non-combatants shall be released immediately and unconditionally by both parties, in accordance with the Statement of June 2, 1999, which is contained in Annex 3 and constitutes an integral part of the present Agreement.

ARTICLE XXII

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

The Parties through the National Commission for Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction agree to seek funding from and the involvement of the UN and other agencies, including friendly countries, in order to design and implement a plan for voluntary repatriation and reintegration of Sierra Leonean refugees and internally displaced persons, including non-combatants, in conformity with international conventions, norms and practices.

ARTICLE XXIII

GUARANTEE OF THE SECURITY OF DISPLACED PERSONS AND REFUGEES

As a reaffirmation of their commitment to the observation of the conventions and principles of human rights and the status of refugees, the Parties shall take effective and appropriate measures to ensure that the right of Sierra Leoneans to asylum is fully respected and that no camps or dwellings of refugees or displaced persons are violated.

ARTICLE XXIV

GUARANTEE AND PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

1. The basic civil and political liberties recognized by the Sierra Leone legal system and contained in the declarations and principles of Human Rights adopted by the UN and OAU, especially the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, shall be fully protected and promoted within Sierra Leonean society.

2. These include the right to life and liberty, freedom from torture, the right to a fair trial, freedom of conscience, expression and association, and the right to take part in the governance of ones country.

ARTICLE XXV

HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

1. The Parties pledge to strengthen the existing machinery for addressing grievances of the people in respect of alleged violations of their basic human rights by the creation, as a matter of urgency and not later than 90 days after the signing of the present Agreement, of an autonomous quasi-judicial national Human Rights Commission.

2. The Parties further pledge to promote Human Rights education throughout the various sectors of Sierra Leonean society, including the schools, the media, the police, the military and the religious community.

3. In pursuance of the above, technical and material assistance may be sought from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights and other relevant international organizations.

4. A consortium of local human rights and civil society groups in Sierra Leone shall be encouraged to help monitor human rights observance.

ARTICLE XXVI

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

1. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission shall be established to address impunity, break the cycle of violence, provide a forum for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their story, get a clear picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation.

2. In the spirit of national reconciliation, the Commission shall deal with the question of human rights violations since the beginning of the Sierra Leonean conflict in 1991.

This Commission shall, among other things, recommend measures to be taken for the rehabilitation of victims of human rights violations.

3. Membership of the Commission shall be drawn from a cross-section of Sierra Leonean society with the participation and some technical support of the International Community. This Commission shall be established within 90 days after the signing of the present Agreement and shall, not later than 12 months after the commencement of its work, submit its report to the Government for immediate implementation of its recommendations.

ARTICLE XXVII

HUMANITARIAN RELIEF

1. The Parties reaffirm their commitment to their Statement on the Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance in Sierra Leone of June 3, 1999 which is contained in Annex 4 and constitutes an integral part of the present Agreement. To this end, the Government shall request appropriate international humanitarian assistance for the people of Sierra Leone who are in need all over the country.

2. The Parties agree to guarantee safe and unhindered access by all humanitarian organizations throughout the country in order to facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance, in accordance with international conventions, principles and norms which govern humanitarian operations. In this respect, the parties agree to guarantee the security of the presence and movement of humanitarian personnel.

3. The Parties also agree to guarantee the security of all properties and goods transported, stocked or distributed by humanitarian organizations, as well as the security of their projects and beneficiaries.

4. The Government shall set up at various levels throughout the country, the appropriate and effective administrative or security bodies which will monitor and facilitate the implementation of these guarantees of safety for the personnel, goods and areas of operation of the humanitarian organizations.

ARTICLE XXVIII

POST-WAR REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

1. The Government, through the National Commission for Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction and with the support of the International Community, shall provide appropriate financial and technical resources for post-war rehabilitation, reconstruction and development.

2. Given that women have been particularly victimized during the war, special attention shall be accorded to their needs and potentials in formulating and implementing national rehabilitation, reconstruction and development programmes, to enable them to play a central role in the moral, social and physical reconstruction of Sierra Leone.

ARTICLE XXIX

SPECIAL FUND FOR WAR VICTIMS

The Government, with the support of the International Community, shall design and implement a programme for the rehabilitation of war victims. For this purpose, a special fund shall be set up.

ARTICLE XXX

CHILD COMBATANTS

The Government shall accord particular attention to the issue of child soldiers. It shall, accordingly, mobilize resources, both within the country and from the International Community, and especially through the Office of the UN Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict, UNICEF and other agencies, to address the special needs of these children in the existing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes.

ARTICLE XXXI

EDUCATION AND HEALTH

The Government shall provide free compulsory education for the first nine years of schooling (Basic Education) and shall endeavour to provide free schooling for a further three years. The Government shall also endeavour to provide affordable primary health care throughout the country.

PART SIX

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT

ARTICLE XXXII

JOINT IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE

A Joint Implementation Committee consisting of members of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP) and the Committee of Seven on Sierra Leone, as well as the Moral Guarantors,

provided for in Article XXXIV of the present Agreement and other international supporters shall be established. Under the chairmanship of ECOWAS, the Joint Implementation Committee shall be responsible for reviewing and assessing the state of implementation of the Agreement, and shall meet at least once every three months. Without prejudice to the functions of the Commission for

the Consolidation of Peace as provided for in Article VI, the Joint Implementation Committee shall make recommendations deemed necessary to ensure effective implementation of the present Agreement according to the Schedule of Implementation, which appears as Annex 5.

ARTICLE XXXIII

REQUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT

The parties request that the provisions of the present Agreement affecting the United Nations shall enter into force upon the adoption by the UN Security Council of a resolution responding affirmatively to the request made in this Agreement. Likewise, the decision-making bodies of the other international organizations concerned are requested to take similar action, where appropriate.

PART SEVEN

MORAL GUARANTORS AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

ARTICLE XXXIV

MORAL GUARANTORS

The Government of the Togolese Republic, the United Nations, the OAU, ECOWAS and the Commonwealth of Nations shall stand as Moral Guarantors that this Peace Agreement is implemented with integrity and in good faith by both parties.

ARTICLE XXXV

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

Both parties call on the International Community to assist them in implementing the present Agreement with integrity and good faith. The international organizations mentioned in Article XXXIV and the Governments of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mali, Nigeria, Togo, the United Kingdom and the United States of America are facilitating and supporting the conclusion of this Agreement. These States and organizations believe that this Agreement must protect the paramount interests of the people of Sierra Leone in peace and security.

PART EIGHT

FINAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE XXXVI

REGISTRATION AND PUBLICATION

The Sierra Leone Government shall register the signed Agreement not later than 15 days from the date of the signing of this Agreement. The signed Agreement shall also be published in the Sierra Leone Gazette not later than 48 (forty-eight) hours after the date of registration of this Agreement. This Agreement shall be laid before the Parliament of Sierra Leone not later than 21 (twenty-one) days after the signing of this Agreement.

ARTICLE XXXVII

ENTRY INTO FORCE

The present Agreement shall enter into force immediately upon its signing by the Parties.

Done in Lomé this seven day of the month of July 1999 in twelve (12) original texts in English and French, each text being equally authentic.

Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah
President of the Republic of Sierra Leone

Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh
Leader of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone

His Excellency Gnassingbé Eyadéma
President of the Togolese Republic Chairman of ECOWAS

His Excellency Blaise Compaore
President of Burkina Faso

His Excellency Dahkpanah Dr. Charles Ghankey Taylor
President of the Republic of Liberia

His Excellency Olusegun Obasanjo
President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria

His Excellency Youssoufou Bamba
Secretary of State at the Foreign Mission in charge of International Cooperation of Cote d'Ivoire

His Excellency Victor Gbeho
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Ghana

Mr. Roger Laloupo
Representative of the ECOWAS Special Representative

Ambassador Francis G. Okelo
Executive Secretary of the United Nations

Secretary General Ms. Adwoa Coleman
Representative organization of African Unity

Dr. Moses K.Z. Anafu
Representative of the Commonwealth of Nations

ANNEX 1

AGREEMENT ON CEASEFIRE IN SIERRA LEONE

President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah and Rev. Jesse Jackson met on 18 May 1999 with Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh, under the auspices of President Gnassingbé Eyadéma. At that meeting, the question of the peace process for Sierra Leone was discussed.

The Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF),

– Desirous to promote the ongoing dialogue process with a view to establishing durable peace and stability in Sierra Leone; and

– Wishing to create an appropriate atmosphere conducive to the holding of peace talks in Lomé, which began with the RUF internal consultations to be followed by dialogue between the Government and the RUF;

– Have jointly decided to:

1. Agree to ceasefire as from 24 May 1999, the day that President Eyadéma invited Foreign Ministers of ECOWAS to discuss problems pertaining to Sierra Leone. It was further agreed that the dialogue between the Government of Sierra Leone and RUF would commence on 25 May 1999;

2. Maintain their present and respective positions in Sierra Leone as of the 24th of May 1999; and refrain from any hostile or aggressive act which could undermine the peace process;

3. Commit to start negotiations in good faith, involving all relevant parties in the discussions, not later than May 25 in Lomé;

4. Guarantee safe and unhindered access by humanitarian organizations to all people in need; establish safe corridors for the provision of food and medical supplies to ECOMOG soldiers behind RUF lines, and to RUF combatants behind ECOMOG lines;

5. Immediate release of all prisoners of war and non-combatants;

6. Request the United Nations, subject to the Security Councils authorisation, to deploy military observers as soon as possible to observe compliance by the Government forces (ECOMOG and Civil Defence Forces) and the RUF, including former AFRC forces, with this ceasefire agreement.

This agreement is without prejudice to any other agreement or additional protocols which may be discussed during the dialogue between the Government and the RUF.

Signed in Lomé (Togo) 18 May 1999, in six (6) originals in English and French

For the Government of Sierra Leone

Dr. Alhadji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah
President Of The Republic Of Sierra Leone

For the Revolutionary United Front Of Sierra Leone

Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh
Leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)

WITNESSED BY:

For the Government of Togo and Current Chairman of ECOWAS

Gnassingbé Eyadéma
President of the Republic of Togo

For the United Nations

Francis G. Okelo
Special Representative of the Secretary General

For the organization of African Unity (OAU)

Adwoa Coleman
Representative of the organization of African Unity

US Presidential Special Envoy for the Promotion of Democracy in Africa

Rev. Jesse Jackson

ANNEX 2

DEFINITION OF CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS

1. In accordance with Article II of the present Agreement, both parties agree that the following constitute ceasefire violations and a breach of the Ceasefire Agreement:

a. The use of weapons of any kind in any circumstance including: –

(i) Automatic and semi-automatic rifles, pistols, machine guns and any other small arms weapon systems.

(ii) Heavy machine guns and any other heavy weapon systems.

(iii) Grenades and rocket-propelled grenade weapon systems.

(iv) Artillery, rockets, mortars and any other indirect fire weapon systems.

(v) All types of mine, explosive devices and improvised booby traps.

(vi) Air Defence weapon systems of any nature.

(vii) Any other weapon not included in the above paragraphs.

b. Troop movements of any nature outside of the areas recognized as being under the control of respective fighting forces without prior notification to the Ceasefire Monitoring Committee of any movements at least 48 hours in advance.

c. The movement of arms and ammunition. To be considered in the context of Security Council Resolution 1171 (1998).

d. Troop movements of any nature;

d. The construction and/or the improvement of defensive works and positions within respective areas of control, but outside a geographical boundary of 500m from existing similar positions.

f. Reconnaissance of any nature outside of respective areas of control.

g. Any other offensive or aggressive action.

2. Any training or other military activities not provided for in Articles XIII to XIX of the present Agreement, constitute a ceasefire violation.

3. In the event of a hostile external force threatening the territorial integrity or sovereignty of Sierra Leone, military action may be undertaken by the Sierra Leone Government.

ANNEX 3

STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SIERRA LEONE AND THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE ON THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND NON-COMBATANTS

The Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) have agreed to implement as soon as possible the provision of the Ceasefire Agreement which was signed on 18 May 1999 in Lomé, relating to the immediate release of prisoners of war and non-combatants.

Both sides reaffirmed the importance of the implementation of this provision in the interest of the furtherance of the talks.

They therefore decided that an appropriate Committee is established to handle the release of all prisoners of war and non-combatants.

Both the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone decided that such a Committee be established by the UN and chaired by the UN Chief Military Observer in Sierra Leone and comprising representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UNICEF and other relevant UN Agencies and NGOs.

This Committee should begin its work immediately by contacting both parties to the conflict with a view to effecting the immediate release of these prisoners of war and non-combatants.

Lomé – 2 June 1999

ANNEX 4

STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SIERRA LEONE AND THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE ON THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN SIERRA LEONE

The parties to the conflict in Sierra Leone meeting in Lomé Togo on 3rd June 1999 in the context of the Dialogue between the Government of Sierra Leone (GSL) and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF):

Reaffirm their respect for international convention, principles and norms, which govern the right of people to receive humanitarian assistance and the effective delivery of such assistance.

Reiterate their commitment to the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement signed by the two parties on 18th May 1999 in Lomé.

Aware of the fact that the protracted civil strife in Sierra Leone has created a situation whereby the vast majority of Sierra Leoneans in need of humanitarian assistance cannot be reached.

Hereby agree as follows:

1. That all duly registered humanitarian agencies shall be guaranteed safe and unhindered access to all areas under the control of the respective parties in order that humanitarian assistance can be delivered safely and effectively, in accordance with international conventions, principles and norms govern humanitarian operations.

2. In this respect the two parties shall:

a. guarantee safe access and facilitate the fielding of independent assessment missions by duly registered humanitarian agencies.

b. identify, in collaboration with the UN Humanitarian coordinator in Sierra Leone and UNOMSIL, mutually agreed routes (road, air and waterways) by which humanitarian goods and personnel shall be transported to the beneficiaries to provide needed assistance.

c. allow duly registered humanitarian agencies to deliver assistance according to needs established through independent assessments.

d. guarantee the security of all properties and of and goods transported, stocked or distributed by the duly registered humanitarian agencies, as well as the security of their project areas and beneficiaries.

3. The two parties undertake to establish with immediate effect, and not later than seven days, an Implementation Committee formed by appropriately designated and mandated representatives from the Government of Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, the Civil Society, the NGO community, and the UNOMSIL; and chaired by the United Nations Humanitarian coordinator, in co-ordination with the Special Representative of the Secretary General in Sierra Leone.

The Implementation Committee will be mandated to:

a. Ascertain and assess the security of proposed routes to be used by the humanitarian agencies, and disseminate information on routes to interested humanitarian agencies.

b. Receive and review complaints which may arise in the implementation of this arrangement, in order to re-establish full compliance.

4. The parties agree to set up at various levels in their areas of control, the appropriate and effective administrative and security bodies which will monitor and facilitate the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance in all approved points of delivery, and ensure the security of the personnel, goods and project areas of the humanitarian agencies as well as the safety of the beneficiaries.

Issued in Lomé

June 3 1999

ANNEX 5

DRAFT SCHEDULE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT

1. ACTIVITIES WITH SPECIFIC TIMING:

DAY 1

Signing of the Peace Agreement

Amnesty

Transformation and new mandate of ECOMOG

The Government to grant absolute and free pardon to the RUF leader Foday Sankoh through appropriate legal steps

Request to ECOWAS by the parties for revision of the mandate of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone

Request to the UN Security Council to amend the mandate of UNOMSIL to enable it to undertake the various provisions outlined in the present Agreement;

Request to the international community to provide substantial financial and logistical assistance to facilitate implementation of the Peace Agreement.

Request to ECOWAS by the parties for contributions of additional troops.

Transformation of the RUF into a political party.

RUF to commence to organize itself to function as a political party.

Encampment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR).

Request for international assistance in adapting and extending the existing DDR programme.

Withdrawal of mercenaries

Supervision by Joint Monitoring Commission

Notification to Joint Monitoring Commission Communication by the parties of positions and description of all known warlike devices/materials

Notification to Military Commands

Communication by the parties of written orders requiring compliance

DAY 15

Enabling members of the RUF to hold public office, and to join a broad-based Government of National Unity through Cabinet appointments

Removal by the Government of all legal impediments

Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP)

Creation of the Commission to implement a post-conflict reconciliation and welfare programme

Mandate of the Commission to terminate at the end of next general elections Jan–Feb 2001

Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD)

Ban on all exploitation, sale, export, or any transaction of gold and diamonds except those sanctioned by the CMRDD

DAY 22

Enabling members of the RUF to hold public office

Discussion and agreement between both parties on the appointment of RUF members to positions of parastatal, diplomacy and any other public sector for a period of fourteen days

DAY 31

Transformation of the RUF into a political party

Commission for the management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD)

Transformation, new mandate, and phased withdrawal of ECOMOG

Necessary legal steps by the Government for the registration of the RUF as a political party

Preparation and submission by Government to the Parliament of relevant bills for enabling legislation commitments made under the peace agreement

Deployment of troops from at least two additional countries

DAY 60

Completion of encampment, disarmament and demobilization

Restriction of SLA soldiers to the barracks and storage of their arms and ammunition under constant surveillance by the Neutral peacekeeping Force during the disarmament process

Monitoring of disarmament and demobilization by UNOMSIL

DAY 90

Human Rights Commission

Creation of an autonomous quasi judicial national Human Rights Commission

Request for technical and material assistance from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the African Commission on Human Rights and Peoples Rights and other relevant organizations

Creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission

Elections

Establishment of a new independent National Electoral Commission (NEC) in consultation with all political parties including the RUF

Request for financial and logistical support for the operations of the NEC

Request for assistance from the international community in monitoring the next presidential and parliamentary elections in Sierra Leone

DAY 456

Human Rights Violations

Submission by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of its report and recommendation to the Government for immediate implementation

II. ACTIVITIES WITHOUT SPECIFIC TIMING: (SHORT/MEDIUM/LONG TERM):

1. Ceasefire monitoring

(Ceasefire Agreement signed on 18 May 1999)

Establishment of a Ceasefire Monitoring Committee at provincial and district levels

Request for international assistance in providing funds and other logistics for the operations of the JMC

JMC already established and operational

2. Review of the present Constitution

Establishment of a Constitutional Review Committee

3. Mediation by the Council of Elders and Religious Leaders

Appointment of members of the Council by the Interreligious Council, the Government, the RUF and ECOWAS

4. Timetable for the phased withdrawal of ECOMOG

Formulation of the timetable in connection with the phased creation and deployment of the restructured Armed Forces

5. Security guarantees for peace monitors

Communication, in writing, of security guarantees to UN military observers

6. Restructuring and training of the SLA

Creation by the Government of truly national armed forces reflecting the geo-political structure of Sierra Leone within the established strength.